Section 1: Q1 2020 Outlook

 

Current Risks of a Reserve Currency Trap

The U.S. economy represents 33% of the global economy, but its spill-over effects on the rest of the world are amplified by the dominant role of the US dollar (USD) in international payments, debt issuance, and FX reserves.ⁱ

The trust and confidence that the world has in the ability of the United States to pay its debts have anointed the dollar as the most redeemable currency, facilitating world commerce. This has led to the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves throughout the global economy over the last 25 years.

As global asset allocators, our ETF Portfolio Models are exposed to foreign currency risk -primarily US dollars. Relative currency movement can be significant and have a positive or negative impact on investment returns. As with our approach to all asset classes, we want to participate on the upside and protect on the downside.

In the case of currency exposure, while we may be allocating specifically for downside protection in a non-Canadian asset class, i.e., the U.S., it may be the case that a weaker US dollar could diminish the benefit of the U.S. exposure. In these events, we apply a neutral hedge to the entire portfolio.

In this Q1 2020 Outlook, we take a look at the risks that exist of an unexpected shift in global central bank US dollar reserve balances.

The US dollar reserve status is based largely on the size and strength of the U.S. economy and the dominance of U.S. financial markets. Despite large deficit spending, trillions of dollars in foreign debt, and the printing of US dollars and US Treasury securities remain the safest store of money.

The dominance of the US dollar, reflected in its role as a global anchor for prices and interest rates, can force central banks to hold excessive USD-denominated foreign exchange reserves to match the significant USD exposure from trade and borrowing of the respective economy. The dominant role of the USD in credit and investment markets impacts investment flows to emerging economies by increasing volatility. Investment flows to emerging markets can reverse much faster than they have built up over time, making them act like very destructive pro-cyclical amplifiers in crisis situations. The role that oil prices play in the level of the USD is significant but may now be overshadowed by the sheer volume of dollar reserves that are now on the balance sheets of central banks around the globe.

 

A New Relationship Between Oil and the US Dollar

Considering the new dynamics of the global energy market, the United States has become the world’s marginal producer of oil products, and the US dollar has been seen to trade more like a petrodollar since 2015.

A barrel of oil is priced in US dollars across the world, so by definition, strength in the US dollar means it takes fewer greenbacks to buy a barrel of oil (all else equal) and weakness in the US dollar makes the price of oil appear higher in dollar terms. Each uptick and downtick in the dollar or in the price of the commodity generates an immediate realignment between the US dollar and numerous forex crosses. These movements are less correlated in nations without significant crude oil reserves, like Japan, and more correlated in nations that have significant reserves like Canada, Russia, and Brazil.

Many nations leveraged their crude oil reserves during the energy market’s historic rise between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, borrowing heavily to build infrastructure, expand military operations, and initiate social programs. Those bills came due after the 2008 economic collapse, where some countries deleveraged while others doubled down, borrowing more heavily against reserves to restore trust and trajectory to their wounded economies.

These heavier debt loads helped keep growth rates high until global crude oil prices collapsed in 2014, dumping commodity-sensitive nations into recessionary environments. Canada, Russia, Brazil, and other energy-rich countries have struggled since then.

Because the United States has historically been a net importer of oil products, rising oil prices meant that the United States’ current account deficit would rise as citizens and companies shipped more currency abroad. Due primarily to the success of horizontal drilling and fracking techniques, the U.S. shale revolution has dramatically increased domestic petroleum production. The United States became a net exporter of refined petroleum products in 2011 and has now become the third-largest producer of crude oil after Saudi Arabia and Russia.ⁱⁱⁱ According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States is currently about 90% self-sufficient in terms of total energy consumption.^iv Economically, this means that higher oil prices no longer lead to a higher U.S. deficit, and in fact, can decrease the deficit in certain situations.

 

Canada is an Important Net Exporter of Oil

When it comes to the US/Canadian dollar relationship, the USD/CAD exchange rate is determined by the demand and supply of Canadian and US dollars. The CAD has a high correlation to U.S. oil because of the large portion of CAD oil exports that are shipped to the United States.

Canada has the third largest volume of oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Canada’s economy is dependent on exports and is the fourth largest exporter of crude oil in the world.^v Approximately 96% of its exports go to the U.S., including over 3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day.^vi Canada and OPEC Countries represent the major sources of U.S. petroleum imports at 38% and 34% respectively. Because of the volume involved, it creates a huge amount of demand for Canadian dollars.

Due to the country’s status as a net exporter of oil, its currency in relation to the USD is highly correlated to oil prices, meaning that they move in similar directions to each other. Other factors can influence the USD/CAD exchange rate including the relative inflation rate, interest rates, balance trade, public debt, OPEC decisions, political stability, and economic performance.

 

 

The 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 oil slump, and correlation breaking down in 2018 are all notable events on the timeline. Despite the history of correlation between CAD and crude, the relationship appears to have broken down late 2018 when oil’s surge made the Canadian dollar decline. This divergence is due to factors such as OPEC policies being a key influencer of oil price rather than supply and demand factors, monetary policy, and Canada’s efforts to diversify its economy and lessen its reliance on oil.

 

A New Dominant Factor Driving Foreign Exchange Rates and the US Dollar: The Failed Clean-Up of the Financial Crisis

A benefit of crises and recessions is that they remove both unproductive firms and financial excess, creating space for more productive firms and fresh financial investment. This was not allowed to happen after the Recession of 2008 and is why the economic recovery from the crisis was so weak. More than ten years later, through FX reserves and through QE programs, central banks globally hold government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies.

The global financial crisis (GFC) was a massive failure of risk-hedging in the financial sector, combined with both regulatory failures and dangerous and deeply embedded incentives. While the extraordinary measures used to stop the crisis from mutating into a systemic meltdown can be considered appropriate, extending these measures through the past decade cannot.

The U.S. recapitalized, merged, and permitted the failure of some banks, but Europe chose the opposite approach resulting in undercapitalized and ailing banks surviving. However, the most impactful mistakes were made after the GFC on both sides of the Atlantic. Many central banks enacted zero or negative interest rate policies and started asset purchase Quantitative Easing (QE) programs run through the commercial banks. In the U.S., the Fed purchased securities from authorized Primary Dealer banks by crediting reserve balances to the Fed accounts associated with each dealer counterparty. These intermediary banks paid the sellers of bonds (households, funds, banks, etc.) and the Fed compensated the banks with reserves. In practice, the Fed forced excess reserves onto the balance sheets of banks far beyond levels they would have acquired independently. Because of the higher supply of reserves system-wide, their marginal benefit decreased, bidding-up the prices of various securities. This led the banks to issue additional and often riskier loans until the balance of the marginal benefits was restored. Also, because QE and low policy rates depressed long-term rates, many of the securities that the commercial banks held had no yield advantage over reserves, making the banks more likely to substitute less-liquid securities with more credit risk.

Using QE, central banks can buy various fixed income assets including government bonds, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, and in a few cases, equities (in the case of Japan, for example). However, the bulk of QE programs concern government bonds with the goal of curbing long-term interest rates across economies. Of the USD 11 trillion of QE programs, it is estimated that USD 9 trillion originate from central banks’ acquisitions of government bonds from the countries concerned.^vii

Despite increased diversification, the bulk of FX reserves are still held in government bonds issued in a select number of advanced economies including the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Approximately 70% of global reserves (ex-gold) are invested into the government bonds issued by these economies. This means that either through FX reserves or through QE programs, central banks hold around USD 18 trillion of government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies.^viii The total stock of government debt issued by these countries was around USD 40 trillion at the end of 2018.^ix This means that central banks currently hold nearly half of global ‘safe assets’, i.e., government bonds issued by leading advanced economies such as the U.S., Japan, European states, and a few others.

Falling current account surpluses point to lower growth in FX reserves. But given the safe haven status of Japan and Switzerland in times of geopolitical uncertainty, they may need further interventions to prevent their currencies from appreciating too much.

The growth in FX reserves managed by Emerging Markets grew with the growth of emerging market economies and the commodity price boom. It continued uninterrupted after the financial crisis of 2008 as growth in Emerging Markets remained resilient, despite the recession in advanced economies. Oil prices were quick to recover from the temporary drop experienced during the most acute phase of the global crisis, thus filling the coffers of commodity-exporting economies.

The massive holdings of government bonds by central banks through FX reserve and QE raises two important questions.

At a policy level, is there a potential conflict of interest between monetary policy and asset management objectives?

Should central banks become concerned about potential losses on their holdings, given their focus on capital protection, will they be tempted to adopt a pro-cyclical behavior. Ultimately, this is an issue of international coordination among central banks as reserves held by emerging markets are often invested into bonds acquired by advanced economies’ central banks via QE programs. This international coordination may dominate over underlying demand and supply drivers including global oil demand.

The second question relates to investment risk. Can central banks weather the inevitable drop in prices that will accompany a future rise in interest rates?

As a result of the decline in global interest rates to zero or even negative levels, government bonds are a very expensive asset in both absolute and relative terms. Central banks are exposed to potentially large losses should interest rates rise. While it is true that central banks often hold bonds until maturity accounted for on an accrual basis, since most of these institutions adopt a mark¬ to-market approach in the measurement of their investment portfolio, any drop in prices on such holdings is reflected in their reported profits and losses. For central banks doing QE, the risk is further increased by significant holdings of these additional fixed income assets.

The dominance of the USD reflects several factors such as the size and depth of its financial markets, and the U.S. dominance in global affairs. From an investment perspective, the USD is the ultimate safe-haven currency and during periods of heightened global risk, investors flock to the U.S. Treasury market. This has not changed over the last 25 years and it is still true today as shown by the rise of the USD when uncertainty in global markets rises.

Central banks may engineer economic growth and generate moderate but manageable inflation, but the stresses that have accumulated on central bank balance sheets may be felt as reversing interest rates eventually happen. We will be carefully monitoring this.

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Gold is a Safe Haven

Gold has long been recognized as a safe haven, an asset that investors seek out for protection and security during uncertain times. In early 2020, tensions in the Middle East, driven by the U.S.-Iran confrontation, supported safe-haven flows, pushing the gold price to a six-year high.

Other reasons for the strength in gold prices include:

• A technical breakout
• Bullish positioning in derivatives markets
• Light trading volumes
• Portfolio rebalancing at the end of 2019 especially as investors hedged risk asset allocations
• Federal Reserve repo activity
• Rebalancing ahead of 2020

According to the World Gold Council, of the current average global annual demand of about 4350 tonnes, about 10% of that comes from central banks. With purchases of over 600 tonnes in 2018, central banks bought more than their long-term average in that year. This trend has continued in 2019 and early 2020.^x As we have highlighted in this report, gold’s behavior is highly correlated with the US dollar. And today, the lack of credit risk makes gold an attractive reserve monetary asset among central banks.

Over the last few decades, investors have shunned gold because it doesn’t produce any income, and therefore the opportunity cost of holding it was significant. In the current era of low and negative interest rates, that opportunity cost is less of a factor, thus highlighting gold’s diversification benefits.

While bonds and cash may also increase portfolio efficiency, gold is an attractive alternative because it is less impacted by interest rates. Rising interest rates put downward pressure on bond valuations, which can make holding them less attractive to investors. Additionally, negative interest rates may push cash yields to negative, on a real basis. Gold also has a low correlation to equities and a historically low correlation to bonds. Moreover, this low correlation to major asset classes holds in both times of expansion and recession. During times of expansion, goods and products that rely on gold, such as jewelry and technology, are often in high demand. In times of recession, there is a gold surge among people seeking a financial safe haven. The benefits of low correlation to stocks and bonds aren’t limited to any one type of investor or one particular risk profile.

The most recent annual statistics from the World Gold Council indicate that the main buyers of gold in 2018 were the central banks of Russia (274 tonnes), Turkey (51 tonnes), Kazakhstan (51 tonnes), India (42 tonnes) and Hungary (28 tonnes). China, which only bought 10 tonnes in 2018, increased its gold purchases in 2019.^xi

The Fed began reducing their balance sheet in 2018 but reversed this decision in the second half of 2019. They began regular repurchase market injections totaling nearly US$500 billion in the fourth quarter of 2019.^xii This activity has continued into 2020 and has been described by some market participants simply as another form of QE – often dubbed “QE light” – causing some investors to worry about liquidity in the Treasury market as a whole. Historically, expansions of QE have led to increases in the gold price.

As highlighted in this report, for several countries, diversification away from US dollar assets has a strategic component. Not only does gold not have a default risk, it is not a title that has to be enforced via Western-based courts nor is it dependent on the U.S.-led financial system.

 

The Fed began to increase their balance sheet in Q4 2019

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

Theme 2: Oil Prices and Geopolitical Risk

Early in January 2020, in a “flight-to-safety” move following the bombings of U.S. bases in Iraq, gold and oil both rallied sharply but following the announcement that Iran was “standing down,” oil dipped while gold was up. And while gold is one of the strongest performing asset classes this year, oil is one of the weakest.^xiii

From the perspective of the oil market, there has been a major structural change to the market that may offer an explanation. In the past, oil prices were the main transmission mechanism from major Gulf conflicts to the broader global economy and financial markets. However, the U.S. is now a net exporter of petroleum products, which was not the case during either the first or second Gulf War. The U.S. has essentially achieved energy independence and it can now use its own supplies to offset the impact of Middle Eastern supply shocks. It appears that oil market participants would need to see sustained physical market disruption to justify adding significant risk premia to energy prices.

 

U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products

SOURCE: U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION

 

The law of unintended consequences is hard at work when one considers any type of escalation in the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. And while the Strait of Hormuz has not been blocked, the option cannot be completely ruled out. It is important to think through the potential effects that a blockade could have not only on pricing or availability of crude but also on the geopolitical power transfer to a player like Russia, who is already seen as a strategic and diplomatic beneficiary of the U.S.-Iran conflict as well as the forced departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.

One of the reasons why OPEC has had such a great influence on the world’s crude market is its ability to increase (or decrease) production at any given time to dampen potential swings in oil prices. This ability hinges mostly on OPEC’s most powerful member (not only in terms of crude supply or spare capacity): Saudi Arabia, which disposes of OPEC’s bulk, and the world’s largest, crude spare capacity, approximately 1.5-2 million barrels per day.^xiv With a blockade or severe limitation in traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia’s ability to release its spare capacity to the market would be greatly impeded.

U.S. shale producers who in the beginning benefit from high crude prices cannot be helpful in the same way Saudi Arabia can. Shale production can respond quickly to changing market conditions—much quicker than conventional crude production—but not as quick as a guarantee of an immediate release of additional volumes.

Important to consider also is that since U.S. crude production is in the hands of private companies, it is dictated by the market. It cannot be stopped at a certain price level but will flow until the market saturates. Also, U.S. crude quality differs substantially from Saudi crude. U.S. shale is lower in density (lighter) and sweeter (includes less sulfur) and, as such, cannot immediately act as a substitute.

One country that can benefit is Russia. Russia produces the “right” quality of crude (a substitute for the crude potentially locked in by the Strait of Hormuz), and according to a Russian government statement, it holds spare capacity of 500,000 barrels per day.^xv The country cut its oil production due to an agreement with OPEC to prevent oil prices from falling too low in a high-supply environment. With oil prices rising and OPEC generally unable to provide relief, Russia and its oil companies (generally not happy with the production cuts) would surely jump at the opportunity to make the extra buck. Higher prices and production would also benefit Russian companies, as crude is traded in US dollars and the country needs currency reserves after the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Russian financial institutions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and interference in U.S. elections.

Russia also stands to gain geopolitical influence. Russia’s leverage in the global oil market has increased in the recent years. The country has become an important partner to OPEC in its struggle to remain the deciding entity to influence oil prices after the U.S. shale revolution unfolded. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could potentially strengthen Russia’s position in Asia since about three-fourths of the crude that passes through the Strait lands there.^xvi This is added to the increasing importance of Russian natural gas that flows to the Chinese market via the newly opened Power of Siberia pipeline. If OPEC’s crude exports were significantly impaired by Iran-U.S. conflict, Russia would stand to profit handsomely in terms of both actual revenues and in terms of geopolitical influence, as recent military exercises among Russia, China, and Iran in the Gulf of Oman remind us.

 

Theme 3: Ultra-Low Rates

Central banks around the world cut interest rates in 2019 to stoke economic growth. Population aging and weaker productivity are set to constrain growth, softening demand for credit. Technology, low inflation, and demographics have fed the demand for fixed income securities and driven interest rates down around the world. Ultra-low interest rates have enhanced household wealth by boosting prices for housing and equities while at the same time hurting savers and pensioners.

Adding in globalization and a slowdown in Europe, an inability to get the economy moving in Japan and the need of the central bank to react have all continued to feed the move to zero and negative rates.

The era of extraordinarily low interest rates has forced central banks to become more creative in responding to periods of economic weakness. They are now in a trap that forces these banks to rely on unconventional monetary policies, including forward guidance, quantitative easing, funding for credit, and negative interest rates, which all may turn out to be less effective than traditional rate cuts.

The amount of global debt trading at negative yields hit a record US$17 trillion in August 2019, as more investors were willing to accept a negative rate in exchange for a safe place to park their money.^xvii

In Canada, we have not seen sub-zero rates on Canadian dollar issuance. But US$85 billion of mostly euro-denominated Canadian debt (provincial, corporate, and covered bonds) is trading at negative yields.^xviii Outside of Canada, positive real yields after inflation exist in long-term interest rates in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and the 30-year treasury in the U.S. The 10-year treasury, at the headline level, remains negative.

Negative interest rates are toxic for the financial system. For now, the global financial system has an out in that the reserve currency of the world, the US Dollar, has the highest positive rates, providing a buffer for now.

 

Theme 4: Slowing Global Growth, Tariffs, and Trade

Global GDP is on track to rise 3%, the slowest pace in a decade, reflecting sagging business confidence that undermined investment and trade. Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting rollercoaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Manufacturers were hardest hit, with the global measure of activity contracting for six straight months. Business investment in OECD countries edged up 1% in the first half of 2019, a marked slowing from a 3%-plus average pace in 2017-18. Amid these difficulties, the services sector held up. As we have highlighted in this report, central bankers have responded by injecting stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going.

In the U.S., easier financial conditions did little to help manufacturers in 2019. The factory sector entered its worst slump since 2015-16 and the ISM manufacturing index declined steadily throughout the year, hitting a cycle low in December. Temporary shutdowns in the auto sector and aerospace have added to the sector’s woes, but the bigger issue last year was escalating trade tensions. A recent Fed paper analyzing U.S. import tariffs found that, in more tariff-exposed manufacturing industries, the negative effects of higher input costs and other countries’ retaliatory measures more than offset any positives from import protection. Added to this is the negative impact of trade policy uncertainty on business investment, which had knock-on effects for manufacturers via slower orders for capital goods.

The nation’s economy is becoming increasingly concentrated in large cities and by the coasts, and less so in rural counties. This leads to the question of whether rural areas will be increasingly left behind. The growing concentration of the country’s economic activity could impact a variety of things from infrastructure spending to labor mobility, but it’s unclear how rural areas will fare as their share of economic output continues to dwindle.

The anticipated USMCA ratification and a preliminary U.S.-China trade deal should resolve some of the trade concerns. On New Year’s Eve President Trump tweeted that he would sign a Phase One trade deal with China on January 15th at the White House, and that he would travel to Beijing at an unspecified later date to begin discussions on a Phase Two agreement. Phase One includes a partial rollback of tariffs imposed in September on $120 billion of Chinese goods and cancellation of those planned to implementation on December 15, 2019, mainly in exchange for higher Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities over the next two years.^xix This truce should allow China’s export sector to gain momentum in 2020 although uncertainty about the path ahead will remain high.

Unfortunately, substantial tariffs remain in place and the Trump administration’s unpredictable approach to trade policy will continue to cause some firms to postpone investment plans. Uncertainty leading up to the November 2020 election could also delay some capital spending.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth and Inverted Yield Curves Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. December 2019 Portfolio Models

We have maintained our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months.

As uncertainty revs up, global GDP is on track to rise 3% in 2019, the slowest pace in a decade. Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting rollercoaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Central bankers have responded with stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going. While low interest rates and accommodative financial conditions will likely prolong the expansion, much will depend on geopolitical influences. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

January 14, 2020

 

ⁱTrading Economics. U.S. GDP. January 2020.
ⁱⁱⁱU.S. Energy Information Administration. What Countries are the top producers and consumers of oil? January 2020.
^ivU.S. Energy Information Administration. January 2020.
^vNatural Resources Canada. Crude Oil Facts. January 2020.
^viNatural Resources Canada. Crude Oil Facts. January 2020.
^viiCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
^viiiCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
^ixCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
^xWorld Gold Council. Outlook 2020. Global economic trends and their impact on gold. January 2020.
^xiWorld Gold Council. Outlook 2020. Global economic trends and their impact on gold. January 2020.
^xiiTrading Economics. U.S. Fed Funds Rate. January 2020.
^xiiiPerlaky, Adam. Recent gold and oil movements highlight inconsistent long-term correlation. World Gold Council. Goldhub blog. January 14, 2020.
^xivMikulska, Anna. How Russian Oil Has The Most To Gain From Iran-U.S. Crisis. Baker Institute. January 8, 2020.
^xvMikulska, Anna. How Russian Oil Has The Most To Gain From Iran-U.S. Crisis. Baker Institute. January 8, 2020.
^xviMikulska, Anna. How Russian Oil Has The Most To Gain From Iran-U.S. Crisis. Baker Institute. January 8, 2020.
^xviiRBC Thought Leadership. Navigating the 2020s. January 2020.
^xviiiRBC Thought Leadership. Navigating the 2020s. January 2020.
^xixJ.P.Morgan. Global Data Watch. January 10, 2020.

 

 

 

 

Section 1: Q4 2019 Outlook

 

Globalization Has Changed the Global Economy. Are We Now in a Period of De-Globalization?

Our investment approach is focused on the expected behavior of asset classes in various economic environments. Our research shows that in addition to five broad economic environments – Growth, Stagnation, Inflation, Recession and Chaos – the global economy also experiences regime shifts, which are temporary, and regime changes, which are permanent. Globalization results in regime change, as does de-globalization. In this Fourth Quarter 2019 Outlook, we take a closer look at the current state of globalization. The recognition of this changing environment is critical in determining our investment positioning in 2020 and beyond.

Economic theory suggests that globalization benefits the world economy. The absence of trade barriers should allow each country to specialize in the production of goods and services in which they are relatively efficient, leading to global productivity gains.

History shows that waves of globalization are driven by both technology and policy, but protectionist shifts tend to end them. In some cases, like in the 1970s, a pushback by policymakers can cause globalization to stall. In more extreme environments like the experience of the 1930s, a sustained policy backlash can push globalization into reverse. So far, the current trade war looks more like a stall but the risk of a de-globalization outcome similar to the 1930s is rising.

 

SOURCE: DEMIG (2015), OUR WORLD IN DATA, CAPITAL ECONOMICS

 

It takes a large and sustained push by policymakers to cause a period of de-globalization. As we begin Q4, the global economy is facing two dangers. The first is that a global economy that is already injured by geopolitical conflicts, including trade wars, endures further negative shocks. The second is that we overestimate resiliency and the feedback loop of slower growth that is occurring in many major economies around the globe.

This is occurring as the U.S. House of Representatives initiates a preliminary inquiry as to whether to proceed with a formal impeachment investigation of President Trump, China potentially delays trade solutions until the 2020 Presidential election, and the deadline for a Brexit decision falls at the end of October. Each of these challenges to the global economy could potentially be prolonged.

Compounding these risks, interest rates worldwide remain low or negative. It is estimated that over 80% of sovereign debt is trading with negative real rates.ⁱ While the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank continues to manipulate the economy with artificially low-interest rates, this policy is likely to backfire as the Federal Reserve’s policies mask the true state of the economy. Without an accurate financial picture, businesses lack the knowledge required to make investments. The resulting inaction could bring about the recession the Fed claims it wants to avoid. In addition, the idea that sub-zero interest rates lower the cost of borrowing has not proven to bring about the anticipated economic stimulus that central banks initially anticipated. Instead of paying banks to hold their money, businesses and individuals will find other sources in which to put their money.

 

Time to Include Gold in our Portfolio Models. Gold is Negatively Correlated with Interest Rates.

Economic events can create structural shifts in the acceptance level of risk. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 is one example of these structural changes, referred to in our modelling as Chaos. Looking back at events including Black Monday, the LTCM crisis, and the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, World Gold Council analysis shows that gold mitigated portfolio losses incurred by investors during almost all tail events under consideration. For example, investors in the U.S., Europe, and the UK, who held a 5% allocation to gold reduced losses by approximately 5% during eight tail risk events.ⁱⁱ

Our Portfolio Models are seeking exposures that offer low correlations among stocks and bonds to mitigate downside risk. In a year marked by noticeable geopolitical unrest, policy uncertainty and the risk of an impending recession, gold becomes a preferred investment to bonds and equities. And while one of the negatives of holding gold is that it does not generate income and has a cost to store it, the periods when bonds have a negative carry momentum become strong periods for gold.

During September, global monetary policy continued to influence gold price performance as many central banks around the world cut rates or expanded quantitative easing measures. The Federal Reserve cut rates by 25 basis points in July, and again in September.ⁱⁱⁱ

Gold has important diversification properties that are evident during periods of systemic risk. Gold has little or no correlation with many other assets, including commodities, during times of stress. In addition, the correlation is dynamic, changing across economic cycles to the benefit of investors. Like other commodities, gold is positively correlated to stocks during periods of economic growth when equity markets tend to rise. Gold is negatively correlated with other assets during risk-off periods, protecting investors against tail risks and other events that can have a significant negative impact on capital or wealth – a protection not always present in other commodities. As a result, gold can enhance portfolio stability and improve risk-adjusted returns.

 

Many Central Banks are Adding to Gold Reserves

Analysis of several factors that are propelling the gold market include central bank gold demand. Physical gold is expected to play an important part as countries shore up their havens, both on the private and official levels. While gold no longer plays a direct role in the international monetary system, central banks and governments still hold extensive gold reserves to preserve national wealth and protect against economic instability. Today, gold is the third largest reserve asset globally, following U.S. dollar and Euro-denominated assets.^iv Gold is increasingly used as collateral in financial transactions, much like other high-quality liquid assets such as government debt.

History shows us that central bankers were net sellers 30 years ago. These same banks have turned to buying gold since 2010, culminating more than 650 tons of bullion bought from the official sector in 2018 with the trend persisting through the first half of 2019.^v This is more than at any time since the end of the gold standard.

We expect that central banks will continue to power gold’s move higher and beyond the current supply and demand dynamics. The October 2019 report from the World Gold Council notes that investors have begun to turn to gold to escape an environment of negative interest rates as treasury yields come under continuing pressure. The U.S. 30-year Treasury acts as a signal here. Should the 30-year U.S. bond fall into negative territory, as has already happened in Germany and France, we expect gold to hit new cycle highs.

 

With rates likely to stay low and geopolitical unrest unlikely to abate, the demand for gold exposure is expected continue.

 

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Global Trade and GDP are Deteriorating

The multilateral trading system remains the most important global forum for settling differences and providing solutions for the challenges of the 21st century global economy. Trade conflicts heighten uncertainty, leading some businesses to delay the productivity-enhancing investments that are essential to raising living standards. Trade conflicts can also heighten political tensions and occasionally physically aggressive behaviors between countries.

 

The World Trade Organization Lowers Trade Forecast as Tensions Unsettle Global Economy

Escalating trade tensions and a slowing global economy have led WTO economists to sharply downgrade their forecasts for trade growth in 2019 and 2020. World merchandise trade volumes are now expected to rise by only 1.2% in 2019, substantially slower than the 2.6% growth forecast in April.^vi The updated trade forecast is based on consensus estimates of world GDP growth of 2.3% at market exchange rates for both 2019 and 2020, down from 2.6% previously.^vii Slowing economic growth is partly due to rising trade tensions but also reflects country-specific cyclical and structural factors, including the shifting monetary policy stance in developed economies and Brexit-related uncertainty in the European Union.

The projected increase in 2020 is now 2.7%, down from 3.0% previously.^viii The economists caution that downside risks remain high and that the 2020 projection depends on a return to more normal trade relations. Risks to the forecast are heavily weighted to the downside and dominated by trade policy. Further rounds of tariffs and retaliation could produce a destructive cycle of recrimination.

Shifting monetary and fiscal policies could destabilize volatile financial markets. Continued slowing of the global economy could produce an even bigger downturn in trade. In addition, a disorderly Brexit could have a significant regional impact, mostly confined to Europe.

 

US Economy Starting to Feel the Pain

More recently, increased foreign competition has been blamed for U.S. manufacturing job losses over the past twenty years. In practice, while the integration of several billion workers into the global economy has contributed to both a loss of manufacturing jobs and a more general squeeze on labour’s share of income in the developed world, most academics agree that other factors, including technological change, have played a bigger role.

The U.S. economy posted strong gains in the first half of 2019, although some measures were negative. Consumer spending surged in the second quarter, supported by the strong labour market. The decline in interest rates over the summer tees up for U.S. consumers to be the key driver of activity in the second half of the year. Companies continue to hire, and the unemployment rate recently hit a 50-year low.^ix Labour market tightness is finally translating into a pickup in wages. Business sentiment has deteriorated amid unrelenting uncertainty about trade. Business investment fell in the second quarter for the first time in three years and exports sagged with the weakness concentrated in the manufacturing sector. While fundamentals are still positive for the consumer, the government’s protectionist policies pose risks to the outlook. The persistence of healthy labour-market conditions, as well as efforts by several central banks to shore up an expansion that’s already passed the 10-year mark, will provide support to the global economy. Another tranche of tariffs on Chinese imports coming into effect in mid-December will hit U.S. consumers.

Open borders tend to boost productivity at a global and national level (particularly for developing countries). However, globalization has distributive consequences within economies. Workers and capital owners in competitive export-orientated industries tend to gain, while consumers’ purchasing power rises from access to cheaper imports. But relatively inefficient domestic industries can lose out to more productive foreign competition.

Our current outlook does not see any material improvement over the next twelve months.

 

Theme 2: Brexit and the EU: Deal or No-Deal?

The prolonged and twisted saga of Brexit has been a weight overhanging global markets since 2016. UK growth was synchronized with its main trading partners in 2015 but slowed following the 2016 Brexit vote from a range of 2.0- 2.5% to around 1.5-2.0% in 2017.^x This occurred despite a clear strengthening in global activity. Throughout the latest phase the labor market has held strong and helped consumers to keep the economy from stagnating. The realistic prospect of no-deal since the change in prime minister has combined with a regional growth slowdown to produce a collapse in business confidence and signs in some of the leading surveys that the labor market is about to weaken. The domestic drag began to stabilize in 2018 after the initial purchasing power shock from the weaker currency peaked. Later in 2018, growth among the UK’s main trading partners slowed and growing complications in the Brexit negotiations prompted a phase of outright decline in UK business spending. Since the referendum UK business investment has weakened by almost 10% compared to capex in other developed markets. Given that UK investment was growing faster than elsewhere prior to the vote.

In a major blow to Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Britain’s highest court ruled in early October that his decision to suspend parliament for five weeks in the crucial countdown to the country’s Brexit deadline was illegal. And unresolved is a legal and operational solution including the Irish border backstop. Currently, there are no border posts or physical barriers between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The backstop is designed to ensure that this continues after the UK leaves the EU. The backstop would only be needed if a permanent solution to avoid border checks could not be found. If it was needed, the backstop would keep the UK in a close trading relationship with the EU to avoid checks altogether.

If the sides fail to reach a deal, Mr. Johnson could be forced to seek a third Brexit extension. That’s because MPs have passed a law – known as the Benn Act – that requires Mr. Johnson to ask for a Brexit delay by October 19. This will push the deadline back from October 31 to January 31, 2020. MPs say the law is necessary in order to prevent a no-deal Brexit.

These events unfolding in the UK have the potential to impact European markets and beyond. Regardless of the outcome of Brexit, there is no doubt that the trading relationship between the EU and Great Briton has changed While many Dutch politicians say they dread the economic repercussions of the looming Oct. 31 Brexit deadline, the Netherlands is working to minimize the damage, in part by attracting some of the organizations and businesses that have already fled the United Kingdom.^xi

 

SOURCE: NETHERLANDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT AGENCY

 

Theme 3: Low and Negative Interest Rates: A Dilemma for Central Banks and the Aging Population

Many central banks reduced policy interest rates to zero during the global financial crisis to boost growth. Ten years later, interest rates remain low in most countries. Core inflation has been low and stable for 15 years and shows no signs of acceleration anytime soon.

The U.S. Federal Reserve cut rates on July 31 for the first time since the Great Recession, and the ECB committed to a range of policy steps to fuel growth and get inflation to levels closer to its stated target. The minutes to the September FOMC meeting show that the Committee held a range of views with respect to both the appropriateness of the September rate cut and to what the Committee should communicate about the future direction of rates. The majority who wanted a cut last month cited trade policy uncertainty, slowing global growth, low inflation, and risk management as motivating considerations. Several participants favored leaving policy rates unchanged and argued policy should respond more to the data than to risks. Some argued that cutting too much now would leave monetary policy with less scope to boost aggregate demand if such shocks materialized.

The two major central banks were among a dozen that eased policy rates to combat the negative spinoff from rising trade tensions and political turmoil. The Bank of Canada was an outlier, staying on the sidelines as Canada emerged from a six-month slump in economic activity. And there is still no firm line of sight on how the UK will leave the European Union. Given these tensions, it will once again fall to extraordinarily stimulative monetary policy to sustain global growth, as few governments have committed to providing fiscal support.

 

Savings Gluts Provide Fuel for Low Rates

From the demand side, as populations age, they have a propensity to save. Prior to 2005, the global saving rate was never above 24.5%. Since then it has only been lower during the panic of 2009. The rate equaled its record high of 26.7% in 2018. This works out to roughly $21 trillion saved every year.^xii Since many seek to match the investments in their savings to their life expectancies, they tend buy bonds.

The savings glut is leading to massive bond buying that is resulting in yields dropping below the inflation rate nearly everywhere in the developed world. Only two countries in the developed world have real 10-year yields above zero: Portugal and Italy.^xiii Everywhere else, older people are buying bonds and driving yields below the inflation rate. Demographics tells us the developed world is not running out of old people anytime soon. The savings glut will continue.

While the global economy has been recovering, future downturns are inevitable. Severe recessions have historically required 3–6 percentage points cut in policy rates. If another crisis happens, few countries would have that kind of room for monetary policy to respond.

 

Theme 4: ETFs have a Positive Role in Market Volatility and Liquidity

Passive investing has historically attracted criticism, typically focused on illiquidity. The liquidity of ETFs varies due to characteristics determined by their underlying markets and indexes. The underlying markets for equity ETFs and credit ETFs are fundamentally different. In addition, apart from the underlying securities in an ETF, there are multiple layers of liquidity in the primary and secondary ETF markets, and the liquidity should never be less than that of the ETF’s underlying holdings. This is a superior feature compared to mutual funds.

ETF market makers and authorized participants looking for arbitrage opportunities trade dynamically to balance the supply and demand for ETF shares and their underlying assets. One of the key features of ETFs is that the supply of shares is flexible. Shares can be created or redeemed to offset the changes in demand. This structure has two important functions: it creates liquidity for the ETF shares by meeting the supply-and-demand needs of investors who trade on an exchange; and it helps keep an ETF’s price per share close to the ETF’s net asset value (NAV).

Index vehicles may be price takers at a microeconomic level but help to set prices at a macroeconomic level. The arbitrage mechanism allows for authorized participants to factor into the price the impact of macro and geopolitical events that may not yet be reflected in the underlying securities when these events occur while the primary markets are closed due to time zones and holidays. Historical evidence is consistent with the idea that higher correlations today are not the result of passive indexing, but rather reflect the macro environment and common factor risks.^xiv

Recently there have been liquidity events that have tested the mechanisms behind ETFs. A number of credible studies have concluded that the arbitrage mechanism associated with the create and redeem feature of ETFs in fact helps, rather than hinders market liquidity in these extreme events.^{xv xvi}

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth and Inverted Yield Curves Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. September 2019 Portfolio Models

We have maintained our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months. While geopolitical developments have always played a role in economies and markets, their scale and impact has been steadily rising since the 2008 financial crisis. Against a hostile trade backdrop, the global economy is losing momentum. Forecasts for world GDP growth this year have fallen to 3.2% from the 3.9% economists expected a year ago. Inverted yield curves and slumping manufacturing activity that are traditional recession predictors are contributing to a cautious business mood. Few governments have committed to providing fiscal support, leaving extraordinary stimulative monetary policy as the tool of choice to combat the recession threat. Our concern is that central banks in several countries are operating at the limits of what monetary policy can do. This has negative feedback implications for fiscal policy and financial markets.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

October 14, 2019

 

ⁱWorld Gold Council. Global Gold-backed ETF Flows. October 8, 2019.
ⁱⁱWorld Gold Council. Gold and Tail-risk Hedging. January 2013.
ⁱⁱⁱTrading Economics. U.S. Fed Funds Rate. September 19, 2019.
^ivWorld Gold Council. Gold Versus Commodities. October 2019.
^vWorld Gold Council. Gold Versus Commodities. October 2019.
^viWorld Trade Organization. Press Release. October 1, 2019.
^viiWorld Trade Organization. Press Release. October 1, 2019.
^viiiWorld Trade Organization. Press Release. October 1, 2019.
^ixTrading Economics. U.S. Unemployment Rate. October 4, 2019.
^xJ.P. Morgan. Global Data Watch. October 11, 2019.
^xiNetherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA). More Brexit-impacted companies choose the Netherlands due to ongoing uncertainty. August 26, 2019.
^xiiNational Accounts of OECD Data. Household Savings. 2019.
^xiiiTrading Economics. Ten Year Yields. October 15, 2019.
^xivMadhavan, A. and Morillo, D. “The Impact of Exchange Traded Funds: Volumes and Correlations.” The Journal of Portfolio Management. Summer 2018, 44 (7) 96-107.
^xvMSCI. “Have High-Yield ETFs Created Liquidity Risk?” Reka Janosik. March 27, 2019.
^xviAquilina, M., Croxson, K., Valentini, G. “Fixed income ETFs: primary market participation and resilience of liquidity during periods of stress.” Financial Conduct Authority. Research Note. August 2019.

 

 

 

Section 1: Q3 2019 Outlook

 

The Danger of Politicizing the Central Bank

As we enter the third quarter of 2019, we review recent global monetary policy and question how it has changed the traditional ways that we use it to detect risk in markets and the global economy.

The global economy is expected to continue to slow in the coming quarters resulting in lower inflation and downward pressure on interest rates. Central banks in developed and emerging markets are now generally cutting rates and quantitative easing (QE) is making a comeback. Weak economic data versus central bank activism remains the key theme.

Recently global markets have been encouraged by a truce in the trade war between the U.S. and China as President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to return to talks late in June. While the truce is encouraging following decades of growing trade flows and cooperation, the process of global trade integration faces risk of stalling or going in reverse. And while the U.S. has proven successful in securing a trade deal with Canada and Mexico (that has not yet been signed off on) and extracting some concessions from China, uncertainty remains due to the growing, rather than shrinking trade deficit in the U.S.

Trade contributed 0.94 percentage points to the U.S. economy’s 3.1% annualized growth pace in the first quarter. ⁱ Building on that trend, the U.S. trade deficit jumped to a five-month high in May, widening to USD 55.5 billion from a revised USD 51.2 billion in April. Imports surged 3.3% and exports rose 2%. The politically sensitive goods trade deficit with China increased 12.2% to USD 30.2 billion despite the recent increase in import tariffs on Chinese goods. Imports increased, likely as businesses restocked ahead of an increase in tariffs on Chinese merchandise. Data for April was also revised higher to show the trade gap widening to $51.2 billion instead of the previously reported $50.8 billion. ⁱⁱ

Many economists highlight that the most important role of the U.S. economy, as the largest economy in the world and the globally recognized main reserve currency, is in providing liquidity to the global economy and driving demand around the world. Contrary to current Trump trade policy, this implies that the U.S. trade deficit is central to global economic stability. The dollar’s role as the global reserve currency and primary tool for global transactions means that many other countries rely on holding dollar reserves, creating massive demand for U.S. financial assets. This means that the U.S. pays little for its foreign borrowing, allowing it to finance its high consumption at low cost, which boosts global demand.

The IMF Working Paper on Tariffs from May 2019 found that U.S. GDP would decline in scenarios that include retaliation on Chinese trade tariffs imposed by the U.S., but also that U.S. output would decline in the case where China only limits exports of selected goods to the United States. ⁱⁱⁱ This is because those foreign goods (electronics and other manufacturing goods) are particularly difficult to substitute with domestic production, and thus tend to be replaced by additional imports from other countries.

The risk that the Trump trade standoff will unwittingly destabilize the entire global economy and thus have dire consequences for the U.S. economy itself is the greatest current risk to equity markets and the broader global economy.

 

 

Global Fundamentals and the Limits on Central Bank Action

After the June FOMC meeting Chair Powell signaled a strong easing bias but indicated a desire to learn more about upcoming policy and data developments. Since then the two main events – the G20 summit and June payrolls – have been positive. U.S. data show that growth has been solid for the first half of the year, supported by a strong labor market and strong financial markets. Inflation remains subdued, and inflation expectations have fallen such that they are no longer consistent with the Fed’s 2.0% target.

But the global picture has deteriorated, and business sentiment has fallen, suggesting that the outlook for the U.S. has also deteriorated. The ECB is expected to ease policy again as the euro area is heavily exposed to a further slowdown in global growth because it has much less policy flexibility. The shift in global policy bias toward easing has also affected the debate around likely Bank of Japan action too, prompted in part when Japanese government bond yields fell further into negative territory.

The gap that has opened between the U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors makes clear that trade policy uncertainty is the primary driver of the slowdown. The case for an “insurance” ease remains strong as global growth momentum is slipping and the latest declines in U.S. and global business confidence have yet to be felt.

While it is understood that the unique position of the U.S. in the global economy warrants a central bank that considers the global economy, recent comments by President Trump suggest that his political motives for seeing a continuation of strong equity markets are an attempt to influence the central bank and Chair Powell. Trump’s call for rate cuts while reminding everyone that the American economy is the best it has ever been leads us to this conclusion and has distorted the ability of market participants to detect actual underlying risk.

Central banks in most modern economies are designed to be insulated from the short-term whims of politicians. The goal is to give central bankers the freedom to snuff out inflation, even if that hurts political leaders at election time. Since the global meltdown of 2008, central banks, in the name of protecting the economy, have reacted to sharp market falls by easing policy. Investors have been placated into seeing the stock market as a roller-coaster ride backed by engineers. This creates a false sense of confidence in those markets that can lead to larger negative shocks.

How long can bad news, by going to lower interest rates, be good news for equity prices? Signs that central banks have abandoned monetary policy normalization and are ready to provide additional policy stimulus have encouraged markets as we enter the third quarter of 2019.

Fed rate cuts may happen with the intent to reassure economic actors that the ongoing expansion will continue. But slowing economies and soft inflation imply lower revenue growth, excess capacity, and competitive pricing pressures. The risk is that monetary policy may delay the correction but not prevent it. Given the deterioration in the global economy and policy uncertainty at home, when the correction does come, it will be all the more unanticipated.

Market skepticism, asset purchase limitations, and the potential adverse effects of greater negative yields on banks are all issues we see challenging risk assets. We continue to hope that the U.S. will develop policies that jointly address the U.S.’s need for strong demand and full employment and the rest of the world’s need for dollars by channeling foreign capital into productive, job-creating domestic investment.

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Slowing Global Growth

The pace of global growth is slowing this year as policy uncertainty takes its toll on the world’s economy. Data points to the global economy expanding by 3.3% this year, slower than 2018’s 3.6% pace, with trade volumes declining and business sentiment deteriorating. ^v

Economic and market risks are elevated as a result of the U.S. administration’s use of tariffs at a time when global growth is slowing. The prospect of a prolonged U.S.-China trade war, the lack of clarity around Brexit, and political and economic upheaval in countries like Venezuela have combined to generate downside risks to the outlook.

The stakes are high for this year’s European Parliamentary elections where the populists are likely to continue gaining ground, while lingering tensions and a lack of progress in Brexit negotiations raise the odds of a “hard Brexit” scenario. Another near-term risk, which was cited in the November FSR (Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report, May 2019) is elevated tensions between the European Commission and Italy over Italy’s budget plan, which had raised the country’s borrowing costs and prompted worries about its long-term fiscal sustainability. ^vi These concerns have been deferred for now, as Italy and the European Commission agreed on a budget plan for 2019, but Italy still faces longer-run fiscal challenges.

European economies have notable international financial and economic linkages, and a sharp economic downturn in Europe would affect banks, markets, and the global economy. Financial market volatility in Europe could spill over to global markets, including the United States, leading to a pullback of investors and financial institutions from riskier assets, which could amplify declines in equity prices and increases in credit spreads. In addition, spillover effects from banks in Europe could be transmitted to the U.S. financial system directly through credit exposures as well as indirectly through the common participation of globally active banks in a broad range of activities and markets. The consequent U.S. dollar appreciation and weaker global demand in such a scenario would depress the U.S. economy through trade channels, which could reduce earnings of some U.S. businesses, particularly exporters. Such effects could harm the creditworthiness of affected U.S. businesses, particularly those that already have high levels of debt.

Amid the uncertainty, global central banks have moved to the sidelines. Even with the economic expansion in its tenth year, contained inflation pressures have removed any urgency for central banks to act.

 

Theme 2: China’s Non-Financial Sector is Dangerously Over Leveraged

In China, the pace of economic growth has been slowing over the past several years, and a long period of rapid credit expansion has left the non-financial sector highly indebted and lenders more exposed in the event of a further slowdown.

Developments that significantly strain the repayment capacity of Chinese borrowers and financial intermediaries, including a further slowdown in growth or a collapse in Chinese real estate prices, could trigger a collapse in this market. If problems arise in China, spill¬overs could trigger a domino effect with a broader pullback from risk-taking, declines in world trade and commodity prices, and U.S. dollar appreciation resulting. Such an event would tighten conditions in U.S. financial markets and affect the creditworthiness of U.S. firms, particularly exporters and commodity producers facing weaker demand and lower prices. ^vii

In the recently released book “Crash” by Adam Tooze, China’s credit boom is compared with other credit bubbles that ended badly. ^viii Tooze highlights that the U.K. banking sector has by far the heaviest exposure to Hong Kong and China in general — much more than the United States, Japan, or Europe. Although the Chinese have not slowed their credit bubble, they have shown an ability to restructure their banking sector in the past – in 1998 to 2005, for example – and more recently to shrink their shadow banking segment. The outlook for the global economy rides on how China manages its current credit situation. Trade-related uncertainty has made Chinese capex expansion less likely. On the monetary side, the ability to cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR), or the benchmark interest rate and on the fiscal side, the government can issue more special local government bonds are both available. If the Chinese economy does stabilize this year, China’s currency could become a global currency stabilizer.

 

 

Theme 3: The U.S. Economy Balancing Act Between Slowing Manufacturing Growth and Strong Markets

The U.S. economy continued to grow at a solid clip in the first quarter of 2019 on the back of net exports and inventory building. ^ix Growth is likely to be somewhat weaker in Q2. Despite an uneven quarterly pattern, the key driver of the U.S. economy remains the consumer. Strong demand for labour pushed the unemployment rate to a 50-year low in early 2019 and wage growth accelerated. Non-farm employment increased by 224,000 jobs in June, handily beating expectations. The resilience of business hiring is in strong contrast to the recent business surveys’ generally downbeat message. In June, the unemployment rate edged up from 3.62% to 3.67%, and average hourly earnings increased only 0.2%. ^x

With more people working and wages rising faster than inflation, we expect consumer spending to increase this year. Business investment is also forecast to contribute to the economy as companies take advantage of last year’s cut in the corporate income tax rate and other supportive policies.

On trade policy, the U.S. is the instigator and the perpetuator. The recent removal of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and the Trump Administration’s desire to ratify the new trade agreement with Canada and Mexico had dampened some of the pressures within North America. Unfortunately, the positive sentiment was crushed in late May when the U.S. threatened to levy tariffs on Mexican imports in order to force its southern neighbor to stem the flow of migrants. Tensions between the U.S. and China, meanwhile, have become increasingly heated after the U.S. bumped up tariff rates and made threats to expand the list of products affected.

The Fed can claim mission accomplished on getting the economy to full employment with most inflation measures at or slightly below the 2% target. Maintaining these conditions is the challenge now facing U.S. policymakers. The FOMC appears content to hold the fed funds rate at a slightly below neutral level as a nod to the risks to the economic outlook coming from an unpredictable presidency.

 

Theme 4: Canada Is Not an Island

Were Canada an island insulated from global developments, there would be little reason for concern about the economy. Growth is solid, the labor market is strong, and there is no sign of imbalances. But Canada is not an island, and global economic developments matter for its economy. With the global outlook having darkened in recent months, it is fair to say that downside risks prevail in Canada at this point, even if the domestic economy looks fine.

Falling oil prices and a deepening in the housing-market correction saw Canada’s economy grow at just a 0.3% annualized rate in the last quarter of 2018 and contributed to the economy growing at a similar pace in the first quarter of this year. ^xi A recovery in oil production, easing of pressure in the housing market and the end of an unseasonably cold winter saw the economy post a solid increase in March, paving the way for stronger gains ahead.

Canada’s own tensions with the U.S. have eased with the removal of U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs along with Canadian retaliatory measures. But the ongoing close integration of cross-border production chains means that anything that hurts the U.S. industrial sector will have spillovers to Canada. Concerns about a slowing in global growth could also spill over to Canada’s resource-producing regions via lower commodity prices.

Canadian business confidence has weakened with the manufacturing sentiment index slipping into negative territory in April for the first time in more than three years. ^xii Global policy uncertainty, frictions with the U.S., and the Chinese government’s banning of Canadian canola all played into the decline.

Although the recent removal of tariffs on steel and aluminum by both the Canadian and U.S. governments and renewed efforts to ratify the updated NAFTA set up to restore confidence, the impact will be limited by the persistence of tensions between the U.S., China, Europe, and Mexico, Canada’s top trading partners. We view the Bank of Canada as more likely to cut rates later this year than not, but we expect those cuts to arrive after the Fed cuts. The difference in timing and magnitude may give the Canadian dollar a slight upward bias relative to its southern neighbor but likely not a large enough one to pose economic danger.

Should significant problems arise in China, spill¬over effects could include a broader pullback from risk-taking, declines in world trade and commodity prices, and U.S. dollar appreciation. The effects on global markets could be exacerbated if they deepen the stresses in already vulnerable EMEs. These dynamics could tighten conditions in U.S. financial markets and affect the creditworthiness of U.S. firms, particularly exporters and commodity producers facing weaker demand and lower prices.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth While the U.S. Fed Pulls Back on Tightening Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. June 2019 Portfolio Models

Our outlook is focused on tension between politics, policy, and the positioning of the corporate sector. The world economy remains vulnerable to the U.S-China power play. If tariffs persist or are ramped up further, already-weak world trade volumes will struggle to gain traction. In addition, rising political conflict (Brexit and Italy) and uncertainty have weighed on business sentiment over the past year and global capex is stalling. The dovish stance by central banks supports our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months.

China is committed to maintaining 6% growth and will respond to any slowing with further easing. ^xiii The U.S. and China have each raised tariffs and appear to be broadening the conflict to their respective tech sectors. The results of the European Parliament elections showed a significant step up in support for populist parties, who now control 28% of total seats in Parliament, up from 22% before. Turnout in the elections was low at 37%, some 30%-35% lower than may be expected in a general election or second referendum. ^xiv The Brexit Party’s win (mostly at the expense of the Conservatives) sent the message that many voters are willing to support a no-deal.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

July 14, 2019

 

ⁱTrading Economics, U.S. Balance of Trade. July 3, 2019.
ⁱⁱTrading Economics, U.S. Balance of Trade. July 3, 2019.
ⁱⁱⁱCaceres, C., and Cerdeiro, D. A., 2019. IMF Working Paper. Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and Western Hemisphere Department. Trade Wars and Trade Deals: Estimated Effects using a Multi-Sector Model.

^ivAhir, H., Bloom, N., Furceri, D. Caution: Trade uncertainty is rising and can harm the global economy. 4 July 2019. The source for the data on key dates in the U.S.-China trade negotiations comes from Bown and Kolb (2019). Item #6 comes from the BBC (2019). Note 1: The font in blue indicates the tariff measure taken, and the font in black indicates the narrative of the World Trade Uncertainty index. The WTU index is computed by counting the frequency of uncertain (or the variant) that are near the following words: protectionism, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), tariff, trade, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) in EIU country reports. The WUI is then normalized by total number of words and rescaled by multiplying by 100,000. A higher number means higher trade uncertainty and vice versa. Note 2: The WUI is computed by counting the frequency of uncertain (or the variant) in Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. The WUI is then normalized by total number of words and rescaled by multiplying by 1,000. The WUI is then normalized by total number of words, rescaled by multiplying by 1,000, and using the average of 1996Q1 to 2010Q4 such that 1996Q1-2010Q4 = 100. A higher number means higher uncertainty and vice versa. While the latest spike is the result of uncertainty over Brexit and US trade policy, trade uncertainty explains more than 70% of the increase in uncertainty since the first quarter of 2018.

^vIMF. World Economic Outlook. Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery. April 2019.
^viFederal Reserve Financial Stability Report. Near-Term Risks to the Financial System. May 2019.
^viiFederal Reserve Financial Stability Report. Near-Term Risks to the Financial System. May 2019.
^viiiTooze, A., “Health of the Global Banking Sector: Differences by Region.” Columbia University.
^ixTrading Economics, U.S. GDP. June 27, 2019.
^xBureau of Labor Statistics. Economic News Release. Employment Situation Summary. July 5, 2019.
^xiTrading Economics, Canada GDP. July 11, 2019.
^xiiTrading Economics, Canada GDP. July 11, 2019.
^xiiiSouth China Morning Post. China lowers 2019 GDP growth target to 6-6.5 per cent range. March 5, 2019.
^xivJ.P. Morgan Economic Research. Global Data Watch. May 31, 2019.