Section 1: Q3 2019 Outlook

 

The Danger of Politicizing the Central Bank

As we enter the third quarter of 2019, we review recent global monetary policy and question how it has changed the traditional ways that we use it to detect risk in markets and the global economy.

The global economy is expected to continue to slow in the coming quarters resulting in lower inflation and downward pressure on interest rates. Central banks in developed and emerging markets are now generally cutting rates and quantitative easing (QE) is making a comeback. Weak economic data versus central bank activism remains the key theme.

Recently global markets have been encouraged by a truce in the trade war between the U.S. and China as President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to return to talks late in June. While the truce is encouraging following decades of growing trade flows and cooperation, the process of global trade integration faces risk of stalling or going in reverse. And while the U.S. has proven successful in securing a trade deal with Canada and Mexico (that has not yet been signed off on) and extracting some concessions from China, uncertainty remains due to the growing, rather than shrinking trade deficit in the U.S.

Trade contributed 0.94 percentage points to the U.S. economy’s 3.1% annualized growth pace in the first quarter. ⁱ Building on that trend, the U.S. trade deficit jumped to a five-month high in May, widening to USD 55.5 billion from a revised USD 51.2 billion in April. Imports surged 3.3% and exports rose 2%. The politically sensitive goods trade deficit with China increased 12.2% to USD 30.2 billion despite the recent increase in import tariffs on Chinese goods. Imports increased, likely as businesses restocked ahead of an increase in tariffs on Chinese merchandise. Data for April was also revised higher to show the trade gap widening to $51.2 billion instead of the previously reported $50.8 billion. ⁱⁱ

Many economists highlight that the most important role of the U.S. economy, as the largest economy in the world and the globally recognized main reserve currency, is in providing liquidity to the global economy and driving demand around the world. Contrary to current Trump trade policy, this implies that the U.S. trade deficit is central to global economic stability. The dollar’s role as the global reserve currency and primary tool for global transactions means that many other countries rely on holding dollar reserves, creating massive demand for U.S. financial assets. This means that the U.S. pays little for its foreign borrowing, allowing it to finance its high consumption at low cost, which boosts global demand.

The IMF Working Paper on Tariffs from May 2019 found that U.S. GDP would decline in scenarios that include retaliation on Chinese trade tariffs imposed by the U.S., but also that U.S. output would decline in the case where China only limits exports of selected goods to the United States. ⁱⁱⁱ This is because those foreign goods (electronics and other manufacturing goods) are particularly difficult to substitute with domestic production, and thus tend to be replaced by additional imports from other countries.

The risk that the Trump trade standoff will unwittingly destabilize the entire global economy and thus have dire consequences for the U.S. economy itself is the greatest current risk to equity markets and the broader global economy.

 

 

Global Fundamentals and the Limits on Central Bank Action

After the June FOMC meeting Chair Powell signaled a strong easing bias but indicated a desire to learn more about upcoming policy and data developments. Since then the two main events – the G20 summit and June payrolls – have been positive. U.S. data show that growth has been solid for the first half of the year, supported by a strong labor market and strong financial markets. Inflation remains subdued, and inflation expectations have fallen such that they are no longer consistent with the Fed’s 2.0% target.

But the global picture has deteriorated, and business sentiment has fallen, suggesting that the outlook for the U.S. has also deteriorated. The ECB is expected to ease policy again as the euro area is heavily exposed to a further slowdown in global growth because it has much less policy flexibility. The shift in global policy bias toward easing has also affected the debate around likely Bank of Japan action too, prompted in part when Japanese government bond yields fell further into negative territory.

The gap that has opened between the U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors makes clear that trade policy uncertainty is the primary driver of the slowdown. The case for an “insurance” ease remains strong as global growth momentum is slipping and the latest declines in U.S. and global business confidence have yet to be felt.

While it is understood that the unique position of the U.S. in the global economy warrants a central bank that considers the global economy, recent comments by President Trump suggest that his political motives for seeing a continuation of strong equity markets are an attempt to influence the central bank and Chair Powell. Trump’s call for rate cuts while reminding everyone that the American economy is the best it has ever been leads us to this conclusion and has distorted the ability of market participants to detect actual underlying risk.

Central banks in most modern economies are designed to be insulated from the short-term whims of politicians. The goal is to give central bankers the freedom to snuff out inflation, even if that hurts political leaders at election time. Since the global meltdown of 2008, central banks, in the name of protecting the economy, have reacted to sharp market falls by easing policy. Investors have been placated into seeing the stock market as a roller-coaster ride backed by engineers. This creates a false sense of confidence in those markets that can lead to larger negative shocks.

How long can bad news, by going to lower interest rates, be good news for equity prices? Signs that central banks have abandoned monetary policy normalization and are ready to provide additional policy stimulus have encouraged markets as we enter the third quarter of 2019.

Fed rate cuts may happen with the intent to reassure economic actors that the ongoing expansion will continue. But slowing economies and soft inflation imply lower revenue growth, excess capacity, and competitive pricing pressures. The risk is that monetary policy may delay the correction but not prevent it. Given the deterioration in the global economy and policy uncertainty at home, when the correction does come, it will be all the more unanticipated.

Market skepticism, asset purchase limitations, and the potential adverse effects of greater negative yields on banks are all issues we see challenging risk assets. We continue to hope that the U.S. will develop policies that jointly address the U.S.’s need for strong demand and full employment and the rest of the world’s need for dollars by channeling foreign capital into productive, job-creating domestic investment.

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Slowing Global Growth

The pace of global growth is slowing this year as policy uncertainty takes its toll on the world’s economy. Data points to the global economy expanding by 3.3% this year, slower than 2018’s 3.6% pace, with trade volumes declining and business sentiment deteriorating. ^v

Economic and market risks are elevated as a result of the U.S. administration’s use of tariffs at a time when global growth is slowing. The prospect of a prolonged U.S.-China trade war, the lack of clarity around Brexit, and political and economic upheaval in countries like Venezuela have combined to generate downside risks to the outlook.

The stakes are high for this year’s European Parliamentary elections where the populists are likely to continue gaining ground, while lingering tensions and a lack of progress in Brexit negotiations raise the odds of a “hard Brexit” scenario. Another near-term risk, which was cited in the November FSR (Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report, May 2019) is elevated tensions between the European Commission and Italy over Italy’s budget plan, which had raised the country’s borrowing costs and prompted worries about its long-term fiscal sustainability. ^vi These concerns have been deferred for now, as Italy and the European Commission agreed on a budget plan for 2019, but Italy still faces longer-run fiscal challenges.

European economies have notable international financial and economic linkages, and a sharp economic downturn in Europe would affect banks, markets, and the global economy. Financial market volatility in Europe could spill over to global markets, including the United States, leading to a pullback of investors and financial institutions from riskier assets, which could amplify declines in equity prices and increases in credit spreads. In addition, spillover effects from banks in Europe could be transmitted to the U.S. financial system directly through credit exposures as well as indirectly through the common participation of globally active banks in a broad range of activities and markets. The consequent U.S. dollar appreciation and weaker global demand in such a scenario would depress the U.S. economy through trade channels, which could reduce earnings of some U.S. businesses, particularly exporters. Such effects could harm the creditworthiness of affected U.S. businesses, particularly those that already have high levels of debt.

Amid the uncertainty, global central banks have moved to the sidelines. Even with the economic expansion in its tenth year, contained inflation pressures have removed any urgency for central banks to act.

 

Theme 2: China’s Non-Financial Sector is Dangerously Over Leveraged

In China, the pace of economic growth has been slowing over the past several years, and a long period of rapid credit expansion has left the non-financial sector highly indebted and lenders more exposed in the event of a further slowdown.

Developments that significantly strain the repayment capacity of Chinese borrowers and financial intermediaries, including a further slowdown in growth or a collapse in Chinese real estate prices, could trigger a collapse in this market. If problems arise in China, spill¬overs could trigger a domino effect with a broader pullback from risk-taking, declines in world trade and commodity prices, and U.S. dollar appreciation resulting. Such an event would tighten conditions in U.S. financial markets and affect the creditworthiness of U.S. firms, particularly exporters and commodity producers facing weaker demand and lower prices. ^vii

In the recently released book “Crash” by Adam Tooze, China’s credit boom is compared with other credit bubbles that ended badly. ^viii Tooze highlights that the U.K. banking sector has by far the heaviest exposure to Hong Kong and China in general — much more than the United States, Japan, or Europe. Although the Chinese have not slowed their credit bubble, they have shown an ability to restructure their banking sector in the past – in 1998 to 2005, for example – and more recently to shrink their shadow banking segment. The outlook for the global economy rides on how China manages its current credit situation. Trade-related uncertainty has made Chinese capex expansion less likely. On the monetary side, the ability to cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR), or the benchmark interest rate and on the fiscal side, the government can issue more special local government bonds are both available. If the Chinese economy does stabilize this year, China’s currency could become a global currency stabilizer.

 

 

Theme 3: The U.S. Economy Balancing Act Between Slowing Manufacturing Growth and Strong Markets

The U.S. economy continued to grow at a solid clip in the first quarter of 2019 on the back of net exports and inventory building. ^ix Growth is likely to be somewhat weaker in Q2. Despite an uneven quarterly pattern, the key driver of the U.S. economy remains the consumer. Strong demand for labour pushed the unemployment rate to a 50-year low in early 2019 and wage growth accelerated. Non-farm employment increased by 224,000 jobs in June, handily beating expectations. The resilience of business hiring is in strong contrast to the recent business surveys’ generally downbeat message. In June, the unemployment rate edged up from 3.62% to 3.67%, and average hourly earnings increased only 0.2%. ^x

With more people working and wages rising faster than inflation, we expect consumer spending to increase this year. Business investment is also forecast to contribute to the economy as companies take advantage of last year’s cut in the corporate income tax rate and other supportive policies.

On trade policy, the U.S. is the instigator and the perpetuator. The recent removal of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and the Trump Administration’s desire to ratify the new trade agreement with Canada and Mexico had dampened some of the pressures within North America. Unfortunately, the positive sentiment was crushed in late May when the U.S. threatened to levy tariffs on Mexican imports in order to force its southern neighbor to stem the flow of migrants. Tensions between the U.S. and China, meanwhile, have become increasingly heated after the U.S. bumped up tariff rates and made threats to expand the list of products affected.

The Fed can claim mission accomplished on getting the economy to full employment with most inflation measures at or slightly below the 2% target. Maintaining these conditions is the challenge now facing U.S. policymakers. The FOMC appears content to hold the fed funds rate at a slightly below neutral level as a nod to the risks to the economic outlook coming from an unpredictable presidency.

 

Theme 4: Canada Is Not an Island

Were Canada an island insulated from global developments, there would be little reason for concern about the economy. Growth is solid, the labor market is strong, and there is no sign of imbalances. But Canada is not an island, and global economic developments matter for its economy. With the global outlook having darkened in recent months, it is fair to say that downside risks prevail in Canada at this point, even if the domestic economy looks fine.

Falling oil prices and a deepening in the housing-market correction saw Canada’s economy grow at just a 0.3% annualized rate in the last quarter of 2018 and contributed to the economy growing at a similar pace in the first quarter of this year. ^xi A recovery in oil production, easing of pressure in the housing market and the end of an unseasonably cold winter saw the economy post a solid increase in March, paving the way for stronger gains ahead.

Canada’s own tensions with the U.S. have eased with the removal of U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs along with Canadian retaliatory measures. But the ongoing close integration of cross-border production chains means that anything that hurts the U.S. industrial sector will have spillovers to Canada. Concerns about a slowing in global growth could also spill over to Canada’s resource-producing regions via lower commodity prices.

Canadian business confidence has weakened with the manufacturing sentiment index slipping into negative territory in April for the first time in more than three years. ^xii Global policy uncertainty, frictions with the U.S., and the Chinese government’s banning of Canadian canola all played into the decline.

Although the recent removal of tariffs on steel and aluminum by both the Canadian and U.S. governments and renewed efforts to ratify the updated NAFTA set up to restore confidence, the impact will be limited by the persistence of tensions between the U.S., China, Europe, and Mexico, Canada’s top trading partners. We view the Bank of Canada as more likely to cut rates later this year than not, but we expect those cuts to arrive after the Fed cuts. The difference in timing and magnitude may give the Canadian dollar a slight upward bias relative to its southern neighbor but likely not a large enough one to pose economic danger.

Should significant problems arise in China, spill¬over effects could include a broader pullback from risk-taking, declines in world trade and commodity prices, and U.S. dollar appreciation. The effects on global markets could be exacerbated if they deepen the stresses in already vulnerable EMEs. These dynamics could tighten conditions in U.S. financial markets and affect the creditworthiness of U.S. firms, particularly exporters and commodity producers facing weaker demand and lower prices.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth While the U.S. Fed Pulls Back on Tightening Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. June 2019 Portfolio Models

Our outlook is focused on tension between politics, policy, and the positioning of the corporate sector. The world economy remains vulnerable to the U.S-China power play. If tariffs persist or are ramped up further, already-weak world trade volumes will struggle to gain traction. In addition, rising political conflict (Brexit and Italy) and uncertainty have weighed on business sentiment over the past year and global capex is stalling. The dovish stance by central banks supports our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months.

China is committed to maintaining 6% growth and will respond to any slowing with further easing. ^xiii The U.S. and China have each raised tariffs and appear to be broadening the conflict to their respective tech sectors. The results of the European Parliament elections showed a significant step up in support for populist parties, who now control 28% of total seats in Parliament, up from 22% before. Turnout in the elections was low at 37%, some 30%-35% lower than may be expected in a general election or second referendum. ^xiv The Brexit Party’s win (mostly at the expense of the Conservatives) sent the message that many voters are willing to support a no-deal.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

July 14, 2019

 

ⁱTrading Economics, U.S. Balance of Trade. July 3, 2019.
ⁱⁱTrading Economics, U.S. Balance of Trade. July 3, 2019.
ⁱⁱⁱCaceres, C., and Cerdeiro, D. A., 2019. IMF Working Paper. Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and Western Hemisphere Department. Trade Wars and Trade Deals: Estimated Effects using a Multi-Sector Model.

^ivAhir, H., Bloom, N., Furceri, D. Caution: Trade uncertainty is rising and can harm the global economy. 4 July 2019. The source for the data on key dates in the U.S.-China trade negotiations comes from Bown and Kolb (2019). Item #6 comes from the BBC (2019). Note 1: The font in blue indicates the tariff measure taken, and the font in black indicates the narrative of the World Trade Uncertainty index. The WTU index is computed by counting the frequency of uncertain (or the variant) that are near the following words: protectionism, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), tariff, trade, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) in EIU country reports. The WUI is then normalized by total number of words and rescaled by multiplying by 100,000. A higher number means higher trade uncertainty and vice versa. Note 2: The WUI is computed by counting the frequency of uncertain (or the variant) in Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. The WUI is then normalized by total number of words and rescaled by multiplying by 1,000. The WUI is then normalized by total number of words, rescaled by multiplying by 1,000, and using the average of 1996Q1 to 2010Q4 such that 1996Q1-2010Q4 = 100. A higher number means higher uncertainty and vice versa. While the latest spike is the result of uncertainty over Brexit and US trade policy, trade uncertainty explains more than 70% of the increase in uncertainty since the first quarter of 2018.

^vIMF. World Economic Outlook. Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery. April 2019.
^viFederal Reserve Financial Stability Report. Near-Term Risks to the Financial System. May 2019.
^viiFederal Reserve Financial Stability Report. Near-Term Risks to the Financial System. May 2019.
^viiiTooze, A., “Health of the Global Banking Sector: Differences by Region.” Columbia University.
^ixTrading Economics, U.S. GDP. June 27, 2019.
^xBureau of Labor Statistics. Economic News Release. Employment Situation Summary. July 5, 2019.
^xiTrading Economics, Canada GDP. July 11, 2019.
^xiiTrading Economics, Canada GDP. July 11, 2019.
^xiiiSouth China Morning Post. China lowers 2019 GDP growth target to 6-6.5 per cent range. March 5, 2019.
^xivJ.P. Morgan Economic Research. Global Data Watch. May 31, 2019.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 1. Q2 2019 Outlook

 

Multiple Factors Raise the Prospect of Risk Asset Volatility

As we look forward to the second quarter of 2019, we expect to experience greater volatility.

Capital around the world moves to markets where it sees the greatest opportunity and to escape other relatively riskier international environments. The U.S. is the largest economy and the largest democracy in the world, and its importance relates to its dominant role in global macro policy setting and driving financial conditions. This is largely driven by relative interest rates, currency differentials, and perceived safety/risk. Common sources of macro risk including the Fed, energy prices, geopolitics, inflation shocks, regulatory change, sovereign risk, elections, and fiscal-policy dysfunction can affect both single stock volatility within an asset class and the correlation among stocks and bonds. ⁱ

Volatility in equity markets around the world has reinvigorated debates about its root cause, as has the recent reversal. After the significant drawdowns and large price swings in risk assets in late 2018, volatility dropped sharply, and returns were positive. The S&P 500 rebounded 13.6% during Q1 as interest rates declined in the United States. ⁱⁱ Why this reversal and reduction in volatility has come about is the focus of our current outlook.

Studies confirm that there is a direct link between macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty, and volatility and correlations within markets and asset classes. In our Q1 2019 Outlook we highlighted the focus on downside risks both domestically and globally in the markets and in the broader economy.

A negative feedback loop had emerged, centered in the U.S., linking bad policy choices to falling asset prices, tighter financial conditions, and weaker corporate earnings. One of the principal drivers to the sell-off in risk assets in the latter part of 2018 was the fear of a policy mistake by the Federal Reserve and by the unexpectedly hawkish rhetoric of key Fed officials. A more dovish and growth supportive Fed has emerged in 2019, driven primarily by the Federal Reserve’s more dovish rhetoric regarding both further interest rate rises in the U.S. and reversal of its quantitative easing program and the progress on U.S./China trade.

In March, the U.S. Fed’s Beige Book reported a slight increase in growth, as the negative impact of the government shutdown was seen in autos, restaurants, and manufacturing, where consumer spending was slow. ⁱⁱⁱ The Fed met and stayed pat, leaving its interest rates unchanged, as expected, and signaled that there would be no additional interest rate increases for 2019, and that it would end its balance sheet reduction in September.

Despite this, we expect higher volatility to be present for the remainder of 2019. The array of outcomes for key macroeconomic variables is broadening as the U.S. cycle matures. This suggests that the overall volatility regime should be higher across assets as investors demand a higher risk premium for the increased uncertainty.

On the geopolitical front, does progress on trade talks between the U.S. and China negate the likely influence of geopolitical risk across markets over the medium term?

Not in our view.
The current trade war between the U.S. and China has already hurt business confidence and weighed on growth. While recent discussions between the two countries appear to have been more constructive, behind the recent headlines are deep seated issues regarding geopolitical influence, national security, and technological intellectual property. In our view, these are very unlikely to be resolved, even if U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are lifted.

Heightened geopolitical risks are embedded and likely to impact multiple asset classes for the foreseeable future. The forces of protectionism and populism are deeply entrenched. Risks remain elevated with the Brexit outcome still uncertain, upcoming elections in the European Union, and the leadup to the U.S. 2020 presidential election campaign. The current U.S. administration is unpredictable and the risk that President Trump follows through with tariffs on European auto exports as a result of its Section 232 investigation, and that he continues to be unpredictable in all aspects of international diplomacy, are very real. ^iv

We focus on minimizing capital losses by recognizing macro and geopolitical risks that are present and expected over our forecast time horizon. The Frame Global Asset Management investment process monitors the global movement of capital into and out of the United States. Few investment models are centered on the movement of capital into markets driven by the macroeconomy. Markets are forward looking, and when we look at the behavior of markets, we see that they eventually reflect the reality of the current and anticipated future macroenvironment. Our investment process incorporates this eventuality. Traditional investment managers are handicapped when their portfolios are “macroeconomic regime” agnostic. We make extensive use of our internal expertise in interpreting economic data. In executing our process successfully, we exploit these inefficiencies and provide our clients with superior outcomes as we focus on minimizing capital losses.

We recognize that aversion to loss is rooted in a current, ongoing, or future need for income as well as an expectation that the value of the investment will be recovered at a future point in time. The lower yield environment that has existed since the global financial crisis in 2008 has also created a greater awareness of the challenges to attaining income goals.

While much attention is paid to asymmetrical pain suffered when experiencing losses compared to gains of the same amount, the reality is that mathematics creates real differences in loss outcomes. A loss of 50% requires a recovery in dollars equal to 100% to make up the lost ground. It is not merely a feeling; it is a real hit to wealth and a hit to the ability to recover on a reduced asset base. Percentages create a sliding scale of absolute dollar returns as the base on which the percent is applied moves up and down, above and below the original investment value. While time may help in recovering from early in the investment period losses, the withdrawal of income along the way has a significant impact on the ability of the investment to grow, particularly when the hits to growth occur early in the investment period. In the most basic sense, the problem comes from differences between steady timing of withdrawals and the unpredictable swings in the fund’s investment value (see graph below).

We believe that multiple factors across the developed world raise the prospect of risk asset volatility as global growth slows down in the second quarter of 2019. High volatility increases the chances that you will be taking money out when the portfolio is down, forcing you to lock in your losses. The impact can be particularly damaging if the downturn happens early in the withdrawal period.

We will be monitoring these risk factors and adjusting our portfolio models to protect you from this risk.

 

 

 

Section 2. Four Themes

 

Theme 1: Slowing Global Growth

After the synchronized growth of 2017, the rate of acceleration in global economic growth has moderated quite significantly over the past year. The best explanation for the slowdown in global growth is that country-specific problems have started to weigh on activity in the world’s three major economic regions, the U.S., China, and Europe, and have then been amplified through various feedback loops. In addition, it’s possible that political uncertainties are beginning to weigh on business investment in some countries, especially those in Europe.
While it is common for global downturns to have their roots in several different areas, the current situation is unlike the last downturn in 2008-09 which was unusual both because of its size and because it had a single cause (debt and housing).

The World Trade Organization said global trade shrank by 0.3% in the fourth quarter and estimates will grow by just 2.6% in 2019, down from 3% in 2018. ^v Global GDP growth has slowed from 3.8% year over year in the first quarter of last year to around 3% year over year currently. Though that may not seem significant, the IMF has previously suggested that a figure below 3% constitutes a global recession. ^vi So this is serious.

The major driver of the slowdown is the lagged impact of tightening financial conditions globally and trade tensions impacting business sentiment and investment. Momentum across recent macroeconomic data releases for major economies has been clearly negative with little sign of durable stabilization.

At a sectoral level, manufacturing has borne the brunt of the downturn, resulting in a sharp decline in global trade. In contrast, the service sector has been relatively resilient.

The U.S. economy has held up relatively well so far, but the monthly activity data and business surveys are now pointing to a more marked slowdown in growth in 2019. The relatively high quality of U.S. data releases further enhances its importance as emerging global impulses are often identified most clearly in the Unites States.

While China’s economy is smaller and its data releases are more difficult to read, its outsized contribution to global growth and its central role in global supply chains has enhanced its importance in global data watching. There is a series of thematic trends driving China’s economy in the future, including the rebalancing of global capital toward Chinese markets, data-driven innovation, industrial upgrading, sustained growth in the consumer sector, and the reorienting of China’s trade relationship. The last ten years of stimulus and deleveraging is a story of “eight-plus-two.” Eight years of government stimulus after the global financial crisis, followed by a couple years of conscious deleveraging and credit reduction. Since 2016, regulators have acknowledged growth challenges and emphasized deleveraging. The government’s crackdown on shadow banking and peer-to-peer lending, including arrests of executives, is having an additional dampening effect on the flow of credit. This has led to a significant drop in credit availability over the past 24 months. Growth in outstanding credit fell to 7% in 2018 from 13% in 2017, below nominal GDP growth of 9.7%. ^vii

There is now evidence of cooling of Chinese GDP growth, especially since the middle of last year, and sales of cars and smartphones have been dropping steeply. Some high-profile companies are flashing warnings of plunging sales and some even of job cuts. The pain is felt in broader Asia as well, home to some of the world’s most export-reliant economies. The McKinsey Global Institute’s Economic Activity Index, which tracks the performance of the Chinese economy using a basket of 57 different indicators ranging from retail and property sales to electricity consumption, measures the dipping trend line in China’s official GDP numbers. ^viii

Despite the doom and gloom, China continues to demonstrate one of the strongest growth rates in the world, adding the equivalent of “another Australia” each year. Consumers continue to trade up to more expensive premium goods and some companies are registering record sales. China’s effort to rebalance the economy toward consumption and services contributed about 76% and 60% of its GDP growth, respectively. ^ix

We also know that the slowdown has been particularly severe in Europe. Europe is not as large as the U.S. and does not contribute to global growth as much as China, but Europe’s latest political and economic news raises the risk that it will be the source of a significant negative global shock this year.

While the ECB said that it will start its third program to stimulate bank lending to counter a softening economy and that it would hold rates low at least through 2019, these programs have been contributing to greater macro-policy lead volatility.

The Western European economy comprises over 20% of global GDP and becomes a central driver of the global business cycle when it experiences a significant idiosyncratic shock. This was the case during the European sovereign crisis in 2011-13, while Europe’s acceleration in 2016-17 was a key contributor to strong synchronized growth phase. ^x

Looking to the U.K., the recent descent of U.K. politics into chaos raises a global threat. It is increasingly difficult to see the U.K. navigating through this mess without a general election. However, both the Conservative and Labour parties are being led from extreme positions, and it is unclear that an election will result with the consensus needed to forge a deal. Although the EU Council of Ministers threat of a “no deal” deadline to force the U.K. into making quick decisions will likely be relaxed in the event of a general election, uncertainty will linger and weigh on U.K. and EU growth.

We continue to monitor global growth.

 

Theme 2: Inverted Yield Curve and Recession Risk

Equity market corrections don’t have a great history of predicting recessions but yield curve inversions have been more reliable. In fact, since 1977, every yield curve inversion has been followed by a period of economic contraction, measured by GDP. ^xi

On March 20, the Fed announced that it would keep rates unchanged, holding its policy rate between 2.25% and 2.5%. ^xii In addition, the central bank alluded to no more rate hikes for the rest of 2019 after initially forecasting two. The central bank has been on a path towards asset reduction, which they say would come prior to the end of 2019. Following the Fed announcement, on March 22, the U.S. yield curve inverted with the 10-year Treasury yield dipping below the 3-month T-bill yield for the first time since 2007. The inversion lasted five trading days and then tipped positive again. Combined with the length of the post-crisis expansion and deteriorating economic data, the inverted yield curve has stirred fears that the countdown to the next downturn has already begun.

Post-crisis regulation encouraged banks to keep more money in ultra-safe assets, and it is hard to find anything safer than U.S. Treasuries. The Fed is still sitting on $3.7 trillion of Treasuries held prior and acquired through bond-buying programs, while negative interest rates and quantitative easing programs in Europe and Japan have nurtured demand for highly rated debt. ^xiii Combined with secular forces such as technology and demographics that keep inflation low, longer-term yields are expected to be kept down.

Complicating the issue is that the U.S. government is financing much of its budget deficit by issuing short-term bills rather than longer-term bonds. We expect that the recently shrinking Fed’s balance sheet and interest rate increases will continue to exert upward pressure on Treasury bill yields. We may prefer to look at the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields as a cleaner measure of the curve’s shape. This spread has remained positive. The 2-year and 30-year spread, another popular measure, has steepened this year, muddying the yield curve’s signal. Japan, the U.K., and Germany have all seen inversions in the past without suffering recessions. However, this does not negate the signal the yield curve is sending.

We will continue to monitor the yield curve along with other signs that this economic cycle is in the latter stages: slowing global economic activity, soft earnings growth, and historically high corporate leverage.

 

 

Theme 3: The Role of Gold When Investors Seek to Minimize Drawdown Rather than Maximize Performance

There are now broad-based signs of slower growth in most major economies, including the U.S., the Eurozone, Japan, and China. In a contraction, the best performing asset classes are cash, government bonds, and gold.

Investors embraced gold for six months up to February of this year. The price of gold rose 14% from August 15, 2018 to February 20, 2019, as economic uncertainty and heightened volatility dominated markets. ^xiv Since then volatility has declined, putting a damper on gold prices at the end of February.

While no clear evidence points to an immediate positive impact on the price of gold after the Fed pauses, gold did move up during the days when the yield curve inverted in March. Historical analysis suggests that gold eventually reacts positively as the pause cycle extends and/or the Fed eases monetary policy. Historical post-tightening periods have shown an eventual strong gold performance, counterbalancing the performance of risk assets such as stocks or commodities, and complementing assets such as Treasuries and corporate bonds.

Gold consumption has seen geographical changes over the past decade. Gold demand seems to have moved ‘West to East’ as emerging markets have become larger consumers of gold. China and India currently make up over 50% of global consumer demand while the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan have become less significant consumers. ^xv

The 2008 crisis prompted a change in central bank behavior. Sales by Western central banks were more than offset by gold purchases by emerging central banks, whose reserves increased strongly due to their external surpluses linked to their rising share of global trade (China in particular) as well as rising commodity prices (Russia). The major buyers of gold since 2000 among central banks have been large emerging countries such as China, Russia, India, and Turkey. ^xvi

Over 20 central banks added gold to their foreign reserves in 2018, some after multi-year absences. In a recent survey by the World Gold Council, 76% of central banks viewed gold’s role as a safe haven asset as highly relevant, while 59% cited its effectiveness as a portfolio diversifier. Additionally, almost 1/5th of central banks signaled their intention to increase gold purchases over the next 12 months. ^xvii

Many Emerging market central banks have continued to diversify their exposure to US dollars, and gold has been a key beneficiary. European central banks who have bought gold include Poland, Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. The desire to de-dollarize foreign exchange reserves, in response to deteriorating geo-political relations in some parts of the world, motivated purchases. Other central banks bought gold for diversification and, in Hungary’s case, partly as a hedge against structural changes in the international financial system.

We model gold as an asset class and will be watching the economic conditions that benefit gold as we move through 2019.

 

Theme 4: The U.S. Dollar Role as Reserve Currency

By the end of the 20th century, the US dollar was considered the world’s most dominant reserve currency. The world’s need for dollars has allowed the U.S. government, and Americans, to borrow at lower costs. Any change in confidence in the U.S. currency, due to economic and political factors, impacts the strength or weakness of the dollar.

During the first quarter, the U.S. dollar appreciated slightly with the U.S. Dollar Index (DXY) rising 1.2%. The euro declined 0.2%, the yen declined 1.1%, and the Brazilian real declined 1.0% against the U.S. dollar, while the Canadian dollar was up 2.2% and the Mexican peso was up 1.1% against the dollar. ^xviii

Continuing the trend since 1971, rising private and public debt is a source of structural U.S. current account deficits, which may eventually translate into dollar depreciation. The US dollar experienced a 2.85% average annual depreciation against gold (from $35/ounce in August 1971 to the $1,282/ounce level observed as of the end of 2018). ^xix

In the first quarter, the trade-weighted index was down only 1%, with depreciation against only one-third of G10 currencies while depreciating against two-thirds of EM ones. ^xx Over the past 25 years, both blocs have either appreciated against the dollar (32% of quarters) or appreciated (45%). It’s unusual for these two blocs to move in different directions. This year, the dollar has gained against most major currencies but declined against most EMs. Strong country-specific influences outside the U.S. explain this anomaly.

Currencies are a relative price; typically driven by relative growth and relative monetary policy rather than the U.S.’s absolute fundamentals. Correlations between Fed policy and the dollar are more difficult to predict, explaining why U.S. equity strength can occur alongside both a strong dollar (31% of instances) and a weak dollar (37% of instances). ^xxi The dollar is behaving as expected by declining with yields, even if the pairwise performance is quite mixed given that many non-U.S. economies have experienced more disappointing growth and greater declines in yields this year.
We will be watching this potential de-correlation within currencies as non-U.S. conditions change.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

Slowing Global Growth While the U.S. Fed Pulls Back on Tightening Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. March 2019 Portfolio Models

In March, we held our asset allocation constant at the February allocations. Allocation to Equities remains at 30% in Tactical Conservative, 40% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 50% in Tactical Growth, and 60% in Tactical Aggressive Growth, continuing the exposure to U.S. equities, with the balance in all models allocated to U.S. municipal bonds and mid-term U.S. treasuries. This asset allocation continues to reflect our concerns that the U.S. economy is slowing but is more stable than other global equity markets and the relative attractiveness of interest rates in the U.S. versus the rest of the world.

Geopolitical risks remain elevated with Brexit’s outcome uncertain, upcoming elections in the European Union, and the leadup to the U.S. 2020 presidential election campaign likely to impact economic growth and markets. In addition, the combined effects of sanctions on Iran’s and Venezuela’s oil sectors, Saudi Arabia’s need to push oil prices up in order to get its finances in order, and of the recent agreement by OPEC and other countries to cut production means that geopolitics could have an outsized impact on oil prices over the next several months.

Progress on U.S./China trade negotiations and the Federal Reserve’s more dovish rhetoric regarding further interest rate hikes have not convinced us to change our forward outlook that expects the U.S. economy to experience stagnation over the next twelve months.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

April 14, 2019

 

ⁱVolatility is a statistical measure of dispersion of returns for a security. Volatility is measured using the standard deviation or variance of returns of that security. A higher volatility means that the security’s value covers a larger range. Correlation is a statistical measure that indicates the extent to which two or more variables fluctuate together. A positive correlation indicates the extent to which those variables increase or decrease in parallel; a negative correlation indicates the extent to which two or more variables more in opposite directions.
ⁱⁱS&P Dow Jones U.S. Dashboard, March 2019.
ⁱⁱⁱThe Beige Book. Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions, By Federal Reserve District. March 6, 2019.
^ivOn March 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed two proclamations placing tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum. The tariffs are authorized under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on the grounds of national security.
^vWorld Trade Organization. Global trade growth loses momentum as trade tensions persist. Press/837. April 2nd, 2019.
^viCapital Economics. The Chief Economists Note. Taking stock of the health of the global economy. March 18, 2019.
^viiMcKinsey & Company. China Brief: The state of the economy. March 2019.
^viiiMcKinsey & Company. China Brief: The state of the economy. March 2019.
^ixMcKinsey & Company. China Brief: The state of the economy. March 2019.
^xJ.P. Morgan. Global Data Watch. Economic Research. March 22, 2019.
^xiAmadio, Kimberley. The Balance. Inverted Yield Curve and Why It Predicts a Recession. March 26, 2019.
^xiiFederal Reserve Board. Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement. Press Release. March 20, 2019.
^xiiiFederal Reserve Board. Quarterly Report on Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Developments. March 23, 2019.
^xivBloomberg.
^xvReade, John. World Gold Council. Gold Investor, February 2019. February 12, 2019.
^xviAmundi. Investment Insights Blue Paper. Gold in central banks’ asset allocation. March 2019.
^xviiGopaul, Krishan. World Gold Council. Goldhub blog. Strong start for central bank demand in 2019. April 8, 2019.
^xviiiBloomberg.
^xixAmundi. Investment Insights Blue Paper. Gold in central banks’ asset allocation. March 2019.
^xxJ.P. Morgan. Cross-Asset Strategy. The J.P. Morgan View. April 5, 2019.
^xxiJ.P. Morgan. Cross-Asset Strategy. The J.P. Morgan View. April 5, 2019.