A global recession in 2020 is all but confirmed as nations shut down economic activity to limit the spread of COVID-19. The virus is unique in that it is a demand shock and supply shock, and also a negative wealth, oil price, and credit shock. There will be a wide range of subsequent effects. We are monitoring these developments and have updated our previous Stagnation followed by Recession outlook for the U.S. economy to reflect a Recession in March, extending through to the end of the year, as the situation will deteriorate further before beginning to recover.

There is evidence that the disease has likely peaked in China. The Bloomberg China Economic Recovery Index shows that 70% of economic activity was restored by March 9th, up from just 27% at the beginning of February.1 A coordinated global response has started to emerge. Based on the experience in China, virus incidents are unlikely to peak in Europe and the U.S. until June.

The Russia-Saudi spat that has resulted in the current global oil glut and the expected decline in demand due to this pandemic will keep oil prices low with mixed effect across economies. It will have a negative impact on oil-exporting emerging markets outside Asia, while also affecting oil-and-gas related capital expenditure in the U.S. Net oil importers in Europe and Asia will be beneficiaries although the stronger US dollar will offset a portion of the benefit.

In January, a record 31.8 million Americans were employed in retail trade, hotels and motels, air transportation, restaurants and other eating places, arts, entertainment and recreation, and offices of real estate agents & brokers.2 Many of these establishments have seen their businesses collapse in recent weeks and have reduced their payrolls significantly. As we enter the third week in March, 158 million Americans have been told to stay home from work and other activities.3 This doesn’t include the multiplier effects on other industries. Initial unemployment claims and the unemployment rate are soaring and will remain high through the second quarter.

Market behavior in recent weeks has broken records for the speed of its decline. It took only 16 trading sessions for the S&P 500 to fall 20% from its highs, the quickest descent into bear market territory on record.4 U.S. equities were battered in February, down 13% from their peak on February 19th. The S&P 500 was down 8.2%, while smaller caps lagged, with the S&P Midcap 400 and the S&P SmallCap 600 down 9.5% and 9.6%, respectively. The S&P/TSX Composite was down 5.9%.

Asian equities took part in the sell-off, with the S&P Pan Asia BMI closing the month with a decline of 6.6%. European equities struggled in the face of a broader global sell-off. The S&P Europe 350 dropped 8.6% on the month. U.K. equities continued to lag their European counterparts; the S&P United Kingdom declined 9.0% on the month, returning all of its gains from the past 12 months.

In March, we maintained the asset allocation positioning that we established on February 19th. This reflects our view on deflationary and recessionary influences that dominate the global economy.  Allocation to equities was reduced in February to 12% in Tactical Conservative, 17% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 26% in Tactical Growth, and 34% in Tactical Aggressive Growth. In February, within the Fixed Income allocation, we added the 20+ year Treasury Bond. As of March 25th, the 10- year treasury yield has declined by 1.577% since the start of the year, rewarding this position. Gold continues to be present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class.

Historically, central bank stimulus is bullish for bullion. In the early days of the selloff, safe haven assets such as gold and treasuries sold off when margin calls on equities and credit occurred as equity portfolio managers were sitting with record-low cash buffers. Gold provides diversification in a portfolio and is correlated with the stock market, becoming inversely correlated during periods of stress. In a world of historically low interest rates, gold is a safe-haven. Similar short-term movement was seen in the ten-year note and in State and Local government bonds and Mortgaged Back Securities guaranteed by the federal government in response to liquidity funding requirements.

The shape of the recovery from the pandemic and for the global economy are highly correlated.  The second-order effects of schools closing, businesses closing due to staff absence, and a paralysis in consumer and corporate confidence will create challenges for commerce and credit markets. Policymakers will need to protect both supply and demand by providing ample liquidity to banks and corporations, in order to minimize the risk of default and job losses. The trend towards global populism and protectionism remains a risk to the recovery. We expect to see prolonged disinflation. We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame , President and CIO

 

1Bloomberg. China Economic Recovery Index. March 9, 2020.

2Trading Economics, United States Employed Persons. January 2020.

3New York Times, World Coronavirus Updates. March 23, 2020.

4Financial Times. “S&P 500 suffers its quickest fall into bear market on record”. March 13, 2020.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. February 28, 2020. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

 

 

The coronavirus outbreak in China has generated economic waves that are disrupting global supply networks that act as the backbone of the global economy and comes as the global economy was already cooling off. Profit warnings from companies with significant operations in China and abroad have begun. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy will shift to Recession beginning in the back half of the twelve-month time horizon.

China is likely heading into a consumer recession, as auto sales there plunged 18% year over year in January to their lowest level in eight years.1 China accounts for 16% of global GDP on a US dollar basis, compared to 4% in 2003.2 In 2019, China accounted for 75% of total world oil demand.3 Commodities markets have tumbled as factories are idled. Iron ore demand is down more than 10% this year. Copper and nickel are down about 8%, while zinc and aluminum are both down more than 5% in 2020.4

In Japan, the world’s third-largest economy declined 1.6% in the fourth quarter of 2019 as the country absorbed the effects of a sales tax hike and a powerful typhoon. It was Japan’s largest contraction compared to the previous quarter since 2014.5

The U.K. and Germany managed to escape a technical recession while France and Italy contracted. Switzerland’s core CPI declined 0.5% sequentially in January. Italy, Germany, and France experienced a 2.7% decline in December industrial production. EU auto sales also declined 7.4% YoY in January.6 The UK’s future trade relationship with the EU remains unanswered. Brexit has already cost the UK economy between 2.5-3.0% of lost output.7 The final economic bill will depend on the extent to which EU trade is disrupted as the UK pursues greater autonomy over regulation, migration, and state aid.

In the U.S. the budget deficit to GDP ratio stands at 4.9%, up from 4.3% a year ago. The last time we saw this level was in May 2013 when the unemployment rate was 400 basis points higher than it is today at 7.5%.8 January nonfarm employment growth was 225,000 jobs. While the unemployment rate ticked up to 3.6%, this increase was driven by a jump in labor force participation.9 The coronavirus impact will be felt in the U.S., resulting in weaker exports, imports, and inventories. Canada’s economy has stalled as transportation activity has been disrupted by blockades set up by anti-pipeline protestors. Real manufacturing shipments fell 0.4% in December and real retail sales were flat. A recent rise in insolvencies comes amid a relatively robust job market.10

U.S. equities started the year strongly, but gains were erased towards the end of the month as a result of coronavirus fears. The S&P 500 was flat in January while the S&P MidCap 400 and the S&P SmallCap 600 were down 2.6% and 4.0%, respectively. Canadian equities were positive, with the S&P/TSX Composite up 1.7%. The S&P Europe 350 finished January with a loss of 1.3%, ending a four-month streak of gains. The S&P United Kingdom lagged its European counterparts in January, with the index declining 3.3% in pound sterling terms. U.S. fixed income performance was positive across the board, with treasuries and corporates leading the way. The decline in the U.S. long bond’s yield reflects a confluence of factors including easy Federal Reserve monetary policy, concerns about the COVID-19 epidemic’s impact on economic growth, and an absence of inflationary pressures. Gold is continuing its advance, after breaking out from a six-year base formation, rising as the US dollar rises, not the usual correlation.

In February, we reduced exposure to U.S. equities across all models and reintroduced the U.S. long-term Treasury Bond. This reflects our view on deflationary influences that dominate the global economy. Allocation to equities was reduced to 12% in Tactical Conservative, 17% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 26% in Tactical Growth, and 34% in Tactical Aggressive Growth. Within the Fixed Income allocation, we added the 20+ year Treasury Bond as long rates are expected to decline further. Gold continues to be present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class.

The trend towards populism and protectionist policy remains a risk to the stability of global financial markets and the COVID-19 outbreak is likely to delay recovery and intensify disinflation. We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, President and CIO

 

Trading Economics, China Vehicle Sales. February 13, 2020.

Visual Capitalist. 70 Years of China Economic Growth. October 12, 2019.

Trading Economics, China Imports of Fuel Oil. February 2020.

Trading Economics, Commodity Prices. February 2020.

Trading Economics, Japan Q4 2019 GDP. February 2020.

Trading Economics, E.U. Economic Data. February 2020.

Oxford Economics. Brexit. February 2020.

Trading Economics, U.S. Debt to GDP. February 2020.

Trading Economics, U.S. Non-Farm Payrolls. February 2020.

10 Trading Economics, Canada Insolvencies. February 2020.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. January 31, 2020. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

Global growth is projected to reach 2.5% in 20201. Reduced trade uncertainty combined with last year’s easing in financial conditions helped business sentiment stabilize in many major economies. The U.S. dollar benefitted from safe-haven demand over the past year amid this trade uncertainty. Global manufacturing activity generally remains soft; the global manufacturing PMI fell to 50.1 in December, consistent with stagnation.2 Trade challenges between the world’s two largest economies are likely to continue, with no long-term deal to tackle structural issues and imbalances between the U.S. and China. Growth forecasts for advanced and developing economies have been revised down as a result of weaker than expected trade and manufacturing activity. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.

GDP growth in China has slowed to 6% in the third quarter of 2019, its slowest pace in about 30 years.3 Policymakers are focused on measures to limit risks arising from excessive debt burdens, even if it means weaker rates of growth. An uptick in infrastructure projects towards the end of last year has been the main driver of growth. Eurozone growth continues to underperform, dampened by the gradual slowdown in China, the ongoing Brexit saga, White House protectionism, and the threat of more tariffs. The accommodative policy measures implemented by the ECB and fiscal policy should continue to prop up the economy. Concern grows about the corrosive side effects of negative interest rates as the ECB’s bond-buying program nears its self-imposed limits.

The U.S. leads the global charge as their economy is entering its eleventh year of expansion, the longest on record. The consumer remains the main source of strength due to strong job gains and low interest rates that have bolstered spending. While the U.S. has proven successful in securing a trade deal with Canada and Mexico and extracting a “phase one” trade agreement with China, vulnerabilities remain due to their sizeable trade deficit. As a share of GDP, the U.S.’s goods trade deficit over the last two years has narrowed only marginally below the last decade average, driven mainly by a slight reduction in U.S. import demand, where lower merchandise imports from China have been replaced by imports from Mexico, Europe, and developing countries in Asia.4 The PMI for the sector hit its lowest level in a decade in December.5 Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the American public strongly opposed to further major conflicts in the Middle East and a direct conflict with Iran would raise downside risks to business activity. For Canada, healthy demand stateside and receding North American (USMCA) trade tensions helped facilitate the much-needed rotation towards exports and business investment from the consumer and housing sector in the fourth quarter.

One of the most notable effects of last year’s Fed rate cuts was support for asset prices. U.S. equities ended 2019 strongly with the S&P 500 up 31.5% for the year, despite lackluster profits, slowing global growth, and recession fears. It is worth noting that a late-2018 selloff provided a flattering comparison for 2019. Mega-caps dominated as gains for the S&P MidCap 400 and the S&P SmallCap 600 were 26.2% and 22.8% for the year, and 2.8% and 3.0% for December, respectively, while the S&P 500 was up 3.0% for the month. U.S. fixed income performance was positive across the board. The S&P/TSX Composite gained 22.9% during 2019 and was up 0.5% in December, closing out the decade with its best annual performance since 2009. European equities also experienced their best year since 2009 with S&P Europe 350 up 27.2% for the year and 2.1% for December. The S&P United Kingdom finished 2019 up 17.2% for the year. Commodities also rallied, with the DJCI up 10.1% and the S&P GSCI up 17.6% for the year, driven by gains in Energy and Precious Metals.

In January we maintained the December allocation between Equities and Fixed Income across all models. Allocation to equities remains at 17% in Tactical Conservative, 22% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 36% in Tactical Growth, and 44% in Tactical Aggressive Growth. Within the Fixed Income allocation, we maintained the weight of the 7-10-year maturity in order to protect the portfolio from a rebound in long rates. Gold continues to be present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class.

The trend towards populism and protectionist policy remains a risk to the stability of global financial markets while heightened geopolitical strains also have the potential to create volatility. We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame , President and CIO

 

The World Bank Group. Flagship Report. Global Economic Prospects. January 2020.

2 J.P. Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI. News Release. January 2, 2020

Trading Economics. China GDP. January 20, 2020.

Trading Economics. U.S. Goods Trade Deficit. November 26, 2019.

Trading Economics. U.S. PMI. January 2020.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. December 31, 2019. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

 

 

Section 1: Q1 2020 Outlook

 

Current Risks of a Reserve Currency Trap

The U.S. economy represents 33% of the global economy, but its spill-over effects on the rest of the world are amplified by the dominant role of the US dollar (USD) in international payments, debt issuance, and FX reserves.i

The trust and confidence that the world has in the ability of the United States to pay its debts have anointed the dollar as the most redeemable currency, facilitating world commerce. This has led to the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves throughout the global economy over the last 25 years.

As global asset allocators, our ETF Portfolio Models are exposed to foreign currency risk -primarily US dollars. Relative currency movement can be significant and have a positive or negative impact on investment returns. As with our approach to all asset classes, we want to participate on the upside and protect on the downside.

In the case of currency exposure, while we may be allocating specifically for downside protection in a non-Canadian asset class, i.e., the U.S., it may be the case that a weaker US dollar could diminish the benefit of the U.S. exposure. In these events, we apply a neutral hedge to the entire portfolio.

In this Q1 2020 Outlook, we take a look at the risks that exist of an unexpected shift in global central bank US dollar reserve balances.

The US dollar reserve status is based largely on the size and strength of the U.S. economy and the dominance of U.S. financial markets. Despite large deficit spending, trillions of dollars in foreign debt, and the printing of US dollars and US Treasury securities remain the safest store of money.

The dominance of the US dollar, reflected in its role as a global anchor for prices and interest rates, can force central banks to hold excessive USD-denominated foreign exchange reserves to match the significant USD exposure from trade and borrowing of the respective economy. The dominant role of the USD in credit and investment markets impacts investment flows to emerging economies by increasing volatility. Investment flows to emerging markets can reverse much faster than they have built up over time, making them act like very destructive pro-cyclical amplifiers in crisis situations. The role that oil prices play in the level of the USD is significant but may now be overshadowed by the sheer volume of dollar reserves that are now on the balance sheets of central banks around the globe.

 

A New Relationship Between Oil and the US Dollar

Considering the new dynamics of the global energy market, the United States has become the world’s marginal producer of oil products, and the US dollar has been seen to trade more like a petrodollar since 2015.

A barrel of oil is priced in US dollars across the world, so by definition, strength in the US dollar means it takes fewer greenbacks to buy a barrel of oil (all else equal) and weakness in the US dollar makes the price of oil appear higher in dollar terms. Each uptick and downtick in the dollar or in the price of the commodity generates an immediate realignment between the US dollar and numerous forex crosses. These movements are less correlated in nations without significant crude oil reserves, like Japan, and more correlated in nations that have significant reserves like Canada, Russia, and Brazil.

Many nations leveraged their crude oil reserves during the energy market’s historic rise between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, borrowing heavily to build infrastructure, expand military operations, and initiate social programs. Those bills came due after the 2008 economic collapse, where some countries deleveraged while others doubled down, borrowing more heavily against reserves to restore trust and trajectory to their wounded economies.

These heavier debt loads helped keep growth rates high until global crude oil prices collapsed in 2014, dumping commodity-sensitive nations into recessionary environments. Canada, Russia, Brazil, and other energy-rich countries have struggled since then.

Because the United States has historically been a net importer of oil products, rising oil prices meant that the United States’ current account deficit would rise as citizens and companies shipped more currency abroad. Due primarily to the success of horizontal drilling and fracking techniques, the U.S. shale revolution has dramatically increased domestic petroleum production. The United States became a net exporter of refined petroleum products in 2011 and has now become the third-largest producer of crude oil after Saudi Arabia and Russia.iii According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States is currently about 90% self-sufficient in terms of total energy consumption.iv Economically, this means that higher oil prices no longer lead to a higher U.S. deficit, and in fact, can decrease the deficit in certain situations.

 

Canada is an Important Net Exporter of Oil

When it comes to the US/Canadian dollar relationship, the USD/CAD exchange rate is determined by the demand and supply of Canadian and US dollars. The CAD has a high correlation to U.S. oil because of the large portion of CAD oil exports that are shipped to the United States.

Canada has the third largest volume of oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Canada’s economy is dependent on exports and is the fourth largest exporter of crude oil in the world.v Approximately 96% of its exports go to the U.S., including over 3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day.vi Canada and OPEC Countries represent the major sources of U.S. petroleum imports at 38% and 34% respectively. Because of the volume involved, it creates a huge amount of demand for Canadian dollars.

Due to the country’s status as a net exporter of oil, its currency in relation to the USD is highly correlated to oil prices, meaning that they move in similar directions to each other. Other factors can influence the USD/CAD exchange rate including the relative inflation rate, interest rates, balance trade, public debt, OPEC decisions, political stability, and economic performance.

 

 

The 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 oil slump, and correlation breaking down in 2018 are all notable events on the timeline. Despite the history of correlation between CAD and crude, the relationship appears to have broken down late 2018 when oil’s surge made the Canadian dollar decline. This divergence is due to factors such as OPEC policies being a key influencer of oil price rather than supply and demand factors, monetary policy, and Canada’s efforts to diversify its economy and lessen its reliance on oil.

 

A New Dominant Factor Driving Foreign Exchange Rates and the US Dollar: The Failed Clean-Up of the Financial Crisis

A benefit of crises and recessions is that they remove both unproductive firms and financial excess, creating space for more productive firms and fresh financial investment. This was not allowed to happen after the Recession of 2008 and is why the economic recovery from the crisis was so weak. More than ten years later, through FX reserves and through QE programs, central banks globally hold government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies.

The global financial crisis (GFC) was a massive failure of risk-hedging in the financial sector, combined with both regulatory failures and dangerous and deeply embedded incentives. While the extraordinary measures used to stop the crisis from mutating into a systemic meltdown can be considered appropriate, extending these measures through the past decade cannot.

The U.S. recapitalized, merged, and permitted the failure of some banks, but Europe chose the opposite approach resulting in undercapitalized and ailing banks surviving. However, the most impactful mistakes were made after the GFC on both sides of the Atlantic. Many central banks enacted zero or negative interest rate policies and started asset purchase Quantitative Easing (QE) programs run through the commercial banks. In the U.S., the Fed purchased securities from authorized Primary Dealer banks by crediting reserve balances to the Fed accounts associated with each dealer counterparty. These intermediary banks paid the sellers of bonds (households, funds, banks, etc.) and the Fed compensated the banks with reserves. In practice, the Fed forced excess reserves onto the balance sheets of banks far beyond levels they would have acquired independently. Because of the higher supply of reserves system-wide, their marginal benefit decreased, bidding-up the prices of various securities. This led the banks to issue additional and often riskier loans until the balance of the marginal benefits was restored. Also, because QE and low policy rates depressed long-term rates, many of the securities that the commercial banks held had no yield advantage over reserves, making the banks more likely to substitute less-liquid securities with more credit risk.

Using QE, central banks can buy various fixed income assets including government bonds, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, and in a few cases, equities (in the case of Japan, for example). However, the bulk of QE programs concern government bonds with the goal of curbing long-term interest rates across economies. Of the USD 11 trillion of QE programs, it is estimated that USD 9 trillion originate from central banks’ acquisitions of government bonds from the countries concerned.vii

Despite increased diversification, the bulk of FX reserves are still held in government bonds issued in a select number of advanced economies including the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Approximately 70% of global reserves (ex-gold) are invested into the government bonds issued by these economies. This means that either through FX reserves or through QE programs, central banks hold around USD 18 trillion of government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies.viii The total stock of government debt issued by these countries was around USD 40 trillion at the end of 2018.ix This means that central banks currently hold nearly half of global ‘safe assets’, i.e., government bonds issued by leading advanced economies such as the U.S., Japan, European states, and a few others.

Falling current account surpluses point to lower growth in FX reserves. But given the safe haven status of Japan and Switzerland in times of geopolitical uncertainty, they may need further interventions to prevent their currencies from appreciating too much.

The growth in FX reserves managed by Emerging Markets grew with the growth of emerging market economies and the commodity price boom. It continued uninterrupted after the financial crisis of 2008 as growth in Emerging Markets remained resilient, despite the recession in advanced economies. Oil prices were quick to recover from the temporary drop experienced during the most acute phase of the global crisis, thus filling the coffers of commodity-exporting economies.

The massive holdings of government bonds by central banks through FX reserve and QE raises two important questions.

At a policy level, is there a potential conflict of interest between monetary policy and asset management objectives?

Should central banks become concerned about potential losses on their holdings, given their focus on capital protection, will they be tempted to adopt a pro-cyclical behavior. Ultimately, this is an issue of international coordination among central banks as reserves held by emerging markets are often invested into bonds acquired by advanced economies’ central banks via QE programs. This international coordination may dominate over underlying demand and supply drivers including global oil demand.

The second question relates to investment risk. Can central banks weather the inevitable drop in prices that will accompany a future rise in interest rates?

As a result of the decline in global interest rates to zero or even negative levels, government bonds are a very expensive asset in both absolute and relative terms. Central banks are exposed to potentially large losses should interest rates rise. While it is true that central banks often hold bonds until maturity accounted for on an accrual basis, since most of these institutions adopt a mark¬ to-market approach in the measurement of their investment portfolio, any drop in prices on such holdings is reflected in their reported profits and losses. For central banks doing QE, the risk is further increased by significant holdings of these additional fixed income assets.

The dominance of the USD reflects several factors such as the size and depth of its financial markets, and the U.S. dominance in global affairs. From an investment perspective, the USD is the ultimate safe-haven currency and during periods of heightened global risk, investors flock to the U.S. Treasury market. This has not changed over the last 25 years and it is still true today as shown by the rise of the USD when uncertainty in global markets rises.

Central banks may engineer economic growth and generate moderate but manageable inflation, but the stresses that have accumulated on central bank balance sheets may be felt as reversing interest rates eventually happen. We will be carefully monitoring this.

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Gold is a Safe Haven

Gold has long been recognized as a safe haven, an asset that investors seek out for protection and security during uncertain times. In early 2020, tensions in the Middle East, driven by the U.S.-Iran confrontation, supported safe-haven flows, pushing the gold price to a six-year high.

Other reasons for the strength in gold prices include:

• A technical breakout
• Bullish positioning in derivatives markets
• Light trading volumes
• Portfolio rebalancing at the end of 2019 especially as investors hedged risk asset allocations
• Federal Reserve repo activity
• Rebalancing ahead of 2020

According to the World Gold Council, of the current average global annual demand of about 4350 tonnes, about 10% of that comes from central banks. With purchases of over 600 tonnes in 2018, central banks bought more than their long-term average in that year. This trend has continued in 2019 and early 2020.x As we have highlighted in this report, gold’s behavior is highly correlated with the US dollar. And today, the lack of credit risk makes gold an attractive reserve monetary asset among central banks.

Over the last few decades, investors have shunned gold because it doesn’t produce any income, and therefore the opportunity cost of holding it was significant. In the current era of low and negative interest rates, that opportunity cost is less of a factor, thus highlighting gold’s diversification benefits.

While bonds and cash may also increase portfolio efficiency, gold is an attractive alternative because it is less impacted by interest rates. Rising interest rates put downward pressure on bond valuations, which can make holding them less attractive to investors. Additionally, negative interest rates may push cash yields to negative, on a real basis. Gold also has a low correlation to equities and a historically low correlation to bonds. Moreover, this low correlation to major asset classes holds in both times of expansion and recession. During times of expansion, goods and products that rely on gold, such as jewelry and technology, are often in high demand. In times of recession, there is a gold surge among people seeking a financial safe haven. The benefits of low correlation to stocks and bonds aren’t limited to any one type of investor or one particular risk profile.

The most recent annual statistics from the World Gold Council indicate that the main buyers of gold in 2018 were the central banks of Russia (274 tonnes), Turkey (51 tonnes), Kazakhstan (51 tonnes), India (42 tonnes) and Hungary (28 tonnes). China, which only bought 10 tonnes in 2018, increased its gold purchases in 2019.xi

The Fed began reducing their balance sheet in 2018 but reversed this decision in the second half of 2019. They began regular repurchase market injections totaling nearly US$500 billion in the fourth quarter of 2019.xii This activity has continued into 2020 and has been described by some market participants simply as another form of QE – often dubbed “QE light” – causing some investors to worry about liquidity in the Treasury market as a whole. Historically, expansions of QE have led to increases in the gold price.

As highlighted in this report, for several countries, diversification away from US dollar assets has a strategic component. Not only does gold not have a default risk, it is not a title that has to be enforced via Western-based courts nor is it dependent on the U.S.-led financial system.

 

The Fed began to increase their balance sheet in Q4 2019

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

Theme 2: Oil Prices and Geopolitical Risk

Early in January 2020, in a “flight-to-safety” move following the bombings of U.S. bases in Iraq, gold and oil both rallied sharply but following the announcement that Iran was “standing down,” oil dipped while gold was up. And while gold is one of the strongest performing asset classes this year, oil is one of the weakest.xiii

From the perspective of the oil market, there has been a major structural change to the market that may offer an explanation. In the past, oil prices were the main transmission mechanism from major Gulf conflicts to the broader global economy and financial markets. However, the U.S. is now a net exporter of petroleum products, which was not the case during either the first or second Gulf War. The U.S. has essentially achieved energy independence and it can now use its own supplies to offset the impact of Middle Eastern supply shocks. It appears that oil market participants would need to see sustained physical market disruption to justify adding significant risk premia to energy prices.

 

U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products

SOURCE: U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION

 

The law of unintended consequences is hard at work when one considers any type of escalation in the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. And while the Strait of Hormuz has not been blocked, the option cannot be completely ruled out. It is important to think through the potential effects that a blockade could have not only on pricing or availability of crude but also on the geopolitical power transfer to a player like Russia, who is already seen as a strategic and diplomatic beneficiary of the U.S.-Iran conflict as well as the forced departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.

One of the reasons why OPEC has had such a great influence on the world’s crude market is its ability to increase (or decrease) production at any given time to dampen potential swings in oil prices. This ability hinges mostly on OPEC’s most powerful member (not only in terms of crude supply or spare capacity): Saudi Arabia, which disposes of OPEC’s bulk, and the world’s largest, crude spare capacity, approximately 1.5-2 million barrels per day.xiv With a blockade or severe limitation in traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia’s ability to release its spare capacity to the market would be greatly impeded.

U.S. shale producers who in the beginning benefit from high crude prices cannot be helpful in the same way Saudi Arabia can. Shale production can respond quickly to changing market conditions—much quicker than conventional crude production—but not as quick as a guarantee of an immediate release of additional volumes.

Important to consider also is that since U.S. crude production is in the hands of private companies, it is dictated by the market. It cannot be stopped at a certain price level but will flow until the market saturates. Also, U.S. crude quality differs substantially from Saudi crude. U.S. shale is lower in density (lighter) and sweeter (includes less sulfur) and, as such, cannot immediately act as a substitute.

One country that can benefit is Russia. Russia produces the “right” quality of crude (a substitute for the crude potentially locked in by the Strait of Hormuz), and according to a Russian government statement, it holds spare capacity of 500,000 barrels per day.xv The country cut its oil production due to an agreement with OPEC to prevent oil prices from falling too low in a high-supply environment. With oil prices rising and OPEC generally unable to provide relief, Russia and its oil companies (generally not happy with the production cuts) would surely jump at the opportunity to make the extra buck. Higher prices and production would also benefit Russian companies, as crude is traded in US dollars and the country needs currency reserves after the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Russian financial institutions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and interference in U.S. elections.

Russia also stands to gain geopolitical influence. Russia’s leverage in the global oil market has increased in the recent years. The country has become an important partner to OPEC in its struggle to remain the deciding entity to influence oil prices after the U.S. shale revolution unfolded. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could potentially strengthen Russia’s position in Asia since about three-fourths of the crude that passes through the Strait lands there.xvi This is added to the increasing importance of Russian natural gas that flows to the Chinese market via the newly opened Power of Siberia pipeline. If OPEC’s crude exports were significantly impaired by Iran-U.S. conflict, Russia would stand to profit handsomely in terms of both actual revenues and in terms of geopolitical influence, as recent military exercises among Russia, China, and Iran in the Gulf of Oman remind us.

 

Theme 3: Ultra-Low Rates

Central banks around the world cut interest rates in 2019 to stoke economic growth. Population aging and weaker productivity are set to constrain growth, softening demand for credit. Technology, low inflation, and demographics have fed the demand for fixed income securities and driven interest rates down around the world. Ultra-low interest rates have enhanced household wealth by boosting prices for housing and equities while at the same time hurting savers and pensioners.

Adding in globalization and a slowdown in Europe, an inability to get the economy moving in Japan and the need of the central bank to react have all continued to feed the move to zero and negative rates.

The era of extraordinarily low interest rates has forced central banks to become more creative in responding to periods of economic weakness. They are now in a trap that forces these banks to rely on unconventional monetary policies, including forward guidance, quantitative easing, funding for credit, and negative interest rates, which all may turn out to be less effective than traditional rate cuts.

The amount of global debt trading at negative yields hit a record US$17 trillion in August 2019, as more investors were willing to accept a negative rate in exchange for a safe place to park their money.xvii

In Canada, we have not seen sub-zero rates on Canadian dollar issuance. But US$85 billion of mostly euro-denominated Canadian debt (provincial, corporate, and covered bonds) is trading at negative yields.xviii Outside of Canada, positive real yields after inflation exist in long-term interest rates in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and the 30-year treasury in the U.S. The 10-year treasury, at the headline level, remains negative.

Negative interest rates are toxic for the financial system. For now, the global financial system has an out in that the reserve currency of the world, the US Dollar, has the highest positive rates, providing a buffer for now.

 

Theme 4: Slowing Global Growth, Tariffs, and Trade

Global GDP is on track to rise 3%, the slowest pace in a decade, reflecting sagging business confidence that undermined investment and trade. Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting rollercoaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Manufacturers were hardest hit, with the global measure of activity contracting for six straight months. Business investment in OECD countries edged up 1% in the first half of 2019, a marked slowing from a 3%-plus average pace in 2017-18. Amid these difficulties, the services sector held up. As we have highlighted in this report, central bankers have responded by injecting stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going.

In the U.S., easier financial conditions did little to help manufacturers in 2019. The factory sector entered its worst slump since 2015-16 and the ISM manufacturing index declined steadily throughout the year, hitting a cycle low in December. Temporary shutdowns in the auto sector and aerospace have added to the sector’s woes, but the bigger issue last year was escalating trade tensions. A recent Fed paper analyzing U.S. import tariffs found that, in more tariff-exposed manufacturing industries, the negative effects of higher input costs and other countries’ retaliatory measures more than offset any positives from import protection. Added to this is the negative impact of trade policy uncertainty on business investment, which had knock-on effects for manufacturers via slower orders for capital goods.

The nation’s economy is becoming increasingly concentrated in large cities and by the coasts, and less so in rural counties. This leads to the question of whether rural areas will be increasingly left behind. The growing concentration of the country’s economic activity could impact a variety of things from infrastructure spending to labor mobility, but it’s unclear how rural areas will fare as their share of economic output continues to dwindle.

The anticipated USMCA ratification and a preliminary U.S.-China trade deal should resolve some of the trade concerns. On New Year’s Eve President Trump tweeted that he would sign a Phase One trade deal with China on January 15th at the White House, and that he would travel to Beijing at an unspecified later date to begin discussions on a Phase Two agreement. Phase One includes a partial rollback of tariffs imposed in September on $120 billion of Chinese goods and cancellation of those planned to implementation on December 15, 2019, mainly in exchange for higher Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities over the next two years.xix This truce should allow China’s export sector to gain momentum in 2020 although uncertainty about the path ahead will remain high.

Unfortunately, substantial tariffs remain in place and the Trump administration’s unpredictable approach to trade policy will continue to cause some firms to postpone investment plans. Uncertainty leading up to the November 2020 election could also delay some capital spending.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth and Inverted Yield Curves Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. December 2019 Portfolio Models

We have maintained our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months.

As uncertainty revs up, global GDP is on track to rise 3% in 2019, the slowest pace in a decade. Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting rollercoaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Central bankers have responded with stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going. While low interest rates and accommodative financial conditions will likely prolong the expansion, much will depend on geopolitical influences. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

January 14, 2020

 

iTrading Economics. U.S. GDP. January 2020.
iiiU.S. Energy Information Administration. What Countries are the top producers and consumers of oil? January 2020.
ivU.S. Energy Information Administration. January 2020.
vNatural Resources Canada. Crude Oil Facts. January 2020.
viNatural Resources Canada. Crude Oil Facts. January 2020.
viiCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
viiiCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
ixCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
xWorld Gold Council. Outlook 2020. Global economic trends and their impact on gold. January 2020.
xiWorld Gold Council. Outlook 2020. Global economic trends and their impact on gold. January 2020.
xiiTrading Economics. U.S. Fed Funds Rate. January 2020.
xiiiPerlaky, Adam. Recent gold and oil movements highlight inconsistent long-term correlation. World Gold Council. Goldhub blog. January 14, 2020.
xivMikulska, Anna. How Russian Oil Has The Most To Gain From Iran-U.S. Crisis. Baker Institute. January 8, 2020.
xvMikulska, Anna. How Russian Oil Has The Most To Gain From Iran-U.S. Crisis. Baker Institute. January 8, 2020.
xviMikulska, Anna. How Russian Oil Has The Most To Gain From Iran-U.S. Crisis. Baker Institute. January 8, 2020.
xviiRBC Thought Leadership. Navigating the 2020s. January 2020.
xviiiRBC Thought Leadership. Navigating the 2020s. January 2020.
xixJ.P.Morgan. Global Data Watch. January 10, 2020.

 

 

 

 

As uncertainty revs up, global GDP is on track to rise 3% in 2019, the slowest pace in a decade.1 Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting roller coaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Central bankers have responded with stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going. While low interest rates and accommodative financial conditions will likely prolong the expansion, much will depend on geopolitical influences. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.

China’s exports to economies involved in the regional supply chain have continued to grow as manufacturers increased shipments to the rest of Asia.  The December U.S. announcement of the Phase One trade deal has committed China to terms on increased intellectual property protection, limits on forced technology transfer, exchange rate transparency, further opening of the financial sector, and increased purchases of U.S. goods and services.2

European growth prospects have improved after several months of stagnating, with survey data improving across both the business and consumer space. In his last meeting as the ECB president, Mario Draghi held rates unchanged. In Germany, disruptive regulations, the global trade conflict, and weakness in global car sales have been blamed for the slump in German car production.3 Data continues to show that German carmakers continue to do well globally. The U.K. Conservative election victory suggests that the withdrawal agreement legislation will likely be passed, allowing for a stable Brexit transition to begin at the end of January.

Slowdowns in China, Germany, and South Korea as well as protests in Latin America, the Middle East, and Hong Kong may be helping U.S. economy to avoid a downturn by driving investment toward America’s relatively safe harbors. The FOMC left rates unchanged at the December meeting.4 The resilience of the U.S. consumer has helped offset challenges in the factory space, thanks to a solid job market that has bolstered confidence and spending. In early December, the Phase One trade deal between China and the U.S. and the revised NAFTA were announced.

Canada’s third quarter gross domestic product data delivered an expected slowdown, as a drop in exports and drawdown in business inventories masked a rebound in domestic demand.5 Strong economic growth earlier in the year has kept the Canadian dollar in its number one spot among major currencies in 2019, supported by some of the highest yields in the G-7 and by the BOC’s reluctance to ease policy like the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank.6

In November, the S&P 500 was up 3.6%, its biggest monthly gain since June, while the S&P SmallCap 600 and the S&P MidCap 400 gained 3.1% and 3.0%, respectively. Canadian equities posted gains in November, with the S&P/TSX Composite up 3.6%. The S&P Europe 350 gained 2.8%, keeping it on track for its best year since 2009. The S&P United Kingdom joined the positive trend, gaining 1.8%, despite uncertainty caused by the pending general election. Trade optimism also helped lift Asian equities in November. U.S. fixed income performance was mixed, with leveraged loans as the top performer while Treasuries lagged. With the People’s Bank of China cutting rates in November, Pan-Asian yields ticked down and bond prices rose.

In December, we maintained the November allocation between Equities and Fixed Income across all models. Allocation to equities remains at 17% in Tactical Conservative, 22% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 36% in Tactical Growth, and 44% in Tactical Aggressive Growth. Within the Fixed Income allocation, we maintained the weight of the 7-10 year maturity in order to protect the portfolio from a rebound in long rates, as treasury yields have been declining and the yield curve is close to inverted. Gold continues to be present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame , President and CIO

 

International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook. October 2019.

ForeignPolicy.com. Why China Isn’t Celebrating the Phase One Trade Deal. December 18, 2019.

Trading Economics. Germany Car Production. November 2019.

Trading Economics. U.S. Fed Funds Rate. December 11, 2019.

Trading Economics. Canada GDP Growth. November 29, 2019.

Trading Economics. Canadian Dollar. November 30, 2019.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. November 30, 2019. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

 

Global growth continues to be weak, with the global economy impacted by the U.S.-China trade war on the one hand, and global monetary easing on the other. The trade standoff has taken a toll on business confidence, industrial production, and trade flows. It has weighed heavily on global manufacturing and hit export-oriented economies, including China, Taiwan and Korea. The trade war has had less impact on the more domestic-oriented econo­mies like the U.S. though, and as a result, there is a pronounced growth divergence among sectors and regions within the global economy. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.

China’s growth slowed to 6.2% year-over-year in the second quarter from 6.4% in the first quarter, as the escalating U.S.-China trade tensions weakened business confidence and export growth.1 Emerging market economies that are less levered to the global export cycle, such as India and Brazil, have also succumbed to a slowdown in growth amidst weaker consumer spending and slow progress on reforms.

Beyond U.S.-China trade tensions, other global risks exist. Eurozone growth is slow, with Germany and Italy teetering on the edge of recession. The European Union granted the U.K. a three-month extension on Brexit, moving the deadline to January 31. The U.K. will also face a general election on December 12, adding a degree of uncertainty to future negotiations. The U.K. economy contracted in the second quarter of 2019, adding to the overall negative mood.2 Violent protests continue in Hong Kong despite a significant concession from the territory’s government in officially pulling the controversial extradition law. Growing tension in the Middle East, made worse by attacks on the Saudi oil fields, create another headwind.

Given the weak growth backdrop and elevated geopolitical risks, many global central banks have undertaken easing, aiming to stimulate growth and counter the negative effects of the trade war. At the same time, globalization appears to have increased the co-movement of government bond yields. The correlation of 10-year government bond yields in the major G7 economies increased steadily from the 1980s until 2007 and has remained high since then.3 This means that the diversification benefit from investing in foreign bond markets has fallen. With interest rates already at near or below zero in many countries, the power of monetary policy is diminished.

U.S. Real GDP grew 1.9% in the third quarter, a slowdown from 2.0% growth in the second quarter.4 A divide in the U.S. economy exists between business investment, flagging the trade war and weaker confidence and consumer spending/housing benefiting from a strong job market and the decline in longer-term interest rates. Nonfarm payrolls topped expectations with a 128,000 increase in October. Prior-month upward revisions lifted September to 180,000 and August to 219,000.5 The Bank of Canada left interest rates unchanged at 1.75% when they met on October 30. There have now been three consecutive Federal Reserve rate cuts with no matching move from the Bank of Canada, bringing U.S. overnight rates below those in Canada.6

U.S. equities posted gains in October with the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 gaining 2.2%, 1.1% and 2.0%. Canadian equities lost in October, with the S&P/TSX Composite down 0.9%. European equities ended the month in positive territory as the S&P Europe 350 gained 1.1% while the S&P United Kingdom declined 2.0%.

In November, we maintained the October allocation between Equities and Fixed Income across all models. Allocation to equities remains at 17% in Tactical Conservative, 22% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 36% in Tactical Growth, and 44% in Tactical Aggressive Growth.  Within the Fixed Income allocation, we shifted the remaining balance of our 20+ year maturity treasury exposure in each of our portfolio models to the 7-10 year maturity in order to protect the portfolio from a rebound in long rates as treasury yields have been declining and the yield curve is close to inverted. Gold continues to be present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, President and CIO

 

1 Trading Economics, China GDP. October 18, 2019.

2 Trading Economics. United Kingdom GDP. September 30, 2019.

3 Capital Economics. Asset Allocation. October 24, 2019.

4 Trading Economics. U.S. GDP. October 30, 2019.

5 Trading Economics. U.S. Nonfarm Payrolls. November 1, 2019.

6 Trading Economics. U.S. Overnight Repo Rate. November 2019.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. October 31, 2019. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

 

 

Having already slowed from 4% to 3%, world GDP growth is set to take another leg down as growth in advanced economies slows to its weakest pace since 2012.1

Under the cloud of protectionism, global trade flows, which have been decelerating due to tariffs, are now outright contracting on a year-on-year basis. As a result, most of the weakness in the world economy this year has been in industry, while the services sector has held up quite well.2 We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in the last quarter of 2020 or early 2021.

The outlook for some emerging markets has been improving, but as emerging economies have benefited from globalization, they are more likely to lose out from de-globalization. China’s economy has remained resilient in recent months, but GDP growth is set to be the weakest in decades. With the property construction boom near the end of its cycle, headwinds from higher food inflation, and cooling global demand, a slowdown will be unavoidable.

In Europe, the outlook for exports is poor because the euro-zone’s key trading partners are losing momentum. To offset the slowing growth in Europe’s economic heartlands and ongoing Brexit uncertainty, the European Central Bank has extended its deposit rate further into negative territory and announced another round of asset purchases.3 It is encouraging that the share of non-performing loans continues to drop in places like Spain and Italy, reflecting a more resilient banking sector.4

In the U.S., consumer spending increased at a nearly 4% annualized rate for the first nine months of 2019 with rate-sensitive durable goods purchases rising at a double-digit pace. U.S. customs receipts hit a record $7.2 billion in August, good news for the Treasury but bad news for domestic firms who are paying those tariffs.5 The average tariff rate on U.S goods imports has doubled over the last year and a half.

Canadian GDP was flat in July, ending a run of upside surprises that amounted to the best monthly growth streak in two years. Maintenance shutdowns in the oil and gas sector and a pullback in drilling activity weighed on growth in July.6

Despite slowing economic growth, ongoing trade tensions, and a presidential impeachment inquiry, U.S. equities recovered in September. Large-caps underperformed mid and small-caps, with the S&P 500 up 1.9%, while the S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 gained 3.1% and 3.3%, respectively. For the first three quarters of 2019, the S&P 500 outperformed, gaining 20.6%, while the S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 gained 17.9% and 13.5%, respectively. Canadian equities gained during the month, third quarter, and YTD, with the S&P/TSX Composite up 1.7%, 2.5%, and 19.1% for those respective periods. The S&P Europe 350 shrugged off the gloom to finish the month, quarter, and YTD with gains of 3.8%, 2.6%, and 20.0%, respectively. A declining pound helped support the S&P United Kingdom which gained 0.8% for the quarter and 3.0% in September. Fixed income markets posted negative results in September.

The U.S. dollar maintained its positive momentum through September even after the Federal Reserve cut rates for a second time this year. In contrast, the euro slumped to its weakest level since 2017 as economic data in the Eurozone continued to deteriorate while U.S. economic results surprised to the upside. The loonie remained strong against the U.S. dollar in spite of the dollar strength and declining crude prices.

In October, we maintained the September allocation between Equities and Fixed Income across all models. Allocation to equities remains at 17% in Tactical Conservative, 22% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 36% in Tactical Growth, and 44% in Tactical Aggressive Growth. Within the Fixed Income allocation, we shifted a part of our 20+ year treasury exposure in each of our portfolio models to the 7-10 year in order to protect the portfolio from a rebound in long rates, as treasury yields have been declining and the yield curve is now inverted. Gold continues to be present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, President and CIO

 

1 Capital Economics. Global Economic Outlook. Q4 2019.

2 Capital Economics. Global Economic Outlook. Q4 2019.

3 S&P Dow Jones Indices. Index Dashboard: Europe. September 30, 2019.

4 National Bank of Canada. Monthly Economic Monitor. Economics and Strategy. October 2019.

5 RBC Economics. Financial Markets Monthly. October 4, 2019.

6 RBC Economics. Financial Markets Monthly. October 4, 2019.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. September 30, 2019. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

 

 

Section 1: Q4 2019 Outlook

 

Globalization Has Changed the Global Economy. Are We Now in a Period of De-Globalization?

Our investment approach is focused on the expected behavior of asset classes in various economic environments. Our research shows that in addition to five broad economic environments – Growth, Stagnation, Inflation, Recession and Chaos – the global economy also experiences regime shifts, which are temporary, and regime changes, which are permanent. Globalization results in regime change, as does de-globalization. In this Fourth Quarter 2019 Outlook, we take a closer look at the current state of globalization. The recognition of this changing environment is critical in determining our investment positioning in 2020 and beyond.

Economic theory suggests that globalization benefits the world economy. The absence of trade barriers should allow each country to specialize in the production of goods and services in which they are relatively efficient, leading to global productivity gains.

History shows that waves of globalization are driven by both technology and policy, but protectionist shifts tend to end them. In some cases, like in the 1970s, a pushback by policymakers can cause globalization to stall. In more extreme environments like the experience of the 1930s, a sustained policy backlash can push globalization into reverse. So far, the current trade war looks more like a stall but the risk of a de-globalization outcome similar to the 1930s is rising.

 

SOURCE: DEMIG (2015), OUR WORLD IN DATA, CAPITAL ECONOMICS

 

It takes a large and sustained push by policymakers to cause a period of de-globalization. As we begin Q4, the global economy is facing two dangers. The first is that a global economy that is already injured by geopolitical conflicts, including trade wars, endures further negative shocks. The second is that we overestimate resiliency and the feedback loop of slower growth that is occurring in many major economies around the globe.

This is occurring as the U.S. House of Representatives initiates a preliminary inquiry as to whether to proceed with a formal impeachment investigation of President Trump, China potentially delays trade solutions until the 2020 Presidential election, and the deadline for a Brexit decision falls at the end of October. Each of these challenges to the global economy could potentially be prolonged.

Compounding these risks, interest rates worldwide remain low or negative. It is estimated that over 80% of sovereign debt is trading with negative real rates.i While the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank continues to manipulate the economy with artificially low-interest rates, this policy is likely to backfire as the Federal Reserve’s policies mask the true state of the economy. Without an accurate financial picture, businesses lack the knowledge required to make investments. The resulting inaction could bring about the recession the Fed claims it wants to avoid. In addition, the idea that sub-zero interest rates lower the cost of borrowing has not proven to bring about the anticipated economic stimulus that central banks initially anticipated. Instead of paying banks to hold their money, businesses and individuals will find other sources in which to put their money.

 

Time to Include Gold in our Portfolio Models. Gold is Negatively Correlated with Interest Rates.

Economic events can create structural shifts in the acceptance level of risk. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 is one example of these structural changes, referred to in our modelling as Chaos. Looking back at events including Black Monday, the LTCM crisis, and the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, World Gold Council analysis shows that gold mitigated portfolio losses incurred by investors during almost all tail events under consideration. For example, investors in the U.S., Europe, and the UK, who held a 5% allocation to gold reduced losses by approximately 5% during eight tail risk events.ii

Our Portfolio Models are seeking exposures that offer low correlations among stocks and bonds to mitigate downside risk. In a year marked by noticeable geopolitical unrest, policy uncertainty and the risk of an impending recession, gold becomes a preferred investment to bonds and equities. And while one of the negatives of holding gold is that it does not generate income and has a cost to store it, the periods when bonds have a negative carry momentum become strong periods for gold.

During September, global monetary policy continued to influence gold price performance as many central banks around the world cut rates or expanded quantitative easing measures. The Federal Reserve cut rates by 25 basis points in July, and again in September.iii

Gold has important diversification properties that are evident during periods of systemic risk. Gold has little or no correlation with many other assets, including commodities, during times of stress. In addition, the correlation is dynamic, changing across economic cycles to the benefit of investors. Like other commodities, gold is positively correlated to stocks during periods of economic growth when equity markets tend to rise. Gold is negatively correlated with other assets during risk-off periods, protecting investors against tail risks and other events that can have a significant negative impact on capital or wealth – a protection not always present in other commodities. As a result, gold can enhance portfolio stability and improve risk-adjusted returns.

 

Many Central Banks are Adding to Gold Reserves

Analysis of several factors that are propelling the gold market include central bank gold demand. Physical gold is expected to play an important part as countries shore up their havens, both on the private and official levels. While gold no longer plays a direct role in the international monetary system, central banks and governments still hold extensive gold reserves to preserve national wealth and protect against economic instability. Today, gold is the third largest reserve asset globally, following U.S. dollar and Euro-denominated assets.iv Gold is increasingly used as collateral in financial transactions, much like other high-quality liquid assets such as government debt.

History shows us that central bankers were net sellers 30 years ago. These same banks have turned to buying gold since 2010, culminating more than 650 tons of bullion bought from the official sector in 2018 with the trend persisting through the first half of 2019.v This is more than at any time since the end of the gold standard.

We expect that central banks will continue to power gold’s move higher and beyond the current supply and demand dynamics. The October 2019 report from the World Gold Council notes that investors have begun to turn to gold to escape an environment of negative interest rates as treasury yields come under continuing pressure. The U.S. 30-year Treasury acts as a signal here. Should the 30-year U.S. bond fall into negative territory, as has already happened in Germany and France, we expect gold to hit new cycle highs.

 

With rates likely to stay low and geopolitical unrest unlikely to abate, the demand for gold exposure is expected continue.

 

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Global Trade and GDP are Deteriorating

The multilateral trading system remains the most important global forum for settling differences and providing solutions for the challenges of the 21st century global economy. Trade conflicts heighten uncertainty, leading some businesses to delay the productivity-enhancing investments that are essential to raising living standards. Trade conflicts can also heighten political tensions and occasionally physically aggressive behaviors between countries.

 

The World Trade Organization Lowers Trade Forecast as Tensions Unsettle Global Economy

Escalating trade tensions and a slowing global economy have led WTO economists to sharply downgrade their forecasts for trade growth in 2019 and 2020. World merchandise trade volumes are now expected to rise by only 1.2% in 2019, substantially slower than the 2.6% growth forecast in April.vi The updated trade forecast is based on consensus estimates of world GDP growth of 2.3% at market exchange rates for both 2019 and 2020, down from 2.6% previously.vii Slowing economic growth is partly due to rising trade tensions but also reflects country-specific cyclical and structural factors, including the shifting monetary policy stance in developed economies and Brexit-related uncertainty in the European Union.

The projected increase in 2020 is now 2.7%, down from 3.0% previously.viii The economists caution that downside risks remain high and that the 2020 projection depends on a return to more normal trade relations. Risks to the forecast are heavily weighted to the downside and dominated by trade policy. Further rounds of tariffs and retaliation could produce a destructive cycle of recrimination.

Shifting monetary and fiscal policies could destabilize volatile financial markets. Continued slowing of the global economy could produce an even bigger downturn in trade. In addition, a disorderly Brexit could have a significant regional impact, mostly confined to Europe.

 

US Economy Starting to Feel the Pain

More recently, increased foreign competition has been blamed for U.S. manufacturing job losses over the past twenty years. In practice, while the integration of several billion workers into the global economy has contributed to both a loss of manufacturing jobs and a more general squeeze on labour’s share of income in the developed world, most academics agree that other factors, including technological change, have played a bigger role.

The U.S. economy posted strong gains in the first half of 2019, although some measures were negative. Consumer spending surged in the second quarter, supported by the strong labour market. The decline in interest rates over the summer tees up for U.S. consumers to be the key driver of activity in the second half of the year. Companies continue to hire, and the unemployment rate recently hit a 50-year low.ix Labour market tightness is finally translating into a pickup in wages. Business sentiment has deteriorated amid unrelenting uncertainty about trade. Business investment fell in the second quarter for the first time in three years and exports sagged with the weakness concentrated in the manufacturing sector. While fundamentals are still positive for the consumer, the government’s protectionist policies pose risks to the outlook. The persistence of healthy labour-market conditions, as well as efforts by several central banks to shore up an expansion that’s already passed the 10-year mark, will provide support to the global economy. Another tranche of tariffs on Chinese imports coming into effect in mid-December will hit U.S. consumers.

Open borders tend to boost productivity at a global and national level (particularly for developing countries). However, globalization has distributive consequences within economies. Workers and capital owners in competitive export-orientated industries tend to gain, while consumers’ purchasing power rises from access to cheaper imports. But relatively inefficient domestic industries can lose out to more productive foreign competition.

Our current outlook does not see any material improvement over the next twelve months.

 

Theme 2: Brexit and the EU: Deal or No-Deal?

The prolonged and twisted saga of Brexit has been a weight overhanging global markets since 2016. UK growth was synchronized with its main trading partners in 2015 but slowed following the 2016 Brexit vote from a range of 2.0- 2.5% to around 1.5-2.0% in 2017.x This occurred despite a clear strengthening in global activity. Throughout the latest phase the labor market has held strong and helped consumers to keep the economy from stagnating. The realistic prospect of no-deal since the change in prime minister has combined with a regional growth slowdown to produce a collapse in business confidence and signs in some of the leading surveys that the labor market is about to weaken. The domestic drag began to stabilize in 2018 after the initial purchasing power shock from the weaker currency peaked. Later in 2018, growth among the UK’s main trading partners slowed and growing complications in the Brexit negotiations prompted a phase of outright decline in UK business spending. Since the referendum UK business investment has weakened by almost 10% compared to capex in other developed markets. Given that UK investment was growing faster than elsewhere prior to the vote.

In a major blow to Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Britain’s highest court ruled in early October that his decision to suspend parliament for five weeks in the crucial countdown to the country’s Brexit deadline was illegal. And unresolved is a legal and operational solution including the Irish border backstop. Currently, there are no border posts or physical barriers between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The backstop is designed to ensure that this continues after the UK leaves the EU. The backstop would only be needed if a permanent solution to avoid border checks could not be found. If it was needed, the backstop would keep the UK in a close trading relationship with the EU to avoid checks altogether.

If the sides fail to reach a deal, Mr. Johnson could be forced to seek a third Brexit extension. That’s because MPs have passed a law – known as the Benn Act – that requires Mr. Johnson to ask for a Brexit delay by October 19. This will push the deadline back from October 31 to January 31, 2020. MPs say the law is necessary in order to prevent a no-deal Brexit.

These events unfolding in the UK have the potential to impact European markets and beyond. Regardless of the outcome of Brexit, there is no doubt that the trading relationship between the EU and Great Briton has changed While many Dutch politicians say they dread the economic repercussions of the looming Oct. 31 Brexit deadline, the Netherlands is working to minimize the damage, in part by attracting some of the organizations and businesses that have already fled the United Kingdom.xi

 

SOURCE: NETHERLANDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT AGENCY

 

Theme 3: Low and Negative Interest Rates: A Dilemma for Central Banks and the Aging Population

Many central banks reduced policy interest rates to zero during the global financial crisis to boost growth. Ten years later, interest rates remain low in most countries. Core inflation has been low and stable for 15 years and shows no signs of acceleration anytime soon.

The U.S. Federal Reserve cut rates on July 31 for the first time since the Great Recession, and the ECB committed to a range of policy steps to fuel growth and get inflation to levels closer to its stated target. The minutes to the September FOMC meeting show that the Committee held a range of views with respect to both the appropriateness of the September rate cut and to what the Committee should communicate about the future direction of rates. The majority who wanted a cut last month cited trade policy uncertainty, slowing global growth, low inflation, and risk management as motivating considerations. Several participants favored leaving policy rates unchanged and argued policy should respond more to the data than to risks. Some argued that cutting too much now would leave monetary policy with less scope to boost aggregate demand if such shocks materialized.

The two major central banks were among a dozen that eased policy rates to combat the negative spinoff from rising trade tensions and political turmoil. The Bank of Canada was an outlier, staying on the sidelines as Canada emerged from a six-month slump in economic activity. And there is still no firm line of sight on how the UK will leave the European Union. Given these tensions, it will once again fall to extraordinarily stimulative monetary policy to sustain global growth, as few governments have committed to providing fiscal support.

 

Savings Gluts Provide Fuel for Low Rates

From the demand side, as populations age, they have a propensity to save. Prior to 2005, the global saving rate was never above 24.5%. Since then it has only been lower during the panic of 2009. The rate equaled its record high of 26.7% in 2018. This works out to roughly $21 trillion saved every year.xii Since many seek to match the investments in their savings to their life expectancies, they tend buy bonds.

The savings glut is leading to massive bond buying that is resulting in yields dropping below the inflation rate nearly everywhere in the developed world. Only two countries in the developed world have real 10-year yields above zero: Portugal and Italy.xiii Everywhere else, older people are buying bonds and driving yields below the inflation rate. Demographics tells us the developed world is not running out of old people anytime soon. The savings glut will continue.

While the global economy has been recovering, future downturns are inevitable. Severe recessions have historically required 3–6 percentage points cut in policy rates. If another crisis happens, few countries would have that kind of room for monetary policy to respond.

 

Theme 4: ETFs have a Positive Role in Market Volatility and Liquidity

Passive investing has historically attracted criticism, typically focused on illiquidity. The liquidity of ETFs varies due to characteristics determined by their underlying markets and indexes. The underlying markets for equity ETFs and credit ETFs are fundamentally different. In addition, apart from the underlying securities in an ETF, there are multiple layers of liquidity in the primary and secondary ETF markets, and the liquidity should never be less than that of the ETF’s underlying holdings. This is a superior feature compared to mutual funds.

ETF market makers and authorized participants looking for arbitrage opportunities trade dynamically to balance the supply and demand for ETF shares and their underlying assets. One of the key features of ETFs is that the supply of shares is flexible. Shares can be created or redeemed to offset the changes in demand. This structure has two important functions: it creates liquidity for the ETF shares by meeting the supply-and-demand needs of investors who trade on an exchange; and it helps keep an ETF’s price per share close to the ETF’s net asset value (NAV).

Index vehicles may be price takers at a microeconomic level but help to set prices at a macroeconomic level. The arbitrage mechanism allows for authorized participants to factor into the price the impact of macro and geopolitical events that may not yet be reflected in the underlying securities when these events occur while the primary markets are closed due to time zones and holidays. Historical evidence is consistent with the idea that higher correlations today are not the result of passive indexing, but rather reflect the macro environment and common factor risks.xiv

Recently there have been liquidity events that have tested the mechanisms behind ETFs. A number of credible studies have concluded that the arbitrage mechanism associated with the create and redeem feature of ETFs in fact helps, rather than hinders market liquidity in these extreme events.xv xvi

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth and Inverted Yield Curves Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. September 2019 Portfolio Models

We have maintained our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months. While geopolitical developments have always played a role in economies and markets, their scale and impact has been steadily rising since the 2008 financial crisis. Against a hostile trade backdrop, the global economy is losing momentum. Forecasts for world GDP growth this year have fallen to 3.2% from the 3.9% economists expected a year ago. Inverted yield curves and slumping manufacturing activity that are traditional recession predictors are contributing to a cautious business mood. Few governments have committed to providing fiscal support, leaving extraordinary stimulative monetary policy as the tool of choice to combat the recession threat. Our concern is that central banks in several countries are operating at the limits of what monetary policy can do. This has negative feedback implications for fiscal policy and financial markets.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

October 14, 2019

 

iWorld Gold Council. Global Gold-backed ETF Flows. October 8, 2019.
iiWorld Gold Council. Gold and Tail-risk Hedging. January 2013.
iiiTrading Economics. U.S. Fed Funds Rate. September 19, 2019.
ivWorld Gold Council. Gold Versus Commodities. October 2019.
vWorld Gold Council. Gold Versus Commodities. October 2019.
viWorld Trade Organization. Press Release. October 1, 2019.
viiWorld Trade Organization. Press Release. October 1, 2019.
viiiWorld Trade Organization. Press Release. October 1, 2019.
ixTrading Economics. U.S. Unemployment Rate. October 4, 2019.
xJ.P. Morgan. Global Data Watch. October 11, 2019.
xiNetherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA). More Brexit-impacted companies choose the Netherlands due to ongoing uncertainty. August 26, 2019.
xiiNational Accounts of OECD Data. Household Savings. 2019.
xiiiTrading Economics. Ten Year Yields. October 15, 2019.
xivMadhavan, A. and Morillo, D. “The Impact of Exchange Traded Funds: Volumes and Correlations.” The Journal of Portfolio Management. Summer 2018, 44 (7) 96-107.
xvMSCI. “Have High-Yield ETFs Created Liquidity Risk?” Reka Janosik. March 27, 2019.
xviAquilina, M., Croxson, K., Valentini, G. “Fixed income ETFs: primary market participation and resilience of liquidity during periods of stress.” Financial Conduct Authority. Research Note. August 2019.

 

 

 

While geopolitical developments have always played a role in economies and markets, their scale and impact has been steadily rising since the 2008 financial crisis. Against a hostile trade backdrop, the global economy is losing momentum. Forecasts for world GDP growth this year have fallen to 3.2% from the 3.9% economists expected a year ago.1 Uncertainty about Brexit and U.S.-China trade relations have combined with stresses in some emerging economies to weigh on the outlook. In August, the U.S. escalated its trade war with China by threatening to impose 15% tariffs on roughly US$300 billion of goods exported by China to the U.S., which until now had been exempted from trade barriers.  September saw an unprecedented liquidity squeeze in USD money markets, the ECB resumption of unconventional easing, a second consecutive Fed cut and other central bank decisions, and an attack on Saudi oil infrastructure. The drone attack on the Abqaiq oil process facility in Saudi Arabia resulted in a loss of approximately 5.7 million barrels (5% of global oil supply).2

Inverted yield curves and slumping manufacturing activity that are traditional recession predictors are contributing to a cautious business mood. Few governments have committed to providing fiscal support, leaving extraordinary stimulative monetary policy as the tool of choice to combat the recession threat.  Our concern is that central banks in several countries are operating at the limits of what monetary policy can do. This has negative feedback implications for fiscal policy and financial markets.

In the Euro area, GDP growth is expected to remain subdued in Q3. The persistence of healthy labour market conditions as well as efforts by several central banks to shore up an expansion will provide support to the global economy. Germany remains in an industrial sector slowdown that saw GDP decline in two of the last four quarters (year-over-year growth of 0.4% is the weakest since the euro crisis).3 Other more domestically oriented economies like France and Spain have expanded more steadily. UK GDP surprised to the upside in July, rising 0.3% month-over-month.4 It looks like the UK will avoid a technical recession (two consecutive quarters of negative growth) in Q3 but uncertainty around another Brexit deadline will make it hard to predict the economy’s underlying direction.

In the U.S., the stronger-than-expected 0.6% month-over-month rebound in industrial production in August suggests that the drag on U.S. producers from weaker global demand may be starting to fade.5 The U.S. consumer is holding up very well, as shown by August retail sales were up 0.4% month-over-month and 4.1% year-over-year.6 The Fed voted to cut its key policy interest rate by an additional 25 basis points to 2.00% on September 18th. The measure of core inflation remains low at 1.6% year-over-year. The Fed cut the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER) rate by 30 basis points to 1.8%. The offer rate on the reverse repo facility was cut by 30 basis points to 1.7%, in order to make it less attractive so it doesn’t soak up as much liquidity.7

After a slow start to the year, Canada’s economy bounced back as real GDP growth accelerated to 3.7% annualized in the second quarter. Trade contributed to growth as exports surged at the fastest pace in five years. Nominal GDP grew 8.3% annualized, on top of the prior quarter’s 5.7% increase.8 The USMCA has yet to be ratified. Canada’s direct exposure to China is relatively limited, as China accounts for about 5% of Canadian exports.9

U.S. equities declined in August, reflecting implications of an inverted yield curve and a possible trade war with China. Large caps declined, with the S&P 500 down 1.6%, while the S&P Midcap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 were down 4.2% and 4.5%, respectively. Interest rates in the U.S. declined across the board, leading to strong fixed income performance. Canadian equities gained in August, with the S&P/TSX Composite up 0.4%. The S&P Europe 350 declined 1.4%. U.K.’s fears of a “no deal” outcome helped send the S&P United Kingdom down to a 4.2% loss in August while sovereign bond prices rose across the continent. Asian equities slipped lower in August, as protests in Hong Kong combined with U.S.-China trade war worries weigh on regional markets. The S&P China 500 lost 0.6% in August. Asian fixed income indices ticked up across the board.

We maintained the August asset allocation across all models in September. Allocation to equities remains at 17% in Tactical Conservative, 22% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 36% in Tactical Growth, and 44% in Tactical Aggressive Growth.  With Treasury yields declining, Gold is present in all models as it performs well in high risk, low yield environments as a risk-free asset class. Geopolitics now a primary driver of markets. We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, President and CIO

 

1 International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook. July 2019.

2 S&P Dow Jones Daily Dashboard. September 16, 2019.

3 Trading Economics. Germany GDP Growth. August 27, 2019.

4 Office for National Statistics. UK GDP Growth for July 2019. September 9, 2019.

5 Trading Economics, U.S. Industrial Production MoM. September 17, 2019.

6 Trading Economics, U.S. Retail Sales in August. September 13, 2019.

7 Federal Reserve, IOER. September 19, 2019.

8 Trading Economics, Canada GDP. August 30, 2019.

9 Trading Economics, Canada Exports. August 30, 2019.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. August 30, 2019. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.

 

 

The pace of global growth continues to slow this year as policy uncertainty takes its toll on the world’s economy. The 1% decline in global growth over the past year in conjunction with the trade war and a number of geopolitical conflicts raises the risk of recession as the rules-based approach to governing international trade is breaking down.1 We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in the last quarter of 2020.

In a year in which politics is generating a large negative sentiment shock, macroeconomic policy has thus far cushioned the blow. The Fed’s early-year pivot away from normalization signals a more growth-supportive policy. China’s moves on multiple fronts are validating its commitment to do “whatever it takes” to prevent growth from slipping below 6%.2 Reinforcing the two largest economies’ efforts, 17 of the 30 central banks have lowered policy rates in the last three months.3

Developing market unemployment rates stand at a 40-year low although the major growth disappointments this year have come from Western Europe. Germany’s GDP shrank 0.3% quarter over quarter in the second quarter. Excluding Germany’s contraction, Euro area GDP rose 1.2% quarter over quarter. At the country level, growth in Italy was also weak at 0.1% quarter over quarter, and other countries were sluggish including France at 1%. These were offset by some firmer performances including Portugal at 2%, Spain at 1.9%, and the Netherlands at 2.1%.4 Boris Johnson began his term as U.K. Prime Minister with demands for a renegotiation of the E.U. withdrawal agreement, issuing a threat to leave without one otherwise. The pound sterling declined to near its lowest in two years.

While the outlook for global economic growth may be more qualified, recent U.S. data has exceeded expectations. Consumers continue to power the U.S. economy. Tariffs have done little to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China and the country’s overall deficit continues to widen, particularly with Mexico, the EU, and some of China’s neighbours. Exports have slowed over the last year while imports have continued to increase. U.S. industry is participating in the global slowdown as factory output fell again in July after declining in the first half of 2019.5 Despite the slowing, job gains are still solid. U.S. business investment declined in Q2 for the first time since 2016.6

The FOMC statement on July 31st explained that Fed motivation to cut was driven by negative global factors. The cut of 0.25 percentage points was America’s first in over a decade. Despite President Trump’s complaints that the strong dollar is holding back the economy, the dollar isn’t that far above its long-run average. The 3% appreciation over the past 12 months is minor in comparison to the 16% surge in late 2014 and early 2015.7 The strengthening against the Chinese renminbi has actually been a positive by limiting the upward pressure on prices from tariffs on Chinese goods.

The odds of the Bank of Canada following the U.S. Fed and other global peers with lower interest rates have increased as the U.S.-led trade war with China has intensified – with risks if anything tilted to an earlier move than the 25 basis point cut that was expected in early 2020.

After a record June, accompanied by continued earnings beats and a month-end interest rate cut from the Federal Reserve, U.S. equities continued to post gains in July. The S&P 500 was up 1.4% while the S&P MidCap 400 was up 1.2% and the S&P SmallCap 600 was up 1.1%.  Canadian equities gained during July, with the S&P/TSX Composite up 0.3%. The S&P Europe 350 gained 0.3% on the month. Asian equities were mixed in July on the back of increased regional and global trade concerns. In fixed income, Treasuries declined.

The risk that rates could move into negative territory would have dramatic consequences for the bond, equity, and currency markets in the United States. In response to this threat, we added gold across all models in August. Allocation to equities is now at 17% in Tactical Conservative, 22% in Tactical Moderate Growth, 36% in Tactical Growth, and 44% in Tactical Aggressive Growth. Equity exposure was maintained in the S&P 500 in all models. The S&P MidCap 400 was eliminated in the Conservative and Moderate Growth models and reduced in the Growth and Aggressive Growth models. Exposure to U.S. Municipal Bonds was reduced in the Conservative and Moderate Growth models.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, President and CIO

 

1 J.P.Morgan. Global Data Watch. August 16, 2019.

2 Trading Economics, China GDP Annual Growth Rate. July 15, 2019.

3 J.P.Morgan. Global Data Watch. August 16, 2019.

4 Trading Economics, Euro Area GDP. August 14, 2019.

5Trading Economics, U.S. Factory Orders. August 2, 2019.

6 Trading Economics, U.S. Economic Indicators. July 19th, 2019.

7Trading Economics, U.S. Currency Exchange Rates. August 21st, 2019.

 

Index return data from Bloomberg and S&P Dow Jones Indices Index Dashboard: U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, Fixed Income. July 31, 2019. Index performance is based on total returns and expressed in the local currency of the index.