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Q4 2020 Outlook

Section 1: Q4 2020 Outlook

 

Teetering Between Recovery and Chaos

COVID-19 has depressed economic activity around the world. Monetary and fiscal responses from governments and central banks in both developed and emerging economies since March are without precedent, far surpassing actions taken during the global financial crisis.

We are currently living in a world that is teetering between recovery and chaos. As a Portfolio Manager, our job is to offer you solutions that provide your investments with the best protection through our portfolio models, addressing the current uncertainty and acknowledging the new economic regime that is the outcome of this global event.

Containing the virus’ spread is the best way to save the economy and investment markets. Policies that allow economic activity to proceed safely, without placing people at undue health risk are needed. The global economy cannot recover until the epidemic is under control. This will happen when efforts to provide relief to individuals and businesses complement efforts to control the spread of the virus.

These are unprecedented times. Investors want to minimize volatility and losses. Traditional investment management that focus on broad diversification among asset classes and relative over and under weights to a broad array of asset classes have experienced losses. The Frame Global Asset Management investment process addresses the global movement of capital into and out of the U.S. and incorporates a forward-looking view of where capital is heading in this changing world.

We know that there is a direct link between macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty and volatility and correlations within markets and asset classes. We also know that capital around the world moves to markets where it sees the greatest opportunity. This is largely driven by relative interest rates, currency differentials, and perceived safety/risk. Common sources of macro risk – including the Fed, energy prices, geopolitics, inflation shocks, regulatory change, sovereign risk, elections, and fiscal-policy dysfunction – can affect both single stock volatility within an asset class and the correlation among stocks and bonds.

The chaos of the economic collapse during this pandemic has obscured the initial impact of global central bank actions. Emergency programs have come while nominal interest rates are low by historical standards. As a result, monetary policy will be constrained in its ability to provide further support to a recovery. Aside from rate cuts, central banks have also begun to increase the money supply via a sweeping Quantitative Easing program. But the conditions for QE to stimulate demand are less favorable now than they were in 2008–2014. This is because the current recession combines a shock to demand with a shock to supply. As supply chains are broken and workers cannot report to their jobs, many firms are not be able to increase output and would not be able to even if the demand returned.

 

The State of the Global Economy

In the face of large budget deficits, a stock market bubble, and the impact of plummeting oil prices from last year, the state of the global economy was less than ideal heading into 2020.

One of the rare benefits of crises and recessions is that they remove both unproductive firms and financial excess, creating space for more productive firms and fresh financial investment. This did not happen after the Recession of 2008, resulting in a weak economic recovery from the crisis that varied in economies around the world. In dealing with the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, the U.S. recapitalized, merged, and permitted the failure of some banks, but Europe chose the opposite approach resulting in undercapitalized and ailing banks surviving.

However, the most impactful mistakes were made after the GFC on both sides of the Atlantic. For the past decade, central banks have enacted zero or negative interest rate policies and sought to manage economic downturns through policies of quantitative easing (QE). Such programs were adopted in Japan, the European Union, and United States, each with varying degrees of success. Intermediary banks paid the sellers of bonds (households, funds, banks, etc.) and the Fed compensated the banks with reserves. In practice, the Fed forced excess reserves onto the balance sheets of banks far beyond levels they would have acquired independently. Because of the higher supply of reserves system-wide, their marginal benefit decreased, bidding up the prices of various securities. This led the banks to issue additional and often riskier loans until the balance of the marginal benefits was restored. Also, because Quantitative Easing and low policy rates depressed long-term rates, many of the securities that the commercial banks held had no yield advantage over reserves, making the banks more likely to substitute less-liquid securities with more credit risk.

More than ten years later, through FX reserves and through QE programs, central banks globally hold government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies. Meanwhile, growth in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis slowed and the U.S. economy began to show signs of recession heading into 2020.

 

The Monetary Policy Challenge and the Unintended Consequences of Quantitative Easing

From its initial detection in Wuhan, China to the outbreak’s late-February global explosion, the early 2020 onset of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic brought chaos to financial markets worldwide.

During the immediate aftermath of COVID-19 reaching pandemic proportions, led by the U.S Federal Reserve (FED), central banks around the globe fought massive uncertainty and took action to restore pricing stability. In an attempt to mitigate the negative economic implications of the coronavirus, a new policy of unlimited quantitative easing was implemented.

The experience of using QE through the past decade has made us aware of a number of unintended consequences. As quantitative easing lowers long-term interest rates, a low-cost financing environment can lead to excessive speculative behavior, which will lead to rapid expansion of debt and add to the market risks. In addition, quantitative easing can lead to excessive issue of cash and push up asset prices, creating bubbles. Globally, quantitative easing is likely to generate more debt and market risks in other countries, especially for emerging economies. If the United States attempts to withdraw easing policies in the future, emerging markets might experience currency devaluation and a fall in the stock market, given the current influx of large amounts of capital to emerging market countries. And although unlimited quantitative easing may lead to a quick economic recovery in the short term, it ignores the urgency of long-term and deep-seated structural problems in the U.S. and other economies.

 

A New Wave of Disinflation

One of the concerns raised about QE that has not proven to be threatening in this pandemic is inflation. To glean insights into the possible economic consequences of Covid-19, a Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco working paper examined the medium- and long-term effects of 15 pandemics, ranging from the Black Death in the 14th century to the 2009 H1N1 outbreak.i

 

Response of the European Real Natural Rate of Interest Following Pandemics and Wars

SOURCE: ÒSCAR JORDÀ, SANJAY R. SINGH, ALAN M. TAYLOR. 2020. “LONGER-RUN ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PANDEMICS,” FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, WORKING PAPER 2020-09. VIA MARK YAMADA ON ADVISOR’S EDGE.

 

The figure above shows how the natural rate of interest responded after the pandemics ended (defined as a smoothed risk-free rate plus a high-quality bond return premium). The figure shows pandemics have been deflationary for decades following the event, while wars have been inflationary. Recessions are usually deflationary because low output and low demand temper prices.

 

Risk Appetite

The distinction between Pandemics and wars comes down to risk appetite. The reality is that we are in uncharted territory and the future is very much dependent upon how the public health crisis evolves. Until risk appetite recovers, disinflationary pressures will prevail. Inflation may come back into focus to the extent that supply is constrained, because of layoffs and the lag time required to re-hire and re-train. Demand could return because of income replacement from unemployment insurance and other government relief measures. These could be exacerbated by the type and timing of additional relief measures.

Fiscal policy has a necessary role in this recovery. In the U.S. it is the responsibility of Congress and the White House, not the Fed. At this point Congress needs to start deploying all its fiscal tools. The proposed $2 trillion package of loans to businesses and cash for households is not guaranteed to bring a swift, V-shaped recovery. The CARES Act is not stimulus, it is relief. Essentially, it is income and cash flow replacement. It is bridge financing, not outright stimulus. The federal government is attempting to create a bridge over a crisis that has caused incomes for individuals and businesses to disappear because of behavioral changes and rolling lockdowns to flatten the infection curve. Stimulus depends on how funds are administered. Businesses are unlikely to invest in capital spending without greater certainty and/or tax incentives. Consumers will be cautious until personal safety and employment certainty are evident, so stimulus may be muted. As a result, post-pandemic deflation is likely.

At the end of the day, this all comes down to risk appetite. Capital reserves are endogenous – a closed system. They cannot be and are not lent out. They always stay within the fed funds system. Secondly, banks create credit – not the Fed. Lastly, credit is a function of risk appetite. What does this all mean for inflation? QE and increasing excess reserves are not inflationary unless there is demand for credit, which is driven by risk appetite. Unless there is risk appetite to borrow and banks have risk appetite to lend, then reserves just sit there as excess reserves.

Until risk appetite recovers, disinflationary pressures likely prevail. With that said, we are in uncharted territory and the future is very much path dependent upon how the public health crisis evolves. As we have come to learn through this crisis, almost anything is possible, but inflation fears should be of little worry at the moment.

 

The Price of Saving the Economy

The federal budget deficit has soared to a record $3.1 trillion in the 2020 fiscal year, as the coronavirus pandemic fueled enormous government spending while tax receipts plunged as households and businesses struggled with economic shutdowns.ii

The Fed has increased the size of its footprint in the economy by more than two-thirds and proved to investors that it would step in to buy entirely new kinds of assets.

The gap between what the U.S. spends and what it earns through tax receipts and other revenue is now $2 trillion more than what the White House budget forecast in February. It is also three times as large as the $984 billion deficit in the 2019 fiscal year.iii

The shortfall underscores the long-term economic challenge facing the United States as it tries to emerge from the sharpest downturn since the Great Depression. Interest rates are low, meaning it costs less for the government to borrow money, although the ballooning deficit is complicating policy choices as Republicans resist another large stimulus package, citing concerns about the U.S. debt burden.

This massive deficit is the result of two Fed policies. First, when panic struck financial markets in March, Fed officials lowered the target for their benchmark rate to a range of zero to 0.25%, where they say it will likely remain for years. They have consistently ruled out pushing rates into negative territory. Second, large-scale bond repurchases, interbank loans, corporate loans and currency swaps were executed. In late 2019, nominal interest rates from the overnight to a 10-year maturity averaged between 1.5 and 2 percent. On March 3, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee reduced the Federal Funds Target Rate by ½ point to 1.00%-1.25% in an emergency policy move. Two weeks later, on March 15th, the FED elected to drop the Federal Funds Target Rate to 0.0%-0.25% to calm the markets. The Fed currently purchases about $120 billion a month combined in Treasuries and mortgage-backed bonds. The damage of the COVID-19 recession will be magnified by the Federal Reserve’s inability to cut interest rates further, leading it to undertake massive additional asset purchases. As the Fed continues to push further into different corners of the economy, it is making it more difficult to get out at some point.iv

History shows that the Fed’s interventions in the name of crisis management are very difficult to withdraw from once a crisis is over. The actions it took from 2008 to 2010, presented as temporary, remain largely in place.

Michael Kiley, a senior Fed economist and deputy director of the bank’s financial stability division, has forecast that bond purchases equal to 30% of U.S. economic output (about $6.5 trillion) will be required to offset the impact of the Fed’s benchmark rate already being nearly zero. The Fed has so far purchased bonds through so-called open-market operations and emergency lending facilities equal to about $3 trillion since March, implying that another $3.5 trillion is needed, to make up for the monetary policy handicap of zero rates.

Globally, QE by central banks in 2021 is expected to more than double the previous peak in 2010 after the financial crisis. Quantitative easing in Central and Eastern Europe has aided coronavirus crisis responses but risks would be more pronounced if QE undermined perceptions of central bank independence and economic policy framework credibility according to Fitch Ratings.v

 

Since the Onset of this Stress Event, We Have Demonstrated that Our Investment Approach is Successful

Traditional investment managers are handicapped when their portfolios are “macroeconomic regime” agnostic. The Frame Global Asset Management investment process monitors the global movement of capital into and out of the United States. Markets are forward looking, and when we look at the behavior of markets, we see that they eventually reflect the reality of the current and anticipated future macroenvironment. We make extensive use of our internal expertise in interpreting economic data. We exploit these inefficiencies and provide our clients with superior outcomes. We focus on minimizing capital losses by recognizing macro and geopolitical risks that are present and expected over our forecast time horizon

In July, we maintained the asset allocation that was established in June for all models. We continued to be positioned in shorter duration fixed income. We expected interest rates to remain low or negative across the globe and as a result, we continued to have exposure to gold which is a store of value in this environment and a preferred asset for central banks for the foreseeable future. Equity exposure to large cap across all models reflects our view that shifting business models during this pandemic have had a negative impact on bottom lines but that select businesses are benefiting from the shift. We are continuing to monitor the recovery in Europe following the Eurozone’s agreement on a stimulus package. Within FX, we are monitoring the US dollar, which tends to perform inversely with global growth. Independent shocks to risk including politics and the outcome of the U.S. election in November could affect dollar performance over the back half of 2020.

In August, we maintained the asset allocation that was established in July for all models. We continued to be positioned in shorter duration fixed income. We expected interest rates to remain low or negative across the globe and as a result, we maintained exposure to gold while monitoring four variables: the US dollar, stock market volatility, real interest rates, and inflation. We continued monitoring the recovery in Europe following the Eurozone’s agreement on a stimulus package.

In September, we maintained the asset allocation that was established in August for all models. We continued to be positioned in shorter duration fixed income due to larger-than-average duration supply from the Fed. Lower rates mean lower income as inflation is positively correlated to yields. With interest rates low or negative, we have maintained exposure to gold. The U.S., as the largest democracy in the world, is still seen as the safest place to invest. The Bank’s monetary policy objective is to deliver price stability and, subject to that, to support the Government’s economic objectives including those for growth and employment. Monetary stability means stable prices and confidence in the currency. A reflection of this stability has been evidenced through most of history as capital flows to the U.S. from abroad for opportunity and to escape other relatively riskier international environments.

 

Economic Regime Based Investing

Unfortunately, a multitude of variables persist regarding the containment and eradication of the COVID-19 contagion. Until the U.S. addresses the long-term structural problems of its economy, ranging from an aging population, to inadequate welfare policies, worsening income inequality, low productivity, insufficient investment in the real economy, and long-term fiscal and foreign trade deficits, it is entirely plausible that the Fed will be struggling a decade from now to undo the emergency actions of today. It is very likely that a new economic regime is underway. Our investment approach allows us to anticipate and adapt to a change like this.

 

 

Section 2. Four Themes

 

Theme 1: The November U.S. Election

While the course of the pandemic is by far the biggest risk to our forecasts over the next year or two, the November 3rd elections have the potential to leave a wide-ranging and long-lasting impact on the economic outlook. The chaotic handling of the pandemic together with Trump’s response to widespread protests in American cities have helped Biden open a wide early lead in the national polls. A Joe Biden victory in November together with Democrats winning back control of the Senate could see a big increase in taxation and federal spending, together with a shakeup of healthcare, regulatory, and trade policy. Uncertainty is exacerbated by the impact of voting during a global pandemic on turnout models and potential operational issues including an increase in voting by mail.

Of more importance is the makeup of Congress, with a clean sweep of the House, Senate, and the Presidency enabling either party to loosen fiscal policy more markedly.

 

Trump & Biden’s Positions on the Key Issues

SOURCE: CAPITAL ECONOMICS

 

Theme 2: Secular Stagnation

The Pandemic is exacerbating secular stagnation that was already present before 2020. This refers to a rise in the amount of desired saving relative to desired investment, which has prompted interest rates to fall to balance the two. This in turn reflects various factors such as the impact on saving of ageing populations, shareholders’ desire for short-term returns, and a dearth of investment opportunities.

We anticipate rest-of-world GDP will finish this year nearly 5% below pre crisis levels as virus containment and macroeconomic policy are not being managed effectively. Recent policy developments have reinforced concerns on this front. Although treatment has improved and mortality rates have decreased, COVID-19 has not been contained and new cases globally have moved back to their mid-year high. At the same time, there is no evidence that fiscal policy is moving to offset the run-off in emergency stimulus.

 

Theme 3: A Flare-Up in Trade Tensions with China

The results of the phase one trade deal between China and the United States and the trade war that preceded it have significantly hurt the American economy without solving the underlying economic concerns that the trade war was meant to resolve. Six months after the deal was inked, the costs and benefits of this agreement are coming into clearer focus. The effects of the trade war go beyond economics. President Trump’s prioritization on the trade deal and de-prioritization of all other dimensions of the relationship produced a more permissive environment for China to advance its interests abroad and oppress its own people at home, secure in the knowledge that American responses would be muted by a president who was reluctant to risk losing the deal.

 

Theme 4: Forecast Uncertainty

The International Monetary Fund has noted several risks around their 2020 forecast.

The forecast sights the depth of the contraction in the second quarter of 2020 as well as the magnitude and persistence of the adverse shock. These elements, in turn, depend on several uncertain factors including:

• The length of the pandemic and required lockdowns
• Voluntary social distancing, which will affect spending
• Displaced workers’ ability to secure employment, possibly in different sectors
• Scarring from firm closures and unemployed workers exiting the workforce, which may make it more difficult for activity to bounce back once the pandemic fades
• The impact of changes to strengthen workplace safety—such as staggered work shifts, enhanced hygiene and cleaning between shifts, new workplace practices relating to proximity of personnel on production lines—which incur business costs
• Global supply chain reconfigurations that affect productivity as companies try to enhance their resilience to supply disruptions
•The extent of cross-border spillovers from weaker external demand as well as funding shortfalls
• Eventual resolution of the current disconnects between asset valuations and prospects for economic activity

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Global Pandemic Leads Us to a Recession Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

 

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. September 2020 Portfolio Models

The global pandemic-induced GDP collapse has led to higher debt service burdens and lower ability to repay, resulting in an increase in non-performing loans and credit risk. We are now in a twilight zone of partial lockdowns. Fearful of rebellion, and of snuffing out signs of economic recovery, governments are opting for a hodge-podge of curbs. Financial intermediaries have become more risk averse, slowing the flow of much-needed new credit and debt. These signs of cooling are consistent with our view to maintaining our Recession Outlook for our forecast horizon of the next twelve months. Our outlook depends on what happens with fiscal policy and the spread of COVID-19, and we will continue to closely monitor these.

In September, we maintained the asset allocation that was established in August for all models. We continue to be positioned in shorter duration fixed income due to larger-than-average duration supply from the Fed. Lower rates mean lower income as inflation is positively correlated to yields. With interest rates low or negative, we have maintained exposure to gold. Equity exposure to large cap across all models reflects our view that shifting business models during this pandemic have had a negative impact on bottom lines but that select businesses are benefiting from the shift. We are continuing to monitor the recovery in Europe following the Eurozone’s agreement on a stimulus package.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

October 14, 2020

 

iFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Longer-Run Economic Consequences of Pandemics. June 2020.
iiTrading Economics. U.S. Government Budget. October 16, 2020.
iiiTrading Economics. U.S. Government Budget. October 16, 2020.
ivFederal Reserve. FOMC Statement. September 16, 2020.
vFitch Ratings London. June 3, 2020.

 

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Q3 2020 Outlook

Section 1: Q3 2020 Outlook

 

A Crisis Like No Other: Recovery in A Changed World

The global economy is in its worst downturn since the 1930s. For the first time, all regions are projected to experience negative growth in 2020. There are, however, substantial differences across individual economies, reflecting the evolution of the pandemic and the effectiveness of containment strategies: variations in economic structure (dependence on severely affected sectors, such as tourism and oil), reliance on external financial flows, and pre-crisis growth trends. As we review and look forward in this Third Quarter 2020 Outlook, we are forecasting a recession in the U.S. and most of the globe that will extend beyond our twelve-month time horizon. Our approach to portfolio management is nimble, opportunistic, and deliberate in identifying asset classes that are best placed to generate returns in a new world order. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

The impact of COVID-19 on the global economy is deeper and longer than initially expected. Economic data available at the time of the April 2020 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook forecasted an unprecedented decline in global activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Data releases since then suggest even deeper downturns than previously projected for several economies. Economic activity remains suppressed due to concerns of multiple waves and global economic output is not forecasted to return to pre-pandemic levels until 2023, led by emerging markets. The IMF projects recovery to be much slower for advanced economies, which are not expected to exceed 2019 real GDP levels until 2026.

The World Trade Organization 2020 forecast estimates that the volume of global merchandise trade will decline by between 13 and 32 per cent compared to the previous year. They expect central banks to keep interest rates low, and in many countries negative, while credit spreads will remain elevated through to 2024. Global growth is projected at negative 4.9 percent in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a more negative impact on activity in the first half of 2020 than anticipated, and the recovery is projected to be more gradual than previously forecast. In 2021, the WTO projected global growth at 5.4 percent, leaving 2021 GDP 6.5 percentage points lower than in the pre-COVID-19 projections of January 2020.

We expect monetary and fiscal policy to remain strongly supportive with most governments able to sustain higher debt loads without the need for severe austerity. The adverse impact on low-income households is particularly acute, undoing the progress made in reducing extreme poverty in the world since the 1990s. Synchronized deep downturns are foreseen in the United States (–8.0 percent), Japan (–5.8 percent), the United Kingdom (–10.2 percent), Germany (–7.8 percent), France (–12.5 percent), and Italy and Spain (–12.8 percent). In 2021, the IMF projected the advanced economy growth rate to strengthen to 4.8 percent, leaving 2021 GDP for the group about 4 percent below its 2019 level.

The downward revision to growth prospects for emerging market and developing economies over 2020–21 (2.8 percentage points) exceeds the revision for advanced economies (1.8 percentage points). Excluding China, the downward revision for emerging market and developing economies over 2020–21 is 3.6 percentage points.i

The steep decline in activity comes with a catastrophic hit to the global labor market. Some countries (notably Europe) have contained the fallout with effective short-term work schemes. According to the International Labor Organization, the global decline in work hours in 2020 Q1 compared to 2019 Q4 was equivalent to the loss of 130 million full-time jobs. The decline in 2020 Q2 is likely to be equivalent to more than 300 million full-time jobs.ii Where economies have been reopening, activity may have troughed in April, as suggested by the May employment report for the United States, where furloughed workers are returning to work in some of the sectors most affected by the lockdown.

The synchronized nature of the downturn has amplified disruptions around the globe. The WTO reported that global trade contracted by close to –3.5 percent (year over year) in the first quarter, reflecting weak demand, the collapse in cross-border tourism, and supply dislocations related to shutdowns (exacerbated by trade restrictions). This underscores why international cooperation to keep global markets open for goods and services is more important than ever.

The pandemic is creating a sharp rise in corporate, government, and individual debt. We see four options to deal with this debt: Default, Austerity, Inflation, and Living with the Extra Debt.

Here we review Austerity, Inflation and Living with the Extra Debt. We will defer a review of the Default option until a point in time when we believe it is viable.

 

1. Austerity and The Paradox of Thrift

The term austerity is taken to mean any measure (i.e. tax rises as well as spending cuts) taken to reduce the structural budget deficit. The prospect of tax increases and government spending cuts to pay for the big fiscal packages that governments have launched to see their countries through the coronavirus crisis will result in austerity that will burden the recovery when lockdowns are eased. The coronavirus will result in a sharp rise in government debt as larger deficits and a deterioration in the trajectory of the debt ratio occur. Some governments are running significant primary budget deficits as the coronavirus results in a rise in health spending and an expanded role for the state more generally. This comes as many countries already face rising spending related to the ageing population.

The impact of austerity depends on the types of tax rises/spending cuts that are introduced and the circumstances at the time. Cuts in day-to-day spending would be less damaging to the economy’s supply potential than the cuts in public sector investment or incentive-blunting tax rises that formed part of the post-financial crisis austerity drive. In addition, there needs to be scope for monetary policy to loosen to compensate. Unfortunately, central banks have depleted their toolboxes. It is most effective when a country is undertaking austerity in isolation, as strong net exports can potentially help to offset the impact on demand.

The Paradox of Thrift was popularized by the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes. It states that individuals try to save more during an economic recession, which essentially leads to a fall in aggregate demand and hence in economic growth. Such a situation is harmful for everybody as investments give lower returns than normal. Scars from the crisis will alter spending behavior for years. Bloomberg Economics has forecast that personal savings rates will settle in around 3 to 4 percentage points above the pre-crisis level of around 8%, a drain of 1% annually in GDP growth. That is $200 billion of forgone spending per year. The paradox of thrift is causing chaos for the traditional retail sector as Brooks Brothers (founded in 1818) files for bankruptcy (following Neiman Marcus, J.C. Penney and J. Crew Group). Other retailers are closing outlets as well (Bed Bath & Beyond is saying it will permanently shutter 200 of its 1,500 stores).

With elections pending around the globe, there will be voter resistance to more spending cuts. The coronavirus crisis will lead to pressure for governments to spend more, not less, with demands for increases in funding for health services and greater welfare spending. Most countries are unlikely to contemplate government austerity before their economies are fully recovered but recovery will be impeded due to austerity among their citizens.

 

2. Deflation in the Short-Term: Inflation in the Long-Term

The unprecedented monetary and fiscal measures implemented around the world are expected lead to weaker long-term growth and currency debasement. The risk of a surge in inflation is nil in 2020 and 2021 as the disinflationary effects of weaker demand outweigh any supply shortages over our twelve-month forecast time horizon. Average inflation in advanced economies has dropped about 1.3 percentage points since the end of 2019, to 0.4 percent (year over year) as of April 2020, while in emerging market economies it has fallen 1.2 percentage points, to 4.2 percent.iii

 

Inflation Is the Price to Be Paid

The 25% year-over-year surge in M2 growth has not resulted in inflation. This is explained by the Quantity Theory of Money: MV = PY, where “M” is the money stock, “V” is money velocity (the turnover rate), “P” is the price level and “Y” is the real level of output. Both sides must equal each other. The problem is that money velocity is contracting to a record low, and at a record rate, with a decline of 27% on a year-over-year basis, overtaking the run-up in the money supply.iv

 

Massive policy stimulus has raised inflation risks for the future when demand does recover.

Policymakers will need to deal with any rise in inflation resulting from the permanent rise in the money supply by imposing controls on lending or raising interest rates. Such measures will impose costs on the economy and the financial system. A rise in inflation would push up borrowing costs, making it more expensive to finance deficits and refinance maturing debt. There would be an initial drop in the debt ratio, given that most government debt does not mature in the short-term, but the average maturity of government debt is not exclusively long.
To avoid this, governments will need to use the bond market, either by monetizing the debt and/or by financial repression (i.e. forcing the private sector to buy debt at below market prices).

 

Debt Monetization

Major economies have not yet reached the stage of debt monetization. There is no formal, universally agreed upon definition of debt monetization but there are two defining characteristics that make it distinct from central banks’ purchases of government bonds through asset purchase programs like quantitative easing (QE). The first is that it involves the central bank funding the government directly, rather than just buying its debt in the secondary market. The second is that it is permanent rather than temporary.

So far in this crisis, many central banks have bought government debt in the secondary market via their asset purchase programs. When the central bank buys bonds in the secondary market, it generally does so to meet its own objectives such as maintaining the functioning of financial markets or meeting its inflation target.

Only a few central banks have funded their government directly. This occurs when the central bank buys new bonds straight from the government either directly or in auctions (the primary market), or by doing away with government bonds altogether and the central bank simply handing money to the government. The Indonesian central bank (which is buying government debt at auction) and the Philippines central bank (which has bought debt directly from the government under a three-month repo agreement) have done this. Although the Bank of England extended a direct loan to the UK Treasury under the Ways and Means facility, this was essentially just a bridging loan.v

 

Financial Repression

More recently, financial repression has tended to take the form of quantitative easing (QE) or more stringent requirements for banks to hold low-risk assets including government bonds. QE has brought the added benefit that the government is just paying the interest to itself on a portion of its debt. Financial repression also describes measures by which governments channel funds from the private sector to themselves as a form of debt reduction. The overall policy actions result in the government being able to borrow at extremely low interest rates, obtaining low-cost funding for government expenditures.

Raising inflation through large amounts of QE would risk inflating another asset price bubble which, when it burst, could prompt another financial and economic crisis. High inflation could also hurt real economic growth. This would also lessen the drop in the debt to GDP ratio. Bringing inflation back down again would require a sharp slowdown in the real economy. Governments could choose to live with high inflation once the debt burden had been reduced, but this would also inflict significant long-term damage on the economy, by reducing investment and distorting price signals, distorting asset prices. When inflation has been used to reduce debt in the past, it has usually happened because a government has resorted to this out of desperation and weakness, rather than because it has judged that it is in the best interests of the economy in the long term. This is negative for the dollar and positive for precious metals.

The current situation in which asset purchase programs are facilitating fiscal expansions are having the same macro-economic effects as debt monetization. While direct financing is likely to be done with the sole intent of funding government spending, under recent asset purchase programs there is a blurring of the line between central banks and governments. Some central banks (including the U.S. Fed) have abandoned quantitative constraints on the amount of their asset purchases. When the debt held by the central bank is not sold back to the market, the government never has to repay the money given to it by the central bank. This equates to a form of so-called “helicopter drop”, meaning that government debt never rises. The permanent rise in the money supply might be reversed in the future as central banks sought to reverse the resulting inflation pressures while the current temporary asset purchase programs might never be reversed and become debt monetization after all.

 

3. Living With Debt

In China, where the recovery from the sharp contraction in the first quarter is underway, growth is projected at 1.0 percent in 2020, supported in part by policy stimulus. Much of the economy already appears to be growing again in year-on-year terms. Significant infrastructure-focused stimulus is now being rolled out.

In countries where the dynamics are less favorable, they will have to reduce debt in one of the other potentially more painful ways. Before the coronavirus struck with interest rates so low, government debt in many countries was expected to rise further while still being sustainable in the long run. When interest rates are lower than GDP growth, debt will rise at a slower rate than GDP and, over time, the debt to GDP ratio will shrink. This is sustainable. In most developed economies and many emerging markets, nominal interest rates have been lower than nominal GDP growth. Countries where interest rates are lower than GDP growth will be able to run a primary deficit, while ensuring that debt as a share of GDP is falling. This hinges on governments keeping their primary budget deficits low. This ensures that the overall deficit (rather than just debt servicing costs) increase at a slower rate than GDP.

When we look at a comparison of total debt to GDP, Canada’s 350% ratio compares to 330% in the U.S. Fitch cut Canada’s AAA rating down to AA+ in June, citing a “deterioration in Canada’s public finances.” Italy’s debt ratio is 360% and its credit rating is BBB. Greece is 340% and it is rated BB-. Spain’s debt ratio is 360% and it has a BBB- ranking. China is at 290% and has an A+ rating by S&P.vi

In the past half-decade, the growth in corporate debt has outstripped the profits to service the debt by a factor of nearly five. Debt-to-equity ratios of 40%, as they stand, were at eight-year highs going into this recession, the same level as in the first quarter of the credit crisis in 2008.

Corporations across the globe tapped bond markets for $384 billion from January to May, resulting for the entire year in an extra $1 trillion of liabilities that are now added to already strained balance sheets. The Fed-led bailouts of impaired companies is, for the third cycle in a row, happening in a recession that is made worse by too much debt being fought with even more debt. Firms with below investment grade or junk credit ratings have been able to float a record $48 billion in new bonds in June, because of the Fed’s program support. For investment grade companies, from March to May, they issued more than $230 billion of new debt.vii Both the federal government and the corporate sector come out of this pandemic with crippled balance sheets. Unfortunately, the corporate sector is in much worse shape as the federal government has taxing authority while companies do not.

When the pandemic struck, governments around the world opened up the fiscal taps in an attempt to limit the human suffering from the necessary lockdowns. Before the coronavirus, support was growing for the idea that many governments could cope with higher levels of debt. This reflected the fact that in most developed markets, as well as many emerging markets, nominal interest rates are below the rate of nominal GDP growth. This implies that, as long as a government is not running big primary budget deficits, the debt to GDP ratio can erode over time. However, the current recession has been made worse by overextended private and public sector balance sheets that were run up during the expansion that was underway prior to the pandemic. That overhang constrained economic growth to the point that the last expansion was the weakest on record and cleaning up the pile of debt will impede future growth, even once we are past this health crisis.

The Bruegel think tank has compiled the cumulative fiscal responses by major European economies and the United States. Their summary breaks the efforts down into three categories: (1) direct fiscal response, (2) tax deferrals, and (3) other liquidity provisions and guarantees. Given the uncertainty about the 2020 GDP forecast, the sizes of the stimulus are scaled relative to 2019 GDP. From this perspective, the U.S. has committed roughly 9.1% of 2019 GDP to fiscal measures, while Germany’s measures are equivalent to roughly 13.3%. The German government had left themselves the fiscal room to respond aggressively to a crisis. The implied debt ratios would grow to 96.8% for the U.S. and 82.1% from the Germans, leaving German authorities in a superior position relative to where the U.S. was before the crisis.viii

In the U.S., federal spending rose to more than US$1.1 trillion in June, more than twice what the government spends in a typical month.ix The amount of tax revenue collected by the federal government remained largely flat, at about US$240 billion, in part because the Treasury Department delayed the tax filing deadline until July.x The huge surge in June pushed the budget deficit for the first nine months of the fiscal year to US$2.7 trillion. For the twelve months to June, the deficit has hit $3 trillion or 14% of GDP. The U.S. budget deficit widened to US$864 billion (about $1.1 trillion) in June, a stark jump from $8 billion in June 2019, almost matching the entire gap for the prior fiscal year ($984 billion).xi

U.S. GDP recovered some lost ground in May and June but renewed outbreaks over recent weeks make apparent that the recovery will not be a perfect V-shape. Without additional government stimulus, the recovery could be in jeopardy. Six U.S. banks have announced $35 billion in cuts to their profits. Government programs are temporarily propping up consumers and businesses. The biggest banks are planning on bad loans. JPMorgan, Citigroup and Wells Fargo set aside almost $28 billion in the second quarter; a mark only surpassed by the last three months of 2008. All three lenders said their economic outlook had deteriorated as the coronavirus rages unchecked across America. Congressional bailout money has only delayed the debt tsunami Wall Street sees coming.

Germany is responsible for 29% of the euro area GDP and is the economic engine of the block. Fiscal authorities avoided crowding out investment to the private sector during the expansion and are now stepping in to provide needed capital to fuel the recovery. German consumers showed up in May as the economy re-opened, pushing nominal retail sales up 8.2% year-over-year, reflecting some pent-up demand.xii Surveys of economic activity in Germany suggest that it held up better between March and May than France, Italy or Spain. That may be because of its heavy reliance on manufacturing, where maintaining both output and a social distance is easier than, say, in retail or hospitality services. Capital Economics argues that Poland will experience Europe’s smallest contraction in GDP this year in part because it relies little on foreign tourists.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has warned that the government’s UK debt/GDP ratio could balloon to more than 500% during the next fifty years in a “downside” scenario has barely caused a ripple in the Gilt market. In Britain, the OBR believes, borrowing, which was forecast to be 55 billion pounds (about $95 billion), could now hit 322 billion pounds (about $550 billion). That is the equivalent of over 16 per cent of GDP, the highest for any year since the Second World War, and the deficit and debt could be higher if the economy performs worse than expected.

 

Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (Percent of GDP)

SOURCE: IMF JUNE 2020 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UPDATE
NOTE: (DATA SOURCE: NATIONAL AUTHORITIES; AND IMF STAFF ESTIMATES.) DATA ARE AS OF JUNE 12, 2020. COUNTRY GROUPS ARE WEIGHTED BY GDP IN PURCHASING POWER PARITY-ADJUSTED CURRENT US DOLLARS. REVENUE AND SPENDING MEASURES EXCLUDE DEFERRED TAXES AND ADVANCE PAYMENTS. AES = ADVANCED ECONOMIES; EMS = EMERGING MARKETS; G20 = GROUP OF TWENTY ECONOMIES; LIDCS = LOW-INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

 

Change in Global Government Debt and Overall Fiscal Balance (Percent of GDP)

SOURCE: IMF JUNE 2020 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UPDATE (IMF STAFF ESTIMATES.)

 

Frame Global Asset Management uses macro-economic analysis in order to develop a twelve-month forward view of where the global economy is heading. We factor this outlook into our Portfolio Model creation, combined with a view to minimize losses. As we advance through the current Covid-19 pandemic, we focus on the facts that we can rely on and adjust our forward views accordingly.

In addition to the unknowns at this time with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, we understand that maintaining open supply lines globally will allow for access to medical products and food. Restricting trade and disrupting established supply chains will hinder the ramp up of the manufacture of much-needed protective equipment, testing kits, ventilators, and other essentials. In the longer run, a turn towards protectionism will slow down the global economic recovery, to the detriment of all countries, most damagingly for the poorest.

We are living a recession that was made worse by overextended private and public sector balance sheets hanging over from the last expansion. Current debt will hang over future growth, even once we are past this health crisis. The depth will depend on two main factors: how long it takes to bring the pandemic under control, and the policies governments implement, domestically and at the international level in order to mitigate the pandemic’s economic consequences.

The economic, social, and financial fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic will almost certainly continue for a prolonged period. It is impossible to predict the exact course that financial markets will take as the pandemic continues.

Governments, rather than having to resort to austerity, default, or inflating debt away, will need to demonstrate to financial markets that they will return debt to a sustainable path.

 

As we enter the back half of 2020, we identify the following risks:

• Secular stagnation – This refers to a rise in the amount of desired saving relative to desired investment, which has prompted interest rates to fall to balance the two. This in turn reflects various factors such as the impact on saving of ageing populations, shareholders’ desire for short-term returns and a dearth of investment opportunities.
• A flare-up in trade tensions with China
• More delays on the re-openings
• The second-quarter earnings season – Key will be guidance, especially since the market is expecting the numbers to turn positive by Q4
• The November U.S. election
• A U.S. fiscal cliff

 

International Monetary Fund Risks Noted

As is the case everywhere, there is uncertainty around the IMF 2020 forecast. Their forecast sights the depth of the contraction in the second quarter of 2020 as well as the magnitude and persistence of the adverse shock. These elements, in turn, depend on several uncertain factors including:

• The length of the pandemic and required lockdowns
• Voluntary social distancing, which will affect spending
• Displaced workers’ ability to secure employment, possibly in different sectors
• Scarring from firm closures and unemployed workers exiting the workforce, which may make it more difficult for activity to bounce back once the pandemic fades
• The impact of changes to strengthen workplace safety—such as staggered work shifts, enhanced hygiene and cleaning between shifts, new workplace practices relating to proximity of personnel on production lines—which incur business costs
• Global supply chain reconfigurations that affect productivity as companies try to enhance their resilience to supply disruptions. The extent of cross-border spillovers from weaker external demand as well as funding shortfalls
• Eventual resolution of the current disconnects between asset valuations and prospects for economic activity

 

 

Section 2. Four Themes

 

Theme 1: The Global Economy is in Recession

According to Yelp, nearly 66,000 businesses have shut their doors since March 1st and the rate of closures is on an upswing into mid-July. Researchers at Harvard estimate the number of business closures is closer to 110,000 nationwide, which makes sense since we already know that the run-up in permanent job losses since the crisis began has totaled an epic 1.6 million.xiii Erratic economic data has driven volatility. Italian industrial production, which just came out for May, soared 42.1% month-over-month, while the year-over-year pace was -20.3%. France saw a 19.6% industrial production pop in May and a year-over-year trend hitting -23.4%. Taiwan’s exports fell last month for a fourth straight month and officials there warned that global demand is going to struggle to recover with the latest outbreak of the coronavirus (adding the heightened tensions between the U.S. and China as another roadblock).xiv

We expect import declines as a GDP offset when inventories go down as this was the case in the U.S. as inbound goods shipments from abroad fell back 1.2% in May. What was most concerning from a capital spending intention standpoint was the 1.9% pullback in capital goods imports, which compounded the 10.7% plunge in April that left the three-month number with a decline of -31.9% at an annual pace.xv

The even bigger problem was the export figure — sliding 5.8% after big declines in April (-25.1%) and March (-7.4%). The numbers are so staggering that the three-month trend has collapsed to an -81.7% annual rate. The entire foreign sector has been hit. And the pullback in business investment plans in the context of eroding profit growth, a complete lack of visibility, and preservation of cash on the balance sheet, has gone global because U.S. exports of capital goods sunk 2.5% in May after a 23.8% decline in April, taking the three-month trend to a -75.3% annual rate.xvi The implications of this for future productivity at a time when labor force participation rates enter a period of secular decline is a severe challenge to the world potential GDP growth rate. This is one reason why deflation today will point morph into stagflation once demand stabilizes. This environment of nil or negative growth accompanied by inflation is a very difficult one to emerge from.

 

Theme 2: Gold is a Safe Haven: Central Banks Agree

Gold performed strongly in the first half of 2020, increasing by 16.8% in US dollar terms and outperforming all other major asset classes. Gold breached the $1800-mark for the first time since 2011. The World Gold Council reports a record of nearly $40 billion flooded into gold-backed ETFs in the first half of the year. Though equity markets around the world rebounded sharply from their Q1 lows, the high level of uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the massive wave of central bank stimulus, and the ultra-low interest rate environment prompted a flight into the safe haven.

Fundamental drivers of the gold price are the low yield environment, substantial fiscal and monetary stimulus, and the inflationary impact on asset prices.

In the current global economic environment, three drivers are supportive of investment demand for gold:

• high risk and uncertainty
• low opportunity cost
• positive price momentum.

Traditionally, assets such as U.S. Treasuries and G-10 sovereign bonds comprise the bulk of central bank reserve portfolios. Gold is also held as it tends to outperform other assets during periods of market stress.

The case for central banks holding gold remains strong, especially considering the economic uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was supported by the findings in the recently published 2020 Central Bank Survey, Gold Trends Report, World Gold Council. Factors related to the economic environment, such as negative interest rates, were overwhelming drivers of these planned purchases. This is supported by gold’s role as a safe haven in times of crisis, as well as its lack of default risk. Our view remains that central banks will remain net purchasers in 2020.

 

Theme 3: Oil Prices: Geopolitics Meets the Pandemic

The oil market experienced sharp decreases in the first quarter of 2020 as it was inundated with low-cost oil after Saudi Arabia launched a price war with Russia. The two countries put an end to the dispute in April by agreeing to reduce production by nearly 10 million barrels per day to stimulate markets. But prices continued to plummet when it became clear that the promised reductions would not be enough to offset the collapse in demand that has been exacerbated by the pandemic. The coronavirus pandemic caused oil demand to drop so rapidly that on April 20th, U.S. oil to be delivered in May settled at -$37.60 per barrel, the first negative close in history. Producers, who were running out of storage space as demand for energy collapsed, were willing to pay buyers to take crude off their hands. The effects of cheap crude infiltrated the global economy.

The double black swan has caused oil prices to collapse to levels that make it impossible for U.S. shale oil companies to make money. In a $20 oil environment, 533 U.S. oil exploration and production companies would be expected to file for bankruptcy by the end of 2021, according to Rystad Energy. At $10, there would be more than 1,100 bankruptcies, Rystad estimates. Rystad’s $20 scenario predicts more than $70 billion of oil company debt will get reorganized in bankruptcy, followed by $177 billion in 2021. That accounts for exploration and production companies but not the servicing industry that provides the tools and manpower to drillers.xvii

In a June Oil Market Report, the International Energy Association predicted that for the year 2020, demand for oil will drop by 8.1 million barrels per day, the biggest-ever decline. Changes in lifestyle and reduced commuting in developed economies are expected to result in a permanent reduction in oil demand.

 

Theme 4: Global Currency Revaluation

The reductions in interest rates across Group-of-10 countries in response to the pandemic-induced halt to their economies has left most currencies yielding close to zero on a nominal basis.

The dollar, an important symbol of America’s global standing, remains the primary currency of choice for investors who use it to trade a wide array of assets around the globe. It is also the world’s top reserve currency, held in large quantities by governments, central banks, and other major financial institutions. The dollar benefits from being the currency of choice for many global transactions, including the trading of commodities like oil. It accounts for 62% of the world’s currency reserves and is involved in 88% of all global currency trades.xviii When the coronavirus became a global pandemic in March, there was a move to snap up US dollars, the world’s ultimate safe haven asset. After an extended stretch of gains, the US dollar lost ground in June as safe-haven demand for US dollars declined.

Investors are becoming less positive about the dollar’s outlook. Growing debt loads and commitment to “America First” policies have added to risks. A worsening economic outlook in the United States and a diminished role on the world stage could encourage allies to look to other top currencies. Research now supports the idea that an “America First” philosophy could hurt the dollar in the long run. A working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2017 found that foreign demand for dollars could decline if the country was no longer seen as guaranteeing the security of its allies, leading them to hold more of their reserves in euros, yen and renminbi.xix Russia and China are increasingly avoiding the dollar when settling crude oil deals. After the United States pulled out of the Iran nuclear agreement, top EU officials began lobbying for greater use of the euro. According to a JP Morgan report by John Normand and Federico Manicardi, the risk of currency debasement may heighten next year and will show in the value of Japanese yen or gold rather than the dollar.

 

 

Section 3: Investment Outlook

 

Global Pandemic Leads Us to a Recession Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

 

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4: June 2020 Portfolio Models

The role of the financial industry as an allocator and distributor of capital to the economy will be paramount to the evolution of the current pandemic. The current health crisis has morphed into an economic crisis, which has morphed into a financial crisis. While advances in testing and contact tracing will help, risk of a second wave of infections and the re-imposition of strict containment measures is likely to remain until a vaccine is developed. Simultaneously, geopolitical risks are heating up amid escalating tensions over Hong Kong, civil unrest in the U.S., and the return of Brexit uncertainty. We are monitoring these developments and have maintained our previous Recession Outlook for the U.S. economy to reflect a Recession that began in March and extends through the end of the year.

In June, we maintained the asset allocation that was established in May for all portfolio models. We continue to be positioned in shorter duration fixed income. We expect interest rates to remain low or negative across the globe and as a result, we continue to have exposure to gold which is a store of value in this environment and a preferred asset for central banks for the foreseeable future. Equity exposure to large cap across all models reflects our view that shifting business models during this pandemic have had a negative impact on bottom lines but that select businesses are benefiting from the shift.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

July 14, 2020

 

iIMF. World Economic Forum. June 2020.
iiIMF. World Economic Forum. June 2020.
iiiIMF. World Economic Forum. June 2020.
ivTrading Economics. Country Interest Rates. June 2020.
vU.K. Government. Treasury Loans. July 16, 2020.
viTrading Economics. Country Lists, Credit Ratings. June 2020.
viiOECD. Corporate Debt to Equity Ratios. June 2020.
viiiChristie, Rebecca. EU Opportunity. The Bruegel Think Tank. July 16, 2020.
ixTrading Economics. U.S. Government Spending. June 2020.
xWorld Bank. U.S. Federal Tax Revenue. July 2020.
xiTrading Economics. U.S. Federal Government Budget. June 2020.
xiiTrading Economics. Germany Retail Sales. July 1, 2020.
xiiiNational Bureau of Economic Research. How Are Small Businesses Adjusting to COVID-19? NBER Working Paper 26989. April 2020.
xivTrading Economics. Country Economic Data. June 2020.
xvTrading Economics. U.S. Imports of Capital Goods. May 2020.
xviTrading Economics. U.S. Exports of Capital Goods. May 2020.
xviiRystad Energy. COVID-19 Report. 14th Edition. July 3, 2020.
xviiiWorld Gold Council. July 2020.
xixNational Bureau of Economic Research. Foreign Safe Asset Demand and the Dollar Exchange Rate. NBER Working Paper 24439. Issued March 2018. Revised March 2019.

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Q2 2020 Outlook

Section 1: Q2 2020 Outlook

 

Global Risk: The World Is Heading for the Sharpest and Deepest Global Slowdown Since WW2

The economic cost of the COVID-19 crisis may pale in comparison to the human cost. Many people fear for their own health and that of their loved ones. As such, there is a “real” element to the fear factor. Measures to contain the virus have upended supply chains and financial markets and weighed on commodity prices. Consumer and business confidence is expected to remain subdued for some time, not least if fears of a second wave of the virus linger. Given the hit to both the services and goods-producing sectors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects real GDP to contract at a greater than 30% annualized pace in the current quarter.i

This shutdown will cause the greatest short-term drop in output that the global economy has ever experienced, and the pace of the subsequent recovery is hard to determine at this time. No one knows how long the supply and demand disruptions will constrain growth.

Markets are looking for confidence in the policy response. Policy must ensure that households, businesses, and the financial system remain liquid. Policy should also aim to minimize damage to the solvency of all stakeholders, preventing sharp drops in business and household cash-flow positions from triggering a wave of bankruptcies in the real economy and of margin calls in the financial system.

 

Containment and Stabilization Followed by Recovery

With lockdowns in place across much of the world, the IMF has downgraded their forecasts further in recent days, now forecasting global real GDP to fall by over 3% this year.ii That compares with a pre-virus forecast assuming growth of about 3%. This means that 2020 is set to be the worst year for the global economy since the end of the Second World War, when world GDP in 1945 plunged by 5.5%. Most of the output lost in the first half of this year will probably be lost forever and it could take years for demand to recover completely. Demand for travel abroad may stay weak for months and possibly years. Secular stagnation forces, political uncertainty, and empty monetary toolkits indicate that rapid recovery is not possible even after the virus-related supply and demand disruptions have faded. Firms will be considering how to repay their emergency loans, while in some countries there might be the prospect of a new wave of austerity to repay the rise in public debt. Early signs from China are that demand has been slow to return despite firms being told to resume normal operations in February.

This crisis will need to be dealt with in two phases: a phase of containment and stabilization followed by the recovery phase. In both phases public health and economic policies have crucial roles to play. Quarantines, lockdowns, and social distancing are all critical for slowing transmission, giving the health care system time to handle the surge in demand for its services and buying time for researchers to try to develop therapies and a vaccine. These measures can help avoid an even more severe and protracted slump in activity and set the stage for economic recovery.

The new policy mix will require that fiscal policy be used to attain full employment and price stability, while monetary policy will be used to ensure debt sustainability by keeping sovereign yields low. As well as going all-out in its role as lender of last resort, central banks will be required to do the same for the financial system.

So far, the fiscal response in affected countries has been swift and sizable in many advanced economies including Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Many emerging market and developing economies, such as China, Indonesia, and South Africa have also begun providing or announc¬ing significant fiscal support to heavily impacted sectors and workers. Fiscal measures will need to be scaled up if the stoppages to economic activity are persistent, or the pickup in activity as restrictions are lifted is too weak.iii

Globally, central banks’ response to the coronavirus crisis has been unprecedented and is likely to change the way that financial markets function for years to come. Countries are starting out with very different fiscal positions. Central banks’ balance sheets will be far larger and contain a much wider variety of assets than before as a result. Germany currently enjoys a budget surplus and has plenty of fiscal capacity, and China is now pumping in substantial support.

The Fed has launched many new programs. The U.S. was on track for an outright fiscal drag in 2020 due to expiring stimulus, living with the largest fiscal deficit and thus is the least capable of delivering more fiscal stimulus. Now the Fed is giving the Treasury access to its printing press. This means that, in the extreme, the administration is free to use its control, to instruct the Fed to print more money so it can buy securities and hand out loans in an effort to ramp financial markets higher. The case for central-bank independence has gone largely unquestioned for years. Logic assumed that politicians think short-term and make decisions for political reasons. At full or close-to-full employment, expansionary monetary policy might briefly juice the economy but, after a delay, create inflation. When monetary policy is kept at arm’s length from politics by making it the responsibility of an independent central bank, you avoid the problem. This logic is now being put to the test.

The Fed’s actions can be split into three main categories. First, it has acted as a “buyer of last resort” in many markets. This covers its open-ended purchases of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), including agency commercial MBS. It also covers its purchases of commercial paper, corporate bonds, and municipal bonds. Though the aim is different, the Fed will also purchase so-called “Main Street” loans. Second, it has lent against all kinds of collateral, either to support key parts of the financial system, or to encourage more lending by other institutions. The Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility and Primary Dealer Credit Facility are examples of the former. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility is an example of the latter. That facility lends against asset-backed securities (whose underlying exposure is to a wide variety of loans including auto loans and leveraged loans), aiming to boost issuance. Third, it has acted to limit financial distress outside the U.S., and the associated upward pressure on its currency, by making cheap dollar funding readily available. This covers the Fed’s revived and expanded swap lines, plus its new Foreign and International Monetary Authority (FIMA) repo facility.iv

The Federal Reserve has now expanded its balance sheet beyond $6 trillion, an increase of almost $2 trillion in less than a month. It has taken extraordinary steps to lift regulations to help banks play their part in the relief effort. One consequence may be that central bank support could help most risky assets to outperform safe ones by a wide margin as these measures go far beyond conventional monetary easing in their efforts to backstop the financial system.v With a policy interest rate that has been cut to a range of 0% to 0.25% and commitment that rates would stay low indefinitely, the supply of funds outside of the Feds own money creation may become scarce. By virtue of a system that promotes superior productivity growth, the country’s knack for nurturing world-beating companies, and less challenging demographics than the developed world, there is some hope that the U.S. can outpace most of the developed world in economic recovery.

 

Controlling Our Own Behavior it the Middle of a Pandemic

In the middle of this global pandemic, we consider what we can and cannot control. This applies not only to our individual behavior, but also when it comes to our investment positioning.

In theory, being prepared for a low-probability, high-consequence event such as a pandemic is possible. Identify threats. Consider how to mitigate. Weigh costs of mitigation against probability and consequence, factoring in available resources and competing demands. Prepare.

An economist describes loss aversion as when an individual’s utility is concave over gains and convex over losses. This means that a gain contributes less to utility/happiness than an equal dollar loss subtracts from utility/happiness. The current economic meltdown presents us with the reality that when a capital loss is suffered, ability to recover the same amount that was lost must be done from a lower base, requiring a larger percent recovery just to break even. This pain is not imagined, it is very real (see our White Paper at www.frameglobal.com/education). Avoiding losses in the first place is much preferred to recovering from losses.

 

We Put Economic Theory into Practice and Have Been Rewarded

Frame Global Asset Management considers the outlook for the global economy relative to a view of expected U.S. GDP growth in the twelve months ahead. We track asset class behavior over time, both in terms of returns – gains and losses – and correlations to other asset classes. When historic data for asset classes is partitioned under broad macro-economic environments, patterns of behavior become obvious. The outlook falls into one of the following five broad descriptions: GROWTH, STAGNATION, RECESSION, INFLATION, or CHAOS, allowing for a transitioning in the period from one environment to another. Macro-economic environments contribute to asset class return distributions. As an economic cycle progresses through different economic environments, including Chaos and Recession, we know that asset classes experience a large distribution of returns, calculated over the measurement period.

Along with consideration of greater downside risk to asset classes from periodic extreme unexpected negative events, we incorporate this information to create tactical asset allocation portfolio models, delivered with an optimal combination of broad asset class exposure.

 

Expected Asset Class Behavior in Recession

Using a statistical sampling technique called bootstrapping, we can see that in a Recession Environment, U.S. Treasuries are expected to experience losses only 7.8% of the time and earn an average return of 11.62%.

 

Gold is expected to experience losses 37% of the time and earn an average return of 8.31%.

 

The S&P 500 is expected to experience losses 76% of the time and earn an average return of negative 9.2%.

 

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

We Positioned for Recession in February and Avoided Losses in the First Quarter in our Conservative and Moderate Growth Portfolio Models

We define the economic environment “Chaos” as a high impact, low probability event. In a Chaos environment, all asset classes become highly correlated and suffer simultaneous losses. In this environment, we look for asset classes that will be expected to experience low correlations as we move out of Chaos and typically into Recession. There is no question that the current pandemic event has had high impact. The low probability was considered low in the broader markets and economies up until February 19th, 2020, the peak of the S&P Dow Jones. But there were indications coming from China about the virility of the virus and the high mortality rate beginning in January. Without complete cessation of all movement of people across boarders at that time, we determined that it was inevitable that the virus would spread globally.

 

In our Portfolio Updates we highlighted the following:

January 20th, 2020:
“The trend towards populism and protectionist policy remains a risk to the stability of global financial markets while heightened geopolitical strains also have the potential to create volatility.”

“We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.”

February 19th, 2020:
“The coronavirus outbreak in China has generated economic waves that are disrupting global supply networks that act as the backbone of the global economy and comes as the global economy was already cooling off.”

“In February, we reduced exposure to U.S. equities across all models and reintroduced the U.S. long-term Treasury Bond. This reflects our view on deflationary influences that dominate the global economy.”

“The trend towards populism and protectionist policy remains a risk to the stability of global financial markets and the COVID-19 outbreak is likely to delay recovery and intensify disinflation.”

March 17th, 2020:
“A global recession in 2020 is all but confirmed as nations shut down economic activity to limit the spread of COVID-19. The virus is unique in that it is a demand shock and supply shock, and also a negative wealth, oil price, and credit shock. There will be a wide range of subsequent effects. We are monitoring these developments and have updated our previous Stagnation followed by Recession outlook for the U.S. economy to reflect a Recession in March, extending through to the end of the year, as the situation will deteriorate further before beginning to recover.”

 

Because the market is forward looking, a Chaos environment is typically short lived and followed by a Recession. We are now positioned for Recession for the twelve- month period ahead.

 

 

Section 2. Four Themes

 

Theme 1: The Entire Global Economy is in Recession

The Great Lockdown is projected to shrink global growth dramatically. A partial recovery is projected for 2021, with above trend growth rates, but GDP will remain below the pre-virus trend, with considerable uncertainty about the strength of the rebound.

Global growth is projected at -3.0% in 2020, an outcome far worse than during the 2009 global financial crisis. The growth forecast is marked down by more than 6 percentage points relative to the October 2019 IMF and January 2020 IMF Update projections – an extraordinary revision over such a short period of time.vi

Recent economic reports helped fill in the picture of what happened to the economy in March and early April, and it is clear that the spread of COVID-19 led to a sharp contraction across much of the U.S. and other major economies. With the shutdown in China occurring in January, imports into the U.S. plunged in February, while exports had yet to be affected. With large parts of the U.S. domestic economy now closed, import demand will contract sharply over the coming months. Export demand so far appears to have held up much better, but widespread factory shutdowns means export volumes are likely to contract too.

The U.S. trade deficit will narrow in the next few months but should reverse over the rest of the year, as the stronger dollar weighs more on exports. With oil production dropping sharply, the U.S. is likely to return to being a net oil importer once gasoline demand recovers.vii

Canada will rack up debt faster in this crisis than any other developed country, relative to its economy, according to data from the IMF. It is fortunate that Canada’s governments went into this economic crisis in a much better financial position than most other developed countries. Net government debt (total government debt minus its cash holdings) was at 40% of economic output before the crisis. The average for developed countries was 107%. This may be why Canada’s governments have proven more willing to spend their way out of the crisis than some others.viii

 

Big-time fiscal deterioration in Canada

SOURCE: NATIONAL BANK FINANCIAL, IMF

NOTE: EUR = EURO AREA. COUNTRY AGGREGATES SHADED BLUE, CANADA RED.

 

Theme 2: Gold is a Safe Haven

Gold has played an important role in portfolios as a source of liquidity and collateral. Like most asset classes, gold is being affected by the unprecedented economic and financial market conditions in play around the globe. Recent volatility in the gold price has been driven by massive liquidations across all assets, and likely magnified by leveraged positions and rule-based trading.

Gold has also likely been used to raise cash to cover losses in other asset classes because it remains one of the best performing asset classes year-to-date, despite recent fluctuations, and it is a high quality and highly liquid asset. But coming out of the market selloff we have seen that the stronger the pullback in the stock market, the more negatively correlated gold becomes with the market, highlighting its effectiveness in a sustained pullback (see graph below).

Gold prices denominated in many other currencies, however, continued to reach all-time highs. This highlights a continued trend of growth in gold ETFs outside of the U.S. over the past few years; a trend underscored by European funds seeing the largest absolute inflows and Asia and other regions registering the largest percentage growth during the month. It serves as a safe haven in the longer term.ix

 

Correlation increased across all major asset classes except three-month Treasuries during the COVID-19 selloff

SOURCE: WORLD GOLD COUNCIL, BLOOMBERG

 

Theme 3: Oil Prices and Geopolitical Risk

Demand for oil has been hit by the coronavirus pandemic while global storage facilities are overflowing. International and domestic travel restrictions throughout the world and a sharp reduction in road traffic are expected to lead to a further decline in oil demand in 2020 that could exceed 10 million barrels a day, about 10 percent of global daily oil production.x

Confronting a weak demand environment, the OPEC+ coalition broke down on March 6th, 2020, leading to the worst one-day price drop in the oil market since 1991. This was repeated on April 21st. Oil prices had already declined 7.3% between August 2019 and February 2020, falling from $57.60 to $53.40, before further declining by 39.6% in March to $32.30 as the COVID-19 outbreak abruptly reversed a positive trend as containment measures directly hit the transportation sector, which accounts for more than 60% of oil demand.

After trading close to $20 toward the end of March, oil prices recovered somewhat in early April as the OPEC+ coalition resumed talks, but by mid-April the price of American crude oil crashed by more than a fifth, falling below $15 a barrel to its lowest point in two decades. The slump came even as OPEC producers and their allies have promised to slash production.xi

The drop in oil prices has already had a marked impact on Canada’s dollar. Canada’s currency is likely to remain around 70 US cents in the near term as uncertainty about the depth and duration of the crisis sees investors gravitate to the safety of US dollars.

 

Theme 4: Global Currency Revaluation

Every recession, financial crisis or geopolitical shock has left a permanent imprint on at least one major asset class. COVID-19’s aftermath is expected to involve at least one regime change. (See Frame Global Asset Management White Paper 3).

The currencies of commodity exporters with flexible exchange rates among emerging market and advanced economies have depreciated sharply since the beginning of the year, while the US dollar has appreciated by some 8.5% in real effective terms as of April 3rd, the yen by about 5%, and the euro by some 3%.xii The broad dollar will continue to be supported by the ongoing deleveraging demand and will maintain a bid against Emerging Market currencies where there are balance sheet vulnerabilities, and Petro currencies which will continue to suffer from the oil supply glut.

While the COVID-19 shock is depressing both global demand and supply, a demand shock this large will probably produce the first negative year-on-year readings on global CPI inflation in several decades. This decline is not just an energy price effect: global core inflation could drop below 1% for the first time in at least 20 years, which will sustain central bank concerns of deflation even once the expansion materializes.

Longer term implications, given the scale of the Fed’s purchases of Treasury securities in the first few weeks of the pandemic and the size of the broader expansion in its balance sheet, suggest that the Fed is monetizing the deficit. The monetary base expansion will eventually trigger a corresponding rise in broad money and consequently, when the economy’s resources are fully utilized again, the prices of goods and services too.

The revenue loss around a recession results with the contraction in aggregate demand. Margin compression is by far the biggest contributor to profit losses in a recession. Margins are driven by many factors, but the three most important are: prices (a positive), wages (a negative), and productivity (a positive). Roughly two-thirds of the variation in global corporate profit growth can be explained by the difference between price inflation and growth in unit labor costs (that is, wages relative to productivity). During recessions, wage inflation is held back but this pales in comparison to the loss in pricing power. At the same time, some degree of labor hoarding creates pro-cyclicality in productivity growth.

Inflation and margin compression will factor into the revaluation of global currencies. We will continue to monitor these.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Global Pandemic Leads Us to a Recession Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

 

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. March 2020 Portfolio Models

A global recession in 2020 is all but confirmed as nations shut down economic activity to limit the spread of COVID-19. The virus is unique in that it is a demand shock and supply shock, and also a negative wealth, oil price, and credit shock. There will be a wide range of subsequent effects. We are monitoring these developments and have updated our previous Stagnation followed by Recession outlook for the U.S. economy to reflect a Recession in March, extending through to the end of the year, as the situation will deteriorate further before beginning to recover.

In March, we maintained the asset allocation positioning that we established on February 19th. This reflects our view on deflationary and recessionary influences that dominate the global economy.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

April 14, 2020

 

iIMF. World Economic Outlook. April 14th, 2020.
iiIMF. World Economic Outlook. April 14th, 2020.
iiiIMF. World Economic Outlook. April 14th, 2020.
ivCapital Economics. U.S. Economic Update. April 16th, 2020.
vCapital Economics. U.S. Economic Update. April 16th, 2020.
viIMF. World Economic Outlook. April 14th, 2020.
viiCapital Economics. U.S. Economic Update. April 16th, 2020.
viiiNational Bank of Canada. Public Sector Debt. April 15th, 2020.
ixWorld Gold Council. April 8th, 2020.
xCapital Economics. U.S. Economic Update. April 16th, 2020.
xiCapital Economics. U.S. Economic Update. April 16th, 2020.
xiiTrading Economics. Currencies. April 20th, 2020.

 

/by
,

Q1 2020 Outlook

Section 1: Q1 2020 Outlook

 

Current Risks of a Reserve Currency Trap

The U.S. economy represents 33% of the global economy, but its spill-over effects on the rest of the world are amplified by the dominant role of the US dollar (USD) in international payments, debt issuance, and FX reserves.i

The trust and confidence that the world has in the ability of the United States to pay its debts have anointed the dollar as the most redeemable currency, facilitating world commerce. This has led to the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves throughout the global economy over the last 25 years.

As global asset allocators, our ETF Portfolio Models are exposed to foreign currency risk -primarily US dollars. Relative currency movement can be significant and have a positive or negative impact on investment returns. As with our approach to all asset classes, we want to participate on the upside and protect on the downside.

In the case of currency exposure, while we may be allocating specifically for downside protection in a non-Canadian asset class, i.e., the U.S., it may be the case that a weaker US dollar could diminish the benefit of the U.S. exposure. In these events, we apply a neutral hedge to the entire portfolio.

In this Q1 2020 Outlook, we take a look at the risks that exist of an unexpected shift in global central bank US dollar reserve balances.

The US dollar reserve status is based largely on the size and strength of the U.S. economy and the dominance of U.S. financial markets. Despite large deficit spending, trillions of dollars in foreign debt, and the printing of US dollars and US Treasury securities remain the safest store of money.

The dominance of the US dollar, reflected in its role as a global anchor for prices and interest rates, can force central banks to hold excessive USD-denominated foreign exchange reserves to match the significant USD exposure from trade and borrowing of the respective economy. The dominant role of the USD in credit and investment markets impacts investment flows to emerging economies by increasing volatility. Investment flows to emerging markets can reverse much faster than they have built up over time, making them act like very destructive pro-cyclical amplifiers in crisis situations. The role that oil prices play in the level of the USD is significant but may now be overshadowed by the sheer volume of dollar reserves that are now on the balance sheets of central banks around the globe.

 

A New Relationship Between Oil and the US Dollar

Considering the new dynamics of the global energy market, the United States has become the world’s marginal producer of oil products, and the US dollar has been seen to trade more like a petrodollar since 2015.

A barrel of oil is priced in US dollars across the world, so by definition, strength in the US dollar means it takes fewer greenbacks to buy a barrel of oil (all else equal) and weakness in the US dollar makes the price of oil appear higher in dollar terms. Each uptick and downtick in the dollar or in the price of the commodity generates an immediate realignment between the US dollar and numerous forex crosses. These movements are less correlated in nations without significant crude oil reserves, like Japan, and more correlated in nations that have significant reserves like Canada, Russia, and Brazil.

Many nations leveraged their crude oil reserves during the energy market’s historic rise between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, borrowing heavily to build infrastructure, expand military operations, and initiate social programs. Those bills came due after the 2008 economic collapse, where some countries deleveraged while others doubled down, borrowing more heavily against reserves to restore trust and trajectory to their wounded economies.

These heavier debt loads helped keep growth rates high until global crude oil prices collapsed in 2014, dumping commodity-sensitive nations into recessionary environments. Canada, Russia, Brazil, and other energy-rich countries have struggled since then.

Because the United States has historically been a net importer of oil products, rising oil prices meant that the United States’ current account deficit would rise as citizens and companies shipped more currency abroad. Due primarily to the success of horizontal drilling and fracking techniques, the U.S. shale revolution has dramatically increased domestic petroleum production. The United States became a net exporter of refined petroleum products in 2011 and has now become the third-largest producer of crude oil after Saudi Arabia and Russia.iii According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States is currently about 90% self-sufficient in terms of total energy consumption.iv Economically, this means that higher oil prices no longer lead to a higher U.S. deficit, and in fact, can decrease the deficit in certain situations.

 

Canada is an Important Net Exporter of Oil

When it comes to the US/Canadian dollar relationship, the USD/CAD exchange rate is determined by the demand and supply of Canadian and US dollars. The CAD has a high correlation to U.S. oil because of the large portion of CAD oil exports that are shipped to the United States.

Canada has the third largest volume of oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Canada’s economy is dependent on exports and is the fourth largest exporter of crude oil in the world.v Approximately 96% of its exports go to the U.S., including over 3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day.vi Canada and OPEC Countries represent the major sources of U.S. petroleum imports at 38% and 34% respectively. Because of the volume involved, it creates a huge amount of demand for Canadian dollars.

Due to the country’s status as a net exporter of oil, its currency in relation to the USD is highly correlated to oil prices, meaning that they move in similar directions to each other. Other factors can influence the USD/CAD exchange rate including the relative inflation rate, interest rates, balance trade, public debt, OPEC decisions, political stability, and economic performance.

 

 

The 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 oil slump, and correlation breaking down in 2018 are all notable events on the timeline. Despite the history of correlation between CAD and crude, the relationship appears to have broken down late 2018 when oil’s surge made the Canadian dollar decline. This divergence is due to factors such as OPEC policies being a key influencer of oil price rather than supply and demand factors, monetary policy, and Canada’s efforts to diversify its economy and lessen its reliance on oil.

 

A New Dominant Factor Driving Foreign Exchange Rates and the US Dollar: The Failed Clean-Up of the Financial Crisis

A benefit of crises and recessions is that they remove both unproductive firms and financial excess, creating space for more productive firms and fresh financial investment. This was not allowed to happen after the Recession of 2008 and is why the economic recovery from the crisis was so weak. More than ten years later, through FX reserves and through QE programs, central banks globally hold government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies.

The global financial crisis (GFC) was a massive failure of risk-hedging in the financial sector, combined with both regulatory failures and dangerous and deeply embedded incentives. While the extraordinary measures used to stop the crisis from mutating into a systemic meltdown can be considered appropriate, extending these measures through the past decade cannot.

The U.S. recapitalized, merged, and permitted the failure of some banks, but Europe chose the opposite approach resulting in undercapitalized and ailing banks surviving. However, the most impactful mistakes were made after the GFC on both sides of the Atlantic. Many central banks enacted zero or negative interest rate policies and started asset purchase Quantitative Easing (QE) programs run through the commercial banks. In the U.S., the Fed purchased securities from authorized Primary Dealer banks by crediting reserve balances to the Fed accounts associated with each dealer counterparty. These intermediary banks paid the sellers of bonds (households, funds, banks, etc.) and the Fed compensated the banks with reserves. In practice, the Fed forced excess reserves onto the balance sheets of banks far beyond levels they would have acquired independently. Because of the higher supply of reserves system-wide, their marginal benefit decreased, bidding-up the prices of various securities. This led the banks to issue additional and often riskier loans until the balance of the marginal benefits was restored. Also, because QE and low policy rates depressed long-term rates, many of the securities that the commercial banks held had no yield advantage over reserves, making the banks more likely to substitute less-liquid securities with more credit risk.

Using QE, central banks can buy various fixed income assets including government bonds, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, and in a few cases, equities (in the case of Japan, for example). However, the bulk of QE programs concern government bonds with the goal of curbing long-term interest rates across economies. Of the USD 11 trillion of QE programs, it is estimated that USD 9 trillion originate from central banks’ acquisitions of government bonds from the countries concerned.vii

Despite increased diversification, the bulk of FX reserves are still held in government bonds issued in a select number of advanced economies including the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Approximately 70% of global reserves (ex-gold) are invested into the government bonds issued by these economies. This means that either through FX reserves or through QE programs, central banks hold around USD 18 trillion of government bonds issued by a relatively small number of advanced economies.viii The total stock of government debt issued by these countries was around USD 40 trillion at the end of 2018.ix This means that central banks currently hold nearly half of global ‘safe assets’, i.e., government bonds issued by leading advanced economies such as the U.S., Japan, European states, and a few others.

Falling current account surpluses point to lower growth in FX reserves. But given the safe haven status of Japan and Switzerland in times of geopolitical uncertainty, they may need further interventions to prevent their currencies from appreciating too much.

The growth in FX reserves managed by Emerging Markets grew with the growth of emerging market economies and the commodity price boom. It continued uninterrupted after the financial crisis of 2008 as growth in Emerging Markets remained resilient, despite the recession in advanced economies. Oil prices were quick to recover from the temporary drop experienced during the most acute phase of the global crisis, thus filling the coffers of commodity-exporting economies.

The massive holdings of government bonds by central banks through FX reserve and QE raises two important questions.

At a policy level, is there a potential conflict of interest between monetary policy and asset management objectives?

Should central banks become concerned about potential losses on their holdings, given their focus on capital protection, will they be tempted to adopt a pro-cyclical behavior. Ultimately, this is an issue of international coordination among central banks as reserves held by emerging markets are often invested into bonds acquired by advanced economies’ central banks via QE programs. This international coordination may dominate over underlying demand and supply drivers including global oil demand.

The second question relates to investment risk. Can central banks weather the inevitable drop in prices that will accompany a future rise in interest rates?

As a result of the decline in global interest rates to zero or even negative levels, government bonds are a very expensive asset in both absolute and relative terms. Central banks are exposed to potentially large losses should interest rates rise. While it is true that central banks often hold bonds until maturity accounted for on an accrual basis, since most of these institutions adopt a mark¬ to-market approach in the measurement of their investment portfolio, any drop in prices on such holdings is reflected in their reported profits and losses. For central banks doing QE, the risk is further increased by significant holdings of these additional fixed income assets.

The dominance of the USD reflects several factors such as the size and depth of its financial markets, and the U.S. dominance in global affairs. From an investment perspective, the USD is the ultimate safe-haven currency and during periods of heightened global risk, investors flock to the U.S. Treasury market. This has not changed over the last 25 years and it is still true today as shown by the rise of the USD when uncertainty in global markets rises.

Central banks may engineer economic growth and generate moderate but manageable inflation, but the stresses that have accumulated on central bank balance sheets may be felt as reversing interest rates eventually happen. We will be carefully monitoring this.

 

 

Section 2: 4 Themes

 

Theme 1: Gold is a Safe Haven

Gold has long been recognized as a safe haven, an asset that investors seek out for protection and security during uncertain times. In early 2020, tensions in the Middle East, driven by the U.S.-Iran confrontation, supported safe-haven flows, pushing the gold price to a six-year high.

Other reasons for the strength in gold prices include:

• A technical breakout
• Bullish positioning in derivatives markets
• Light trading volumes
• Portfolio rebalancing at the end of 2019 especially as investors hedged risk asset allocations
• Federal Reserve repo activity
• Rebalancing ahead of 2020

According to the World Gold Council, of the current average global annual demand of about 4350 tonnes, about 10% of that comes from central banks. With purchases of over 600 tonnes in 2018, central banks bought more than their long-term average in that year. This trend has continued in 2019 and early 2020.x As we have highlighted in this report, gold’s behavior is highly correlated with the US dollar. And today, the lack of credit risk makes gold an attractive reserve monetary asset among central banks.

Over the last few decades, investors have shunned gold because it doesn’t produce any income, and therefore the opportunity cost of holding it was significant. In the current era of low and negative interest rates, that opportunity cost is less of a factor, thus highlighting gold’s diversification benefits.

While bonds and cash may also increase portfolio efficiency, gold is an attractive alternative because it is less impacted by interest rates. Rising interest rates put downward pressure on bond valuations, which can make holding them less attractive to investors. Additionally, negative interest rates may push cash yields to negative, on a real basis. Gold also has a low correlation to equities and a historically low correlation to bonds. Moreover, this low correlation to major asset classes holds in both times of expansion and recession. During times of expansion, goods and products that rely on gold, such as jewelry and technology, are often in high demand. In times of recession, there is a gold surge among people seeking a financial safe haven. The benefits of low correlation to stocks and bonds aren’t limited to any one type of investor or one particular risk profile.

The most recent annual statistics from the World Gold Council indicate that the main buyers of gold in 2018 were the central banks of Russia (274 tonnes), Turkey (51 tonnes), Kazakhstan (51 tonnes), India (42 tonnes) and Hungary (28 tonnes). China, which only bought 10 tonnes in 2018, increased its gold purchases in 2019.xi

The Fed began reducing their balance sheet in 2018 but reversed this decision in the second half of 2019. They began regular repurchase market injections totaling nearly US$500 billion in the fourth quarter of 2019.xii This activity has continued into 2020 and has been described by some market participants simply as another form of QE – often dubbed “QE light” – causing some investors to worry about liquidity in the Treasury market as a whole. Historically, expansions of QE have led to increases in the gold price.

As highlighted in this report, for several countries, diversification away from US dollar assets has a strategic component. Not only does gold not have a default risk, it is not a title that has to be enforced via Western-based courts nor is it dependent on the U.S.-led financial system.

 

The Fed began to increase their balance sheet in Q4 2019

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL

 

Theme 2: Oil Prices and Geopolitical Risk

Early in January 2020, in a “flight-to-safety” move following the bombings of U.S. bases in Iraq, gold and oil both rallied sharply but following the announcement that Iran was “standing down,” oil dipped while gold was up. And while gold is one of the strongest performing asset classes this year, oil is one of the weakest.xiii

From the perspective of the oil market, there has been a major structural change to the market that may offer an explanation. In the past, oil prices were the main transmission mechanism from major Gulf conflicts to the broader global economy and financial markets. However, the U.S. is now a net exporter of petroleum products, which was not the case during either the first or second Gulf War. The U.S. has essentially achieved energy independence and it can now use its own supplies to offset the impact of Middle Eastern supply shocks. It appears that oil market participants would need to see sustained physical market disruption to justify adding significant risk premia to energy prices.

 

U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products

SOURCE: U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION

 

The law of unintended consequences is hard at work when one considers any type of escalation in the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. And while the Strait of Hormuz has not been blocked, the option cannot be completely ruled out. It is important to think through the potential effects that a blockade could have not only on pricing or availability of crude but also on the geopolitical power transfer to a player like Russia, who is already seen as a strategic and diplomatic beneficiary of the U.S.-Iran conflict as well as the forced departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.

One of the reasons why OPEC has had such a great influence on the world’s crude market is its ability to increase (or decrease) production at any given time to dampen potential swings in oil prices. This ability hinges mostly on OPEC’s most powerful member (not only in terms of crude supply or spare capacity): Saudi Arabia, which disposes of OPEC’s bulk, and the world’s largest, crude spare capacity, approximately 1.5-2 million barrels per day.xiv With a blockade or severe limitation in traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia’s ability to release its spare capacity to the market would be greatly impeded.

U.S. shale producers who in the beginning benefit from high crude prices cannot be helpful in the same way Saudi Arabia can. Shale production can respond quickly to changing market conditions—much quicker than conventional crude production—but not as quick as a guarantee of an immediate release of additional volumes.

Important to consider also is that since U.S. crude production is in the hands of private companies, it is dictated by the market. It cannot be stopped at a certain price level but will flow until the market saturates. Also, U.S. crude quality differs substantially from Saudi crude. U.S. shale is lower in density (lighter) and sweeter (includes less sulfur) and, as such, cannot immediately act as a substitute.

One country that can benefit is Russia. Russia produces the “right” quality of crude (a substitute for the crude potentially locked in by the Strait of Hormuz), and according to a Russian government statement, it holds spare capacity of 500,000 barrels per day.xv The country cut its oil production due to an agreement with OPEC to prevent oil prices from falling too low in a high-supply environment. With oil prices rising and OPEC generally unable to provide relief, Russia and its oil companies (generally not happy with the production cuts) would surely jump at the opportunity to make the extra buck. Higher prices and production would also benefit Russian companies, as crude is traded in US dollars and the country needs currency reserves after the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Russian financial institutions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and interference in U.S. elections.

Russia also stands to gain geopolitical influence. Russia’s leverage in the global oil market has increased in the recent years. The country has become an important partner to OPEC in its struggle to remain the deciding entity to influence oil prices after the U.S. shale revolution unfolded. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could potentially strengthen Russia’s position in Asia since about three-fourths of the crude that passes through the Strait lands there.xvi This is added to the increasing importance of Russian natural gas that flows to the Chinese market via the newly opened Power of Siberia pipeline. If OPEC’s crude exports were significantly impaired by Iran-U.S. conflict, Russia would stand to profit handsomely in terms of both actual revenues and in terms of geopolitical influence, as recent military exercises among Russia, China, and Iran in the Gulf of Oman remind us.

 

Theme 3: Ultra-Low Rates

Central banks around the world cut interest rates in 2019 to stoke economic growth. Population aging and weaker productivity are set to constrain growth, softening demand for credit. Technology, low inflation, and demographics have fed the demand for fixed income securities and driven interest rates down around the world. Ultra-low interest rates have enhanced household wealth by boosting prices for housing and equities while at the same time hurting savers and pensioners.

Adding in globalization and a slowdown in Europe, an inability to get the economy moving in Japan and the need of the central bank to react have all continued to feed the move to zero and negative rates.

The era of extraordinarily low interest rates has forced central banks to become more creative in responding to periods of economic weakness. They are now in a trap that forces these banks to rely on unconventional monetary policies, including forward guidance, quantitative easing, funding for credit, and negative interest rates, which all may turn out to be less effective than traditional rate cuts.

The amount of global debt trading at negative yields hit a record US$17 trillion in August 2019, as more investors were willing to accept a negative rate in exchange for a safe place to park their money.xvii

In Canada, we have not seen sub-zero rates on Canadian dollar issuance. But US$85 billion of mostly euro-denominated Canadian debt (provincial, corporate, and covered bonds) is trading at negative yields.xviii Outside of Canada, positive real yields after inflation exist in long-term interest rates in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and the 30-year treasury in the U.S. The 10-year treasury, at the headline level, remains negative.

Negative interest rates are toxic for the financial system. For now, the global financial system has an out in that the reserve currency of the world, the US Dollar, has the highest positive rates, providing a buffer for now.

 

Theme 4: Slowing Global Growth, Tariffs, and Trade

Global GDP is on track to rise 3%, the slowest pace in a decade, reflecting sagging business confidence that undermined investment and trade. Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting rollercoaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Manufacturers were hardest hit, with the global measure of activity contracting for six straight months. Business investment in OECD countries edged up 1% in the first half of 2019, a marked slowing from a 3%-plus average pace in 2017-18. Amid these difficulties, the services sector held up. As we have highlighted in this report, central bankers have responded by injecting stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going.

In the U.S., easier financial conditions did little to help manufacturers in 2019. The factory sector entered its worst slump since 2015-16 and the ISM manufacturing index declined steadily throughout the year, hitting a cycle low in December. Temporary shutdowns in the auto sector and aerospace have added to the sector’s woes, but the bigger issue last year was escalating trade tensions. A recent Fed paper analyzing U.S. import tariffs found that, in more tariff-exposed manufacturing industries, the negative effects of higher input costs and other countries’ retaliatory measures more than offset any positives from import protection. Added to this is the negative impact of trade policy uncertainty on business investment, which had knock-on effects for manufacturers via slower orders for capital goods.

The nation’s economy is becoming increasingly concentrated in large cities and by the coasts, and less so in rural counties. This leads to the question of whether rural areas will be increasingly left behind. The growing concentration of the country’s economic activity could impact a variety of things from infrastructure spending to labor mobility, but it’s unclear how rural areas will fare as their share of economic output continues to dwindle.

The anticipated USMCA ratification and a preliminary U.S.-China trade deal should resolve some of the trade concerns. On New Year’s Eve President Trump tweeted that he would sign a Phase One trade deal with China on January 15th at the White House, and that he would travel to Beijing at an unspecified later date to begin discussions on a Phase Two agreement. Phase One includes a partial rollback of tariffs imposed in September on $120 billion of Chinese goods and cancellation of those planned to implementation on December 15, 2019, mainly in exchange for higher Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities over the next two years.xix This truce should allow China’s export sector to gain momentum in 2020 although uncertainty about the path ahead will remain high.

Unfortunately, substantial tariffs remain in place and the Trump administration’s unpredictable approach to trade policy will continue to cause some firms to postpone investment plans. Uncertainty leading up to the November 2020 election could also delay some capital spending.

 

 

Section 3. Investment Outlook

 

Slowing Global Growth and Inverted Yield Curves Leads Us to a Stagnation Forecast for the Next Twelve Months

SOURCE: FRAME GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT

 

Frame Global Asset Management considers these trends and factors them into our outlook for the economy in our twelve-month forward period. We look back to periods of similar economic behavior and use this information to predict the future behavior of the asset classes that we consider. Our investment process allows us to adapt for non-traditional monetary policy and other exogenous variables.

 

 

Section 4. December 2019 Portfolio Models

We have maintained our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy as growth is capped over our forecast time horizon of twelve months.

As uncertainty revs up, global GDP is on track to rise 3% in 2019, the slowest pace in a decade. Global trade volumes fell in 2019 for the first time since the Great Recession, reflecting rollercoaster U.S.-China trade negotiations, a lack of progress on Brexit, and political unrest in Hong Kong and some Latin American countries. Central bankers have responded with stimulus to keep the decade-long expansion going. While low interest rates and accommodative financial conditions will likely prolong the expansion, much will depend on geopolitical influences. We are monitoring these developments and have concluded that our Stagnation outlook for the U.S. economy over our forecast time horizon of twelve months still stands, with a recession likely in 2021.

We will continue to monitor the data for growth, inflation, and recession signals from employment, consumer spending, business sentiment, Fed policy, the yield curve, inflation, and global economics. Our focus is on protecting portfolios from downside risk, and we believe that our investment process is working to achieve that goal.

 

Deborah Frame, CFA, MBA

President and Chief Investment Officer

January 14, 2020

 

iTrading Economics. U.S. GDP. January 2020.
iiiU.S. Energy Information Administration. What Countries are the top producers and consumers of oil? January 2020.
ivU.S. Energy Information Administration. January 2020.
vNatural Resources Canada. Crude Oil Facts. January 2020.
viNatural Resources Canada. Crude Oil Facts. January 2020.
viiCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
viiiCastelli, Massimiliano; Salman, Philipp. (2019) Time to evolve. UBS Asset Management.
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